State ex rel. Summerfield v. Tyler

• Decision Date: 18 May 1896
• Citation: 14 Wash. 495,45 P. 31
• Parties: STATE EX REL. SUMMERFIELD v. TYLER, COUNTY AUDITOR.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

45 P. 31

14 Wash. 495

STATE EX REL. SUMMERFIELD v. TYLER, COUNTY AUDITOR.

Supreme Court of Washington

May 18, 1896

Appeal from superior court, Spokane county; Norman Buck, Judge.

Action by the state of Washington, on the relation of J Summerfield, against Horace W. Tyler, as auditor of Spokane county, to compel the payment of a judgment in favor of relator against such county. From a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Samuel R. Stern, for appellant.

J. W Feighan, Pros. Atty., for respondent.

HOYT C.J.

By this proceeding, relator sought to compel the payment of a judgment against Spokane county. Such proceedings were had and such a showing made, as to entitle relator to the relief sought if the judgment was such that it could be enforced against the county. Such judgment was rendered more than a year before the commencement of this proceeding, and was so rendered in the superior court for Spokane county, and no appeal had been prosecuted therefrom. It follows that any error which may have been committed by the court in which such judgment was rendered in the action would constitute no defense to this proceeding, unless the error was of such a nature as to render the judgment void. Appellant might safely concede that error was committed in the rendition of the judgment, and yet be entitled to the relief prayed for. The only ground on which the respondent could successfully defend was that the judgment was absolutely void for want of jurisdiction. It is not claimed but that process was regularly served in the action in which such judgment was rendered. Hence, if the complaint was such as to give the court jurisdiction of a subject-matter which under any circumstances could be the foundation of a judgment against the county, it must follow that jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the person of the defendant had been obtained in the action in which the judgment was rendered, and that for that reason it was not void, but, at most, simply voidable.

It appeared from the papers, as well as from the process served upon the county, in the action in which the judgment was rendered, that it was sought to charge the county by garnishee process as a debtor of the principal defendant in the action; and it is claimed on the part of the respondent that there is no power in any court to render a judgment against a county as garnishee defendant. The appellant contends that a county is subject to garnishment the same as a private corporation, and that, if it is not, the judgment rendered against it was only erroneous, and not void; that, the subject of garnishment being within the jurisdiction of the superior court, it had jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and, having obtained jurisdiction of the person of the county by the service of process, had such jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the person of the respondent as to authorize it to enter a judgment. It is familiar law that a judgment rendered in an action in which a court has jurisdiction of the person, upon a complaint which does not state a cause of action, is not void, but simply erroneous, and it is upon this principle that the contention of the appellant that the judgment in question is not void is founded. But in our opinion, if the county was not subject to garnishee process, the complaint in the action in which the judgment in question was rendered not only failed to state a cause of action, but affirmatively showed that no judgment could be rendered thereon against the county. It must be conceded that if, under the legislation of the state, the county could not be sued at all, a judgment rendered against it would be absolutely void; and, in our opinion, a judgment will be equally void which was rendered in a proceeding to which the county could not, under the law, be made a party. If the process served upon the county was one which was not authorized by the statute, no rights could be obtained by such service. If it commanded the county to do that which, under the statute, it had no right to do, it was without force. It follows that, in our opinion, the court had no jurisdiction of any subject-matter which could authorize a judgment against the county, and likewise had no such jurisdiction of the person of the county as to authorize the entry of judgment against it if the county was not subject to garnishment. If, on the other hand, it was subject to garnishment, the claim that the judgment was void by reason of the fact that the particular debt which was sought to be reached was not subject to garnishment cannot be sustained. Such a fact might be sufficient to show that the court committed error in the rendition of the judgment, but would not be sufficient to show that it acted without jurisdiction in so doing.

It follows that the material question is as to whether or not a county is, under our statute, subject to garnishment. This is an important question, and has been elaborately argued by counsel. The authorities upon the subject are not entirely uniform, but from the cases cited in the briefs, and from such other cases as we have been enabled to examine, we are satisfied that an overwhelming weight of authority is in favor of the proposition that counties are not subject to garnishment. It is held that a county is organized for public purposes, and should not be made the instrument by...