State ex rel. Strong v. Griffith, SC 95043

• Decision Date: 07 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. SC 95043,SC 95043
• Citation: 462 S.W.3d 732
• Parties: State ex rel. Richard Strong, Petitioner, v. Cindy Griffith, Warden, Potosi Correctional Center, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

462 S.W.3d 732

State ex rel. Richard Strong, Petitioner

v.Cindy Griffith, Warden, Potosi Correctional Center, Respondent.

No. SC 95043

Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc .

Opinion issued June 7, 2015

Strong was represented by Jennifer Herndon, an attorney in Florissant, (314) 280–4734, and Michael J. Gorla, an attorney in St. Louis, (314) 621–1617.

The state was represented by Michael Spillane, Terrence Messonnier, Gregory Goodwin, Caroline M. Coulter, Stephen Hawke and Jessica McKee of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City, (573) 751–3321.

Opinion

Patricia Breckenridge, Judge

On April 23, 2015, this Court issued a warrant for the execution of Richard Strong on June 9, 2015. On June 4, 2015, Mr. Strong filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming his execution would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and article I, section 21 of the Missouri Constitution because his severe mental illness at the time of his crimes makes him unfit to be executed. He asks this Court to prohibit the state from executing him. In his petition, Mr. Strong fails to allege facts that would prove entitlement to a writ of habeas corpus because he could have raised his claim at trial, on appeal, or during post-conviction relief proceedings. Missouri provides statutory safeguards at both the guilt and penalty phase of trial to ensure that those with severe mental illness are not sentenced to the death penalty. See sections 552.020, 552.030, 565.032.3(2), (6).¹ Habeas review of a conviction is not appropriate where a defendant could have raised claims at trial, on direct appeal, or during post-conviction relief proceedings according to the state's procedural rules but did not do so for reasons internal to the defense. State ex rel. Woodworth v. Denney, 396 S.W.3d 330, 337 (Mo. banc 2013). Moreover, habeas review does not provide “duplicative and unending challenges to the finality of a judgment,” so it is not appropriate to review claims already raised on direct appeal or during post-conviction proceedings. Id. Because Mr. Strong failed to raise relevant mental illness claims at trial due to a lack of evidence or a defense strategy and already raised a claim of his trial counsel's ineffectiveness for not presenting mitigating factors related to his mental condition during the penalty phase of his trial, Mr. Strong cannot overcome the procedural bar for not timely raising his current claim. Accordingly, Mr. Strong does not raise a legally cognizable claim for habeas relief related to his claim that he was mentally ill at the time of the murders.

Moreover, pursuant to the ban in the Eighth Amendment in the United States Constitution on cruel and unusual punishment, a prisoner may not be executed whose current mental illness “ ‘prevents him from comprehending the reasons for the penalty or its implications' ” or “those who are [currently] unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 957, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 168 L.Ed.2d 662, (2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Ford v. Wainwright , 477 U.S. 399, 417, 422, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986). Mr. Strong, however, does not claim that his current mental condition makes him incompetent to be executed and, without a substantial threshold showing otherwise, he is presumed competent because he was competent to stand trial. Mr. Strong does not make such a substantial threshold showing so he does not raise a cognizable competency claim. Accordingly, having failed to raise any legally cognizable habeas corpus claim, this Court denies his habeas petition.

Factual and Procedural Background

In 2003, a jury convicted Richard Strong of two counts of first degree murder for killing his girlfriend and her two-year-old daughter. Mr. Strong was sentenced to death for the murders. This Court affirmed his convictions and death sentence on direct appeal in 2004. State v. Strong, 142 S.W.3d 702 (Mo. banc 2004) (Strong I ). In 2008, Mr. Strong's motion for post-conviction relief was overruled, and this Court affirmed that decision. Strong v. State, 263 S.W.3d 636 (Mo. banc 2008) (Strong II ). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied Mr. Strong's federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed that decision. Strong v. Roper, 737 F.3d 506 (8th Cir.2013) (Strong III ).

