State ex rel. Sutton v. Mazzone

• Decision Date: 07 December 2001
• Docket Number: No. 29958.,29958.
• Citation: 210 W.Va. 331,557 S.E.2d 385
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of West Virginia ex rel. Ryan A. SUTTON, Petitioner, v. Honorable James P. MAZZONE, Judge of the Circuit Court of Ohio County, and Scott R. Smith, Prosecuting Attorney for Ohio County, Respondents.

557 S.E.2d 385

210 W.Va. 331

STATE of West Virginia ex rel. Ryan A. SUTTON, Petitioner, v. Honorable James P. MAZZONE, Judge of the Circuit Court of Ohio County, and Scott R. Smith, Prosecuting Attorney for Ohio County, Respondents.

No. 29958.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted September 5, 2001.

Decided December 7, 2001.

Mark A. Blevins, Esq., Assistant Public Defender, Wheeling, West Virginia, Attorney for Petitioner.

Honorable James P. Mazzone, respondent pro se.

Scott R. Smith, Esq., Prosecuting Attorney, William J. Ihlenfeld, II, Esq., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Stephen L. Vogrin, Esq., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, Attorneys for Prosecuting Attorney.

PER CURIAM:

In this original proceeding in prohibition, the relator, Ryan A. Sutton, who has been charged with homicide, prays that this Court prohibit the trial judge, the judge of the Circuit Court of Ohio County, from compelling his attorney to produce certain information prior to trial. He also claims that the trial judge has improperly placed certain conditions upon the independent forensic examination, which he has requested, of the alleged murder weapon and the victim's medical and autopsy reports.

I. FACTS

The relator, Ryan A. Sutton, was charged with committing homicide through the use of a deadly weapon in Ohio County, and prior to trial, the trial court acting pursuant to Rule 42.01 of the West Virginia Trial Court Rules, ordered that the relator, as well as the State, file statements of facts to be proved at trial, as well as the names and addresses of potential witnesses.¹ Additionally, in preparing for trial, the relator's attorney requested that the alleged murder weapon be turned over to an independent forensic expert for examination and testing. He also requested that the original medical and autopsy reports of the victim be turned over for examination. The trial court granted the relator's motions for an independent examination of the murder weapon and for an independent examination of the medical and autopsy reports, but required counsel for the relator to disclose the names of the experts whom he intended to employ, as well as their scientific backgrounds and the tests which they proposed to employ. In the present proceeding, the relator claims that the trial judge should be prohibited from requiring him to give a statement of his case and to provide a witness list in advance of jury selection. He argues that what the court has required him to do is to disclose his theory of the case, the State's weaknesses, as well as his attorney's work product.

Additionally, the relator claims that, given the fact that he has not requested any non-mandatory discovery from the State, the trial court has erred in requiring him to reveal the names of the experts he intended to employ to examine the murder weapon and the autopsy and medical reports, as well as their findings.

II. STANDARD FOR DETERMINING WHETHER PROHIBITION IS APPROPRIATE

In Syllabus Point 4 of State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W.Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996), this Court stated that:

In determining whether to entertain and issue the writ of prohibition for cases not involving an absence of jurisdiction but only where it is claimed that the lower tribunal exceeded its legitimate powers, this Court will examine five factors: (1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as direct appeal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal; (3) whether the lower tribunal's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether the lower tribunal's order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law; and (5) whether the lower tribunal's order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression. These factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue. Although all five factors need not be satisfied, it is clear that the third factor, the existence of clear error as a matter of law, should be given substantial weight.

III. DISCUSSION

The relator's first claim in the present proceeding is that the trial judge erred, and violated his constitutional rights, by requiring him to disclose, in advance of jury selection, his witnesses and their addresses, his theory of his case, the State's weaknesses and his attorney work product, when he did not seek mandatory discovery from the State.

After examining the documents submitted in the present proceeding, this Court finds that the trial court did order that both the relator and the prosecution submit witness lists, but the court did not order that the relator submit his theory of the case, the State's weaknesses, and his attorney's work product. All that the court's order states is that: "It is further ORDERED that both counsel for the Defendant and counsel for the State shall submit in writing by the close of business on July 20, 2001, all required material as contained in Trial Court Rule 42.01...."

Additionally, the trial judge states in his memorandum in response to the rule to show cause in the present proceeding:

[I]t has become apparent that Petitioner [Relator] is confused as to the meaning of the phrase "a statement of facts." It is this Respondent's opinion, and had been the intent of its ruling on June 12, 2001, that "a statement of facts" does not imply a summary of each witnesses [sic] testimony. Instead, the phrase is more broad and global, akin more to a pre-trial memorandum statement of contentions.

Indeed, upon review of the transcript, the trial court on several occasions attempted to limit the scope and discussion of the Rule 42.01 motion to include just the names and addresses of the witnesses, and not a summary of testimony.... Hence, as is reflected in both the June 12, 2001 transcript as well as the July 20, 2001 Order, the Respondent's ruling has been that both parties are obligated to the language of Rule 42.01, which ruling, to be clear, is that both parties are to disclose only the names and addresses of the witnesses that each may call at trial.

(Emphasis supplied.)

In State ex rel. Hill v. Reed, 199 W.Va. 89, 483 S.E.2d 89 (1996), this Court discussed the question of whether it was appropriate for a trial court to require a criminal defendant to disclose the names of his prospective witnesses. The Court recognized that jury selection was critical to the fairness of criminal trials and pointed out that a function of voir dire is to elicit possible prejudice possessed by prospective jurors which might affect their ability to render a verdict solely on the evidence under the instructions of the court. The Court also indicated that voir dire must be meaningful so that the parties may select a jury competent to judge and determine the facts in issue without bias, prejudice or partiality. The Court concluded that voir dire can not be effectively conducted unless the names of prospective jurors are disclosed prior to trial. As a consequence, the Court concluded that it was appropriate, and within the discretion of a trial judge, to require that the parties to a criminal proceeding prepare and submit to the court a list of their prospective witnesses, as well as the addresses of those witnesses.

The Court did, however, suggest in State ex rel. Hill v. Reed, id., that there was a countervailing concern involved in the pretrial identification of witnesses. That concern is that the process of identifying witnesses not be used as a subterfuge for discovery where such discovery is not otherwise appropriate. In State ex rel. Hill v. Reed, id., the relator did not seek disclosure pursuant to Rule 16 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Court noted that he was not, therefore, obligated to make reciprocal disclosure to the State. The Court stated that:

Rule 16 [of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure] basically permits discovery by the State only if the defendant has already requested and received certain things and provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(D) Defense Witnesses. If the defendant requests disclosure under subdivision (a)(1)(F) of this rule, upon compliance with such request by the state, the defendant, on the request of the state, shall furnish the state with a list of the names and addresses of the witnesses the defendant intends to call in the presentation of the case in chief. When a request for discovery of the names and addresses of witnesses has been made by the state, the defendant may be allowed to perpetuate the testimony of such witnesses in accordance with the provisions of Rule 15.

W.Va.R.Crim.P. 16(b)(D) (emphasis supplied).

Note 2, ...