State ex rel. Sutton v. Keadle
| Citation | 342 S.E.2d 103,176 W.Va. 138 |
| Decision Date | 19 December 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 16814,16814 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. John S. SUTTON v. Thomas H. KEADLE, et al. |
| Court | Supreme Court of West Virginia |
Syllabus by the Court
As long as a defendant is being held for trial in one county in this State, he is not entitled to have the three-term rule, W.Va.Code, 62-3-21, run in the county where other criminal charges are pending in this State. If, however, a defendant is incarcerated under a sentence in one county and there are criminal charges pending in another county in this State, then the prosecutor in the county where the charges are pending must exercise reasonable diligence to secure the defendant's return for trial, otherwise the three-term rule, W.Va.Code, 62-3-21, is applicable. To the extent that Syllabus Points 2 and 3 of State ex rel. Smith v. DeBerry, 146 W.Va. 534, 120 S.E.2d 504 (1961), and the Syllabus of Ex Parte Hollandsworth v. Godby, 93 W.Va. 543, 117 S.E. 369 (1923), vary from these principles, they are overruled.
Randall C. Levine, Buckhannon, for relator.
Silas B. Taylor, Deputy Atty. Gen., Charleston, for respondents.
In this original proceeding in prohibition, the relator, John S. Sutton, seeks to prevent the Honorable Thomas H. Keadle, judge of the Circuit Court of Upshur County, and Alexander M. Ross, prosecuting attorney of Upshur County, the respondents, from trying him on a two-count felony indictment on the ground that the State failed to afford him a speedy trial as statutorily guaranteed by W.Va.Code, 62-3-21.
The essential facts in this case are not in dispute; only their legal significance is debated. The relator was indicted during the January 1984 term of the Circuit Court of Upshur County on felony charges of breaking and entering and grand larceny. The three regular annual terms of that circuit court commence on the second Monday in January, April, and September. W.Va.Code, 51-2-1z (1951).
At the time the indictment was returned, the relator was incarcerated in the Harrison County jail serving a sentence for an unrelated conviction. The relator was brought from the Harrison County jail in February, 1984, to appear before the Upshur County Circuit Court. The circumstances surrounding his release from jail are not shown by the record before us. At that appearance, the relator's counsel and the assistant prosecuting attorney of Upshur County made a joint motion to continue the case until the next regular term of the circuit court. The joint motion was granted by order entered on February 29, 1984, and the case was continued to the April 1984 term of court. The relator was remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Harrison County and was ordered to reappear before the circuit court for further proceedings on April 9, 1984, the beginning of the April 1984 term.
The relator was returned to the Harrison County jail where he remained until October of 1984, when he was released from custody upon completion of his jail sentence. He was not brought back before the circuit court at the beginning of the April 1984 term as had been provided for in the court's order, and the prosecution made no effort to secure his presence for trial during the period of his incarceration. After his release, the relator remained in Harrison County where he had formerly resided. No effort was made to prosecute the relator during the April 1984, September 1984, and January 1985 regular terms of court.
On May 20, 1985, the relator voluntarily appeared before the circuit court and presented a motion to dismiss the indictment and discharge him from prosecution on those charges, asserting that the State had failed to prosecute him within three regular terms of court after the term in which he was indicted and was therefore barred from prosecuting him under the express provisions of W.Va.Code, 62-3-21.
The circuit court judge, relying on the authority of State ex rel. Smith v. DeBerry, 146 W.Va. 534, 120 S.E.2d 504 (1961), found that the Harrison County Circuit Court had exclusive custody and control over the relator during his incarceration in the county jail and that the relator was effectively outside or without the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Upshur County from January, 1984, until the relator was released in October, 1984. Consequently, he held that there was no violation of the three-term statute. The trial court judge also found that the prosecuting attorney of Upshur County had filed a detainer with the sheriff's office in Harrison County, but that the relator was released without the Upshur County authorities being notified.