A. Mr. Strong's Crimes²

On October 23, 2000, police officers were dispatched to the home of Mr. Strong's girlfriend, Eva Washington, following a disconnected 911 call. The officers knocked on both the front and back doors, but no one responded. Mr. Strong eventually came to the back door, where the officers asked about his wife and children. Mr. Strong responded that Ms. Washington and the children were asleep. He then stepped outside and closed the door behind him. When asked again about Ms. Washington and the children, Mr. Strong replied that Ms. Washington was at work and the children were inside the apartment. The officers asked to check on the children, but Mr. Strong informed them that he had locked himself out. Mr. Strong then knocked on the door, calling for someone to open it. The officers noticed that Mr. Strong was sweating profusely, had dark stains on the knees of his jeans, and had blood on his hands. When no one answered, the officers kicked in the door. Mr. Strong ran away. After he was apprehended, Mr. Strong told the officers, “[Y]ou should have shot me, they're both dead, I killed them.”

Inside the apartment, the officers found the bodies of Ms. Washington and her two-year-old daughter, Zandrea Thomas. The bodies were located on the floor in the back bedroom, where the police also discovered a butcher knife. Ms. Washington and Mr. Strong's three-month-old child was in the room as well but was unharmed. An autopsy revealed that Ms. Washington had been stabbed twenty-one times and had five slash wounds. Zandrea had been stabbed nine times and had twelve slash wounds. Both Ms. Washington and Zandrea were disemboweled, and Mr. Strong had attempted to decapitate Zandrea.

A jury convicted Mr. Strong of two counts of first degree murder. Mr. Strong was sentenced to death for the murders on the recommendation of the jury. The jury found the state had proven two statutory aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt. Strong II, 142 S.W.3d at 710 n. 3 ; see section 565.032.1. Pursuant to section 565.032.2, the jury found Mr. Strong had committed each murder while “engaged in the commission or attempted commission of another unlawful homicide” and that the murders were “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, or depravity of mind[.]” Id. The jury found that these aggravators were not outweighed by mitigating circumstances, and, therefore, justified a sentence of death. See section 565.032.1.

B. Mr. Strong's Trial

Prior to his trial, Mr. Strong's counsel requested an evaluation of Mr. Strong's competency to stand trial under sections 522.020 and 522.030. The trial court appointed Dr. John Rabun who “attempted to evaluate Strong on two separate occasions, but Strong declined to be interviewed.” Strong III, 737 F.3d at 515. The court then ordered Mr. Strong admitted to the Fulton State Hospital for observation. Id. After two weeks of observation, Dr. Rabun concluded that Mr. Strong “had the capacity to know and appreciate the nature, quality, and wrongfulness of his conduct,” “had the capacity to form the intent as charged,” and did not have “any signs or symptoms to suggest [he] was mentally ill.” Id. at 515–16. Mr. Strong's counsel discussed this report with Mr. Strong and his family but did not retain an independent doctor or mitigation specialist to further evaluate and investigate Mr. Strong's mental condition and did not raise the issue of his mental health during the guilt or sentencing phase of Mr. Strong's trial. Id. at 516, 519–20.

C. Mr. Strong's Post–Conviction Proceedings

In his post-conviction proceedings, Mr. Strong asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for not adequately investigating and presenting all available mitigating factors during the penalty phase of his trial. Mr. Strong contended that trial counsel failed to adequately question two family members about his prior mental condition. Strong II, 263 S.W.3d at 652–53. Mr. Strong also contended that trial counsel was ineffective for not seeking an independent mental health examination for Mr. Strong and should have called experts such as Dr. Wanda Draper and Dr. Marilyn Hutchinson to prove that the murders were caused by his severe mental illness.

Id. at 653. Notably, Mr. Strong did not contend that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present a defense during the guilt phase of his trial that Mr. Strong was not criminally liable by reason of a mental disease or defect under section 552.030.

In denying his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the motion court found trial counsel conducted a reasonable investigation of Mr. Strong's family members. Id. Regarding his claim that trial counsel should have presented expert testimony of his mental condition, “the motion court found the testimony of Dr. Draper and Dr. Hutchinson to be that of ‘paid experts with a biased opinion,’ that their opinions were ‘limited’ and based on ‘one-sided information,’ and that ‘neither expert would have benefited or been helpful’ to Mr. Strong.” Strong II, 263 S.W.3d at 653 n. 11. The motion court ultimately found that trial counsel was not ineffective for not attempting to present such expert testimony. Id. at 653. Significantly, Mr. Strong's trial counsel had testified that counsel “believed that the best strategy was to show Mr. Strong was a good man, able to do good things—not to blame Mr. Strong's actions on a bad childhood” that “could appear to a jury as making excuses, which might alienate or...