State ex rel. The Fairfield Leader v. Ricketts, 89-550

Decision Date19 December 1990
Docket NumberNo. 89-550,89-550
Citation564 N.E.2d 486,56 Ohio St.3d 97
Parties, 18 Media L. Rep. 1825 The STATE, ex rel. THE FAIRFIELD LEADER v. RICKETTS, Mayor, et al.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Relator, The Fairfield Leader ("The Leader"), publishes a weekly newspaper that chronicles events in Fairfield County, Ohio. Respondents are officials of Fairfield County and of two local governments in that county, the village of Pickerington and Violet Township. The Fairfield County respondents include the clerk and all three members of the Fairfield County Board of County Commissioners--Lori Marinacci, Steven L. Goodyear, and Leo J. DeMastry. The Pickerington respondents include the mayor, manager, and clerk of the village of Pickerington, and six members of the Pickerington Village Council--David England, Louis V. Postage, Julie A. Divine, Lee A. Gray, David H. Lindsey, and David M. Peirano. The Violet Township respondents include the clerk and two members of the Violet Township Board of Trustees--Lyle E. Diley and John T. Ricketts.

On the morning of January 28, 1989, a Saturday, respondents, except for the clerks, met with other area officials at the Lenox Inn, in Reynoldsburg, Ohio. The meeting was arranged by Pickerington Mayor Rita Ricketts and Barry Zacks, a developer whose firm, Kinetic Ventures, had recently petitioned the Fairfield County Commissioners for annexation of land, situated outside Pickerington, in Violet Township. According to the Pickerington respondents, the January 28 meeting was designed to be a "workshop" or "retreat" for area officials to discuss their respective communities' combined concerns and plans for future development.

The public was not invited to attend this meeting. However, the editor of The Leader came to the meeting and asked to be admitted. Mayor Ricketts denied the editor's request and gave him two documents in explanation.

The first document given to the editor related the Pickerington Law Director's opinion that the "Sunshine Law [R.C. 121.22]" did not apply to a meeting "called by and paid for by a private developer wherein representatives from various governmental entities are invited to attend." The second document related the Fairfield County Prosecuting Attorney's opinion that the meeting could be legally closed to the public as long as the participants did not take formal action or deliberate on specific items of business. Mayor Ricketts had requested the Pickerington Law Director's opinion because, while she was aware of laws requiring access to public meetings, she "hoped" to provide "a chance for * * * [officials] to talk * * * [p]rivately." Fairfield County respondents sought the prosecuting attorney's opinion to see if they could properly attend the meeting to which Mayor Ricketts and Zacks had "invited" them.

The January 28 meeting lasted for approximately two and one-half hours during which Mayor Ricketts acted as moderator. (Zacks did not attend.) The respondents in attendance discussed annexation generally, including their respective concerns about water and sewer service, planning, and traffic. No specific proposals were made and no official action was taken at that time. However, the Fairfield County Commissioners later denied Kinetic Ventures' annexation petition, and the Pickerington Council later adopted a resolution to join Fairfield County in supporting a study about how to provide future water and sewer services to growth areas within the Violet Township area.

Shortly after the meeting, Mayor Ricketts issued a press release describing the discussions held on that day as "concerning the future development of Violet Township." The Leader, however, asked to inspect minutes of the meeting. Respondents refused this request because minutes had not been prepared during the meeting, and they saw no obligation to create minutes from notes that had been taken.

The Leader then filed this original action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel preparation of and access to minutes of the meeting and attorney fees from the Pickerington respondents.

Baker & Hostetler, David L. Marburger and Jane S. Arata, Cleveland, for relator.

Don S. McAuliffe, Law Director, Pickerington, for respondents Rita Ricketts et al.

David L. Landefeld, Pros. Atty., and Roy E. Hart, Lancaster, for respondents Lori Marinacci et al.

Paul D. Morehart, Lancaster, for respondents Lyle E. Diley et al.

Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, C. William O'Neill and Robert N. Webner, Columbus, urging allowance for amici curiae, The Plain Dealer Publishing Co. et al.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., Simon B. Karas, Shawn H. Nau, Columbus and Kirk T. Albrecht, Massillon, urging allowance for amicus curiae, Attorney General of Ohio.