Some confusion in our law has been engendered by Ex Parte Hollandsworth v. Godby, 93 W.Va. 543, 117 S.E. 369 (1923), and Syllabus Point 2 of DeBerry, where we stated: "Where a defendant is incarcerated in a county jail on a charge contained in an indictment returned in that county, he is not, within the meaning of Code, 62-3-21, as amended, held for trial on a charge alleged to have been committed in another county." The defendant in DeBerry had been arrested on a felonious assault charge in Tyler County in March, 1960, and had been held in jail. Subsequently, the victim died. In the July 1960 term, the defendant was indicted for murder. In the meantime, he was indicted on five felonies in the April 1960 term of the Pleasants County Circuit Court and these indictments were served on him while he was incarcerated in the Tyler County jail.
In March, 1961, the defendant entered a plea to voluntary manslaughter in Tyler County and was sentenced to the State penitentiary. He was later brought to the Circuit Court of Pleasants County in its April 1961 term for trial on the five felonies. The court concluded that he had not been held for trial in Pleasants County during the time he had been incarcerated in Tyler County and denied him relief.
However, in Hollandsworth the defendant was arrested in Mercer County on a felony warrant issued in Raleigh County. During the course of being arrested in Mercer County, the defendant injured one of the arresting officers and was charged with felonious assault and taken to the Mercer County jail. He remained in the Mercer County jail until he was sentenced to the State penitentiary on the felonious assault charge. After he was in the penitentiary for approximately one year, he was brought back for trial in Raleigh County. He claimed the benefit of the three-term rule which we found applicable and discharged him from further prosecution.
In Hollandsworth, we concluded that the beginning phrase in W.Va.Code, 62-3-21, "[e]very person charged ... and remanded to a court of competent jurisdiction" meant that if the defendant is held for trial by way of being arrested this would trigger the three-term rule. In DeBerry, we said that the defendant was in the exclusive custody of Tyler County and, therefore, was not held by Pleasants County. In this situation, we held, in effect, that the three-term statute had been tolled.
Without being unduly critical of either case, it would appear that the proper answer to the question of when the three-term rule begins to run where a defendant is under indictment in more than one county in this State cannot be resolved by trying to determine when a defendant is remanded 1 or held for trial.
It is apparent from the language of the three-term statute 2 that it begins to run at the term subsequent to the term that the indictment or presentment is returned to a court of competent jurisdiction. 3 This is a fact that is independent of the defendant's physical location. It is true that the statute tolls the three-term rule for certain specified reasons. 4 However, these exemptions do not cover the situation we have in the present case where the defendant is being held in another county in this State.
We have often stated that the three-term rule statute is a legislative enactment which is designed to afford the defendant a speedy trial as mandated by Article III, Section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See State ex rel. Shorter v. Hey, 170 W.Va. 249, 294 S.E.2d 51 (1981); State v. Young, 167 W.Va. 312, 280 S.E.2d 104 (1981); State v. Underwood, 130 W.Va. 166, 43 S.E.2d 61 (1947).
We do not believe that where the State is diligently pursuing prosecution of the defendant in one county that the charges against the defendant in the other county are then subject to the three-term rule. To hold otherwise would result in a total confusion of orderly trial procedures and require the defendant to be shuttled back and forth between the two counties where the charges are pending. The situation would, of course, become even more exacerbated if more than two counties were involved or if there were multiple charges in one county that necessitated multiple trials. 5
Oddly enough this matter has not received a great deal of attention by other courts. This may be in part due to the fact that in some states legislative enactments have taken care of the problem, as illustrated by Slaughter v. State, 683 S.W.2d 746 (Tex.Ct.App.1984). There the court concluded that the period the defendant was held for trial in one county was not to be counted on criminal proceedings pending in another county by virtue of Article 32A.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (Vernon Supp.1984). 6
The Illinois Supreme Court, after noting the lack of precedent in other states, settled the question in People v. Davis, 97 Ill.2d 1, 72 Ill.Dec. 272, 452 N.E.2d 525 (1983). It had a general speedy trial statute, 7 and followed the rule developed by its intermediate appellate courts:
"However, the vast majority of appellate court decisions resolving the issue have stated that where a defendant 'is in custody awaiting trial in one county and there is a charge pending against him in another county, * * * he cannot be deemed to be in custody for the...
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