State ex rel. Tanner v. Staeheli
| Decision Date | 03 September 1920 |
| Docket Number | 15764. |
| Citation | 112 Wash. 344,192 P. 991 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. TANNER, Atty. Gen., v. STAEHELI et ux. |
Department 2.
Appeal from Superior Court, Stevens County; D. H. Carey, Judge.
Action by the State of Washington, on relation of W. V. Tanner Attorney General, against Casper Staeheli and wife. From a judgment dismissing the action, relator appeals. Reversed and remanded for the entry of a judgment of escheat as prayed for in the complaint.
Lindsay L. Thompson, Atty. Gen., and Roscoe R. Fullerton, of Olympia for appellant.
Zent & Jesseph, of Spokane, for respondents.
This action was brought by the Attorney General to forfeit to the state a certain tract of land in Stevens county for the alleged reason that the defendants were aliens, and not citizens of the United States, and therefore prohibited from holding land in this state under the provisions of article 2, § 33, of the Constitution of this state. The trial of the case resulted in a judgment of dismissal. The Attorney General has appealed from that judgment.
The facts, as shown by the pleadings and the proofs, are these: At the time the action was begun the respondents were aliens, not citizens of the United States or the state of Washington, and had filed no declaration of intention to become citizens. They acquired the land in question by purchase after the state Constitution was adopted. This land is agricultural land, not valuable for minerals or used for manufacturing purposes, and was not acquired by inheritance or under mortgage or in the collection of a debt. The respondent Casper Staeheli was born in Switzerland. After he came to this country his father, in January, 1908, was duly naturalized. After that time the respondent, supposing that the naturalization of his father resulted in making him also a citizen of the United States, exercised all the rights of a citizen until the year 1917, when he was required to respond for military service. Then in reporting to answer his questionnaire he concluded he was not a citizen and claimed military exemption on that account because he was past 21 years of age when his father was naturalized in 1908. Thereafter, in February, 1918, the Attorney General brought this action. After the action was begun, and while it was pending, in June, 1918, respondent filed his declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States.
Under this state of facts the trial court was apparently of the opinion that section 33 of article 2 of the Constitution of this state is in conflict with the treaty of 1850 between the United States and Switzerland (11 Stat. 587), and that when respondent filed his declaration to become a citizen of the United States while the action was pending that declaration related back to the time when the respondent acquired the land. The Constitution, at section 33 of article 2, provides as follows:
We have held under the provisions of this section that a lease of land for 99 years to an alien is void ( State ex rel. Winston v. Morrison, 18 Wash. 664, 52 P. 228), and that a lease for 45 years made to a corporation where the majority of the stock was held by aliens was void ( State ex rel. Winston v. Hudson Land Co., 19 Wash. 85, 52 P. 574, 40 L. R. A. 430). We have also held that the right of an alien to hold real estate contrary to the provisions of this section can be questioned by the state alone. Prentice v. How, 84 Wash. 136, 146 P. 388. See, also, Abrams v. State, 45 Wash. 327, 88 P. 327, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 186, 122 Am. St. Rep. 914, 13 Ann. Cas. 527. So it necessarily follows that the judgment of the trial court was wrong, unless the fact that the respondent filed his declaration of intention to become a citizen after the action was begun avoids the constitutional provision above quoted, or unless the treaty of 1850 with Switzerland takes the case away from this section of our Constitution, because it is an admitted fact that at the time the action was brought the respondents were aliens holding the lands by purchase made after the Constitution of the state was adopted.
It is argued by respondent, in substance, that because Mr. Staeheli filed his declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States, this declaration relates back to the time he purchased the land, and therefore the state has no right to insist upon the forfeiture of the land. A number of cases are cited to the effect that title to lands held by an alien is not lost if the alien files his intention to become a citizen or becomes naturalized before judgment, for the reason that the naturalization relates back and confirms title in the land. This is no doubt the rule where the contest is between citizens, and the state itself has not begun proceedings to forfeit the title, because the state alone can question the title of real estate held by an alien. Prentice v. How, supra. No case has been cited to us which holds that an action to forfeit lands such as this by the state can be abated by the defendant merely filing a declaration of intention to become a citizen after the action is begun. If this be the rule, then the constitutional provision above quoted becomes of no practical effect, because any living alien may at any time avoid the constitutional provision by the very simple act of declaring his intention to become a citizen.
But in this case it is unnecessary to determine that question, for we are convinced that the declaration by respondent of intention to become a citizen was not made in good faith, as the Constitution...
To continue reading
Request your trial