State ex rel. Thurston v. Sargent
| Decision Date | 03 January 1898 |
| Docket Number | 10,966 - (294) |
| Citation | 73 N.W. 626,71 Minn. 28 |
| Parties | STATE OF MINNESOTA ex rel. HOWARD THURSTON v. WILLIAM C. SARGENT and Another |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by relator from an order of the district court for St. Louis county, Cant, J., discharging a writ of habeas corpus directed to William C. Sargent, sheriff, and another, and remanding relator to the county jail. Reversed.
Criminal Law -- Bribing Witness to Absent Himself from Trial -- Jurisdiction over Offense Charged.
The accused bribed or offered to bribe a witness to absent himself from a trial to which he had been duly subpoenaed. Held, the accused cannot be convicted under section 6385 G.S. 1894, as that section applies only to cases where the witness was bribed, or attempted to be bribed, to give false testimony, nor under sections 6386 and 6310, for aiding and abetting the receiving of a bribe, and can only be convicted under section 6383, of a misdemeanor, of which a justice of the peace has jurisdiction.
Criminal Law -- Misdemeanor -- Holding to Grand Jury -- Habeas Corpus.
Held, chapter 106, G.S. 1894, which provides for preliminary examination of persons accused of crime, authorizes the committing magistrate to hold the accused to the grand jury in cases where the evidence does not show that any higher crime has been committed than one of which a justice of the peace has jurisdiction, if the grand jury has power to indict for the same; but the constitution guaranties the accused a speedy trial, and, unless the grand jury is in session at the time the accused is committed or will meet shortly afterwards, it is an abuse of the powers of the committing magistrate to hold the accused to await the action of the grand jury in such a case, and the accused is entitled to redress by habeas corpus.
Fryberger & Johanson, for appellant.
Geo. E. Arbury, for respondents.
A criminal prosecution was instituted against one Smith in the municipal court of Duluth on the charge of gambling or running a lottery. He was arrested, pleaded not guilty, the case was set for trial, and one Gustafson, the complaining witness, was duly subpoenaed to appear as a witness at the trial on behalf of the state. After the time set for said trial, a criminal complaint was filed in said municipal court reciting the foregoing facts, and charging the appellant, Thurston, with having offered to Gustafson $15
"For the purpose of, and with the intent to, influence said Gustafson to withhold true testimony and all his testimony in said cause," "knowing that said Gustafson was such witness and was so subpoenaed."
Thurston was arrested on a warrant issued on this complaint, a preliminary examination was had, and on December 9, 1897, he was ordered held to await the action of the grand jury. Thereupon he sued out of the district court a writ of habeas corpus, and, the evidence taken on the preliminary examination having been returned to that court, the matter came on for hearing on such evidence, and on such hearing the writ was discharged, and the relator remanded to custody. He appeals to this court from the order remanding him.
The point made by appellant is that the evidence tends to prove that he is guilty of a misdemeanor of which a justice of the peace has jurisdiction, but that he is not guilty of any higher crime; that, therefore, the municipal court should not have ordered him held to await the action of the grand jury. In our opinion the point is well taken. The evidence tends to prove that, after Gustafson was subpoenaed as aforesaid, appellant offered him and another witness $15 to leave Duluth, go over with appellant to West Superior, Wis., and not appear at the trial of Smith, the $15 to be paid after the parties had arrived at West Superior; that Gustafson accepted the offer, went with appellant to West Superior, did not appear at the trial, and has ever since remained out of the state. The other witness refused to accept the bribe or disobey the subpoena with which he had been served.
The Penal Code abolished common-law crimes except such as are deemed criminal or punishable by some statute. G.S. 1894, § 6286. We have examined all the sections of our statutes to which our attention has been called, and find none under which the appellant can, on the evidence, be convicted of any higher crime than that of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment not exceeding three months, or by a fine not exceeding $100. Sections 98-100 of the Penal Code appear in G.S. 1894, as follows:
Can the appellant be convicted, on the evidence, under any of these sections except section 6383? The state contends that he can be found guilty, under section 6385, of bribing or offering to bribe the witness "to withhold true testimony," and therefore can be convicted of a felony. We cannot so hold. When all of that section is read together, it is plain that it is directed, not against bribing or offering to bribe the witness to stay away from the trial, and give no testimony at all, but against bribing or offering to bribe him to give false testimony, or "to withhold true testimony" when testifying. The rule of noscitur a sociis applies to the statute here interpreted, as did that rule or the rule of ejusdem generis, to the statute interpreted in State v. McCrum, 38 Minn. 154, 36 N.W. 102.
This construction of section 6385 is strengthened by the fact that the words "to withhold true testimony" appear in a similar situation in section 6384, and these words, as there used, should be held to cover a case where, without bribery the accused induced or attempted to induce the witness to absent himself from the trial, if the same words as used in section 6385 cover a case where the same result was accomplished, or attempted to be...
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