PER CURIAM.

This case presents three questions for our review. First, we must decide if respondents have a clear legal duty to prepare and make available for public inspection minutes of the January 28 meeting. Second, we must decide if a writ of mandamus is appropriate to compel these acts. Third, we must decide if The Leader is entitled to attorney fees. For the reasons that follow, we answer all these questions affirmatively. We therefore allow the writ and reasonable attorney fees.

I The Pickerington Respondents' Duties

The village of Pickerington is a chartered municipality exercising home rule powers under Sections 3 and 7, Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution. Thus, the Pickerington respondents must act in accordance with their charter, their administrative code, and the general laws of Ohio that are not inconsistent with the charter. Section 1.02 of the Pickerington Charter. The Leader argues that the local laws of Pickerington require the Pickerington respondents to prepare minutes of the meeting at issue and that R.C. 149.43(B) requires them to provide public access to the minutes they prepare. We agree.

The first act that the Leader seeks to compel is clearly mandated by Sections 121.04(d)(2)(B) and (3) of the Pickerington Adm.Code. These sections establish a duty to prepare minutes of "all Council meetings," even those from which the municipal clerk is excused by the council pursuant to Section 4.09 of the charter. 1 The term "meeting" is defined only by Section 121.03 of the Pickerington Adm.Code, and it states that a "meeting" is "any prearranged discussion of the public business of any public body by a majority of its members." The January 28 meeting was prearranged, it facilitated discussions about development in and around Pickerington, and it was attended by a majority of the council. Thus, a duty to prepare minutes of that meeting exists.

The Pickerington respondents do not deny the duty set forth in the Pickerington Administrative Code. They instead cite Section 2.03 of the Pickerington Charter, which provides, inter alia, that "[a]ll regular and special meetings of Council shall be open to the public, excepting those covered by Section 121.22 of the general laws of the State of Ohio." From this, the Pickerington respondents argue that the January 28 meeting was something other than a regular or special council meeting and, therefore, that it could be held in private. They also argue that the charter exception for meetings "covered by" R.C. 121.22 allowed the instant meeting to be closed to the public.

Both of these arguments miss the mark. The Leader's complaint seeks to inspect minutes of the January 28 meeting, not to attend that meeting or to invalidate any subsequent council action. Cf. State, ex rel. Craft, v. Schisler (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 149, 532 N.E.2d 719, and Fox v. Lakewood (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 19, 528 N.E.2d 1254. Thus, whether the meeting should have been held open to the public does not directly concern us.

Beyond this, however, we fail to see how the charter allows any meeting of council that is not either regular or special. Section 2.03 of the Pickerington Charter also provides that the council "shall meet at such times as set by its rules, but not less than once a month" and that "[s]pecial meetings may be called by the mayor or three (3) members of Council." Under Section 121.02 of the Pickerington Administrative Code, "regular" meetings are held on the first and third Tuesdays of each month, unless such day is a national holiday or unless an exception is approved by a majority of council. "Special" meetings may be held on other days if council members are given twenty-four hours' notice.

To us, the "regular" and "special" meetings described in the Pickerington Charter and Administrative Code require the conclusion that these terms are mutually exclusive. The council either meets in a regular session or it does not, and any session that is not regular is special. Thus, we agree with The Leader's argument that regular and special meetings are the only alternatives under the charter for a majority of the council to assemble to discuss public business, and we reject the theory that the January 28 meeting was neither of these. Indeed, like the unannounced council meeting with the mayor in State, ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., v. Barnes (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 165, 167, 527 N.E.2d 807, 810, the January 28 meeting here was within the ambit of the special meeting category of the Pickerington Charter.

Further, we reject the argument that the exception for any meeting "covered by" R.C. 121.22 encompasses the January 28 meeting. The statute declares that all meetings of any public body are to be open to the public at all times, R.C. 121.22(C), but it also permits closed executive sessions about specified topics during a regular or special meeting of the public body. R.C. 121.22(G). 2 R.C. 121.22, therefore, "covers" regular and special meetings, just as Section 2.03 of the Pickerington Charter does. Thus, if we read the charter exception literally, as the Pickerington respondents suggest, the exception would swallow the charter rule that all regular and special meetings be held open to the...

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