State ex rel. Stone v. Cnty. Court of Vernon Cnty.

• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: WAGNER
• Citation: State ex rel. Stone v. Cnty. Court of Vernon Cnty., 53 Mo. 128 (Mo. 1873)
• Decision Date: 31 July 1873
• Parties: STATE OF MISSOURI, ex rel. STONE, Respondent, v. THE COUNTY COURT OF VERNON COUNTY, Appellant.

53 Mo. 128

STATE OF MISSOURI, ex rel. STONE, Respondent,

v.THE COUNTY COURT OF VERNON COUNTY, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

July Term, 1873.

Appeal from Vernon Circuit Court.

Wight, Jackson & Burton, for Appellant.

I. The act of 1873 is not amendatory of, but repeals the act of 1872 by the most emphatic language. The court cannot construe a law that can only have one manifest meaning. (Sedg. Stat. Law, 121.) There is no question here of repeal by implication. (Newkirk vs. Chapman, 17 Ill., 344.)

II. A subsequent statute, revising the whole subject of a former one, and intended as a substitute for it, although it contains no express words to that effect, operates as a repeal of the former. (Mich. Canal vs. City of Chicago, 14 Ill., 336; Bartlett vs. King, 12 Mass., 537; Nichols vs. Squire, 5 Pick., 168.)

III. After the repeal of the law, there could undoubtedly be no election of officers under that law, and the new law must be looked to for a full organization. (Sedg. Stat. Law, 129, 130; Pot. Dwar. Stat., 160.)

Johnson & Buller, and Thos. Van Swearingen, for Respondent.

I. Though the act of 1873 purports to repeal that of 1872, it is in reality merely a revision thereof, embodying the same principles, and to a great extent literally re-enacting its provisions. Sections 1, 2, and 3 of Article 1 of both acts are precisely the same, and section 4 of Article 1 is substantially so.

These sections are the only ones which make provision for the adoption of the act, and when found in the new statute, must be construed as continuations of the old, and not as new enactments. (State vs. Fiala, 49 Mo., 319; St. Louis vs. Alexander, 23 Mo., 483; Mullen vs. Guest, 6 Texas, 275; W. S. 897, § 5, 3rd Ed.]

II. In construing a statute, the intention of the Legislature is always to be sought, and, when manifestly ascertained, will often control the strict letter of the law, and it will not be presumed, that the Legislature intended to do an unreasonable thing unless such intention is indicated in express terms so as to be unavoidable. [Neenan vs. Smith, 50 Mo., 525; State vs. King, 44 Mo, 283; Ryegate vs. Wardsboro, 30 Ver., 746; Sedg. Const. Lim., 124.]

III. The title of the act of 1873 also shows that it was merely intended as a revision of the former law. In this country, the title of an act is one of the guides to its interpretation. [Const. Mo. Art. 4, § 31; Smith's Const. Constr'n., § 643.]

IV. The repeal of the statute of 1872 would not affect any thing which was already done and completed, nor any right which was acquired under the old law. (Smith's Const. Constr, § 759; W. S. 894, 895, §§ 3, 5.)

WAGNER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

This was a proceeding by mandamus, instituted in the Circuit Court of of Vernon county, to compel the County Court of that county to district the county into four compact districts for the purpose of electing justices to constitute the future County Court, and to order an election therefor. A peremptory writ was ordered, and the defendants appealed the case to this court.

From the pleadings and exhibits it appears, that under the provisions of the act entitled, “an act to provide for the organization of counties into municipal townships, and to further provide for the local government thereof,” approved, March 18, 1872, a proper petition was presented to the County Court, and an order made submitting to the qualified voters of Vernon county, at the general election in November, 1872, the question whether they would adopt the provisions of the above mentioned act. At the election the proposition received a large majority of the votes cast. Subsequently the County Court divided the county into a suitable number of townships to meet the requirements of the people under the proposed new system. But afterwards, at the May term, 1873, the County Court refused to district the county, and to order an election for justices to constitute the new County Court, upon the ground, that the act of March 24, 1873 repealed the act of March 18, 1872, and that Vernon county had not adopted the township organization law, so as to authorize the County Court to district the county and order an election. The sole and only question therefore presented is, whether the act of 1873, to more fully provide for the organization of counties into municipal townships, and to more fully provide for the local government thereof, has any application to Vernon county, so as to require the authorities to proceed under it. The two acts are upon the same subject and intended to accomplish the same object. They must accordingly be construed together in arriving at the legislative intent. There is no doubt of the correctness of the general rule, that lege posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. But this rule has its limitations.

The act of 1873 is really nothing more than a revision of the act of 1872. Some of the provisions in the two acts are identical, and they all relate to the same subject matter. The...