State ex rel. Tittle v. Covington Community Consol. Schools

• Decision Date: 02 February 1951
• Docket Number: No. 28675,28675
• Citation: 229 Ind. 208,96 N.E.2d 334
• Parties: STATE ex rel. TITTLE v. COVINGTON COMMUNITY CONSOL. SCHOOLS et al.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 334

96 N.E.2d 334

229 Ind. 208

STATE ex rel. TITTLE v. COVINGTON COMMUNITY CONSOL. SCHOOLS et al.

No. 28675.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Feb. 2, 1951.

Ellis H. Bell, Harold J. Bell, and Bell & Bell, all of Indianapolis, for relator.

White & White, Covington, for respondent.

GILKISON, Judge.

By her second amended complaint, relator, by proper averments, shows that on July 1, 1925, by written contract, she became a teacher of Covington-Troy Township Consolidated Schools, Fountain County, Indiana, and that she taught in said schools under contract continuously since said date until May, 1948. That about April 1, 1930, she entered into her sixth annual contract with such schools, and thereupon became a permanent teacher with an indefinite contract under Chapter 97 of the Acts of 1927 and amendments thereto. § 28-4307, Burns' 1948 Repl. That her said contract has not been cancelled or otherwise terminated in any manner provided by law. She avers her repeated demand from appellees for a teacher's contract for the 1948-1949 school year; that she is a properly licensed teacher under the state laws; that she has never waived any of her rights as a tenure teacher; there her compensation for the school year 1948-1949 would have been $3600. That on July 9, 1948 she received from Covington public schools a communication made Exhibit 'A' to the complaint as follows:

'Covington Public Schools

Covington, Indiana

July 9, 1948

'Miss Thelma Title

Covington, Indiana

'Dear Miss Tittle:

'As you have read in the notices of consolidation appearing in local papers, the present Covington-Troy Township Consolidated Schools Corporation ceases to exist as of August 1, 1948, and the Covington Community School Corporation becomes the new corporate today.

'Under the present school law your contract with the present school corporation ceases with the termination of this corporation's administration.

'As the already elected or appointed members of the New Covington Community School Corporation's Board of School Trustees, representing a majority of the board which will administer the schools after August 1, 1948, we wish to advise you that your teacher's contract will not be renewed with the new corporation.

'Very truly yours,

(Signed) THOMAS A. McGURK

(Signed) MAX KELLER

(Signed) LOUIS F. HENDERSON.'

Prayer for mandate to appellees commanding them to respect relator's tenure status and to enter into a contract with her to teach in appellees' schools, for $5000 damages and all proper relief.

To this complaint appellees filed a general demurrer which was sustained by the trial court. Appellant declined to plead further. Judgment was rendered against relator from which this appeal is taken.

The first question presented by appellees on the appeal is that 'the second amended complaint does not show any legal relationship between 'Covington-Troy Township Consolidated Schools' and Covington Community Consolidated Schools.' Appellant contends that this question was not presented to the court below and is first presented on appeal. The memoranda to the demurrer supports this contention of appellant and appellees do not contend to the contrary. However, it has long been the policy of this court to search the record to find causes for sustaining the trial court's action.

So searching the record we find in the first grammatical paragraph of relator's second amended complaint, an averment as follows: 'The Relator in the above entitled cause would respectfully show the Court herein that the defendant, the Covington Community Consolidated Schools, of Fountain and Warren Counties, Indiana, is the duly organized school corporation pursuant to Chapter 123 of the Acts of 1947; which came into existence August first, 1948, and that as of the first day of August, 1948, the School City of Covington, Fountain County, Indiana, Troy School Township, Fountain County, Indiana, Covington-Troy Consolidated Schools, Fountain County, Indiana, and Mound School Township, Warren County, Indiana, ceased to exist.'

The third grammatical paragraph of the complaint is as follows: 'The Relator would further show that the School City of Covington, and Troy School Township were and had been for some years prior to August first, 1948, consolidated under the Provisions of Chapter 134 of the Acts of 1925 as amended and operated as the Covington-Troy Township Consolidated Schools.'

In the seventh grammatical paragraph of the complaint she pleads Exhibit 'A' to her complaint, heretofore copied in this opinion as appellees' effort to cancel her contract.

It has long been the statutory law of this state that: 'In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations shall be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties; but when the allegations of a pleading are so indefinite or uncertain that the precise nature of the charge or defense is not apparent, the court may require the pleading to be made definite and certain by amendment.'

§ 2-1048, Burns' 1946 Replacement. See also § 376, R.S.1881. Monnett v. Turpie, 1892, 132 Ind. 482, 485, 32 N.E. 328.

Before the enactment of § 2-1005, Burns' 1946 Replacement this court had held that under the code it is not necessarily the rule that a pleading must be construed most strongly against the pleader. On the contrary 'when substantial justice will be promoted thereby, a liberal construction is required.' Dickensheets and Another v. Kaufman and Another, 1867, 28 Ind. 251, 252. And under § 376, R.S.1881, § 2-1048 Burns' 1946 Replacement supra, this court announced the rule that, 'The pleading is to be read in the light of all such ultimate facts as must be necessarily intended from the facts which are will pleaded. A complaint ought to be fairly construed, and it is often the fact that matters of substance are shown by the very narrative of the manner in which an occurrence took place.' (Authorities.)

Town of New Castle v. Grubbs, 1908, 171 Ind. 482, 489, 86 N.E. 757, 762. Domestic Block Coal Co. v. DeArmey, 1913, 179 Ind. 592, 601, 609, 100 N.E. 675, 102 N.E. 99. Fauvre Coal Co. v. Kushner, 1919, 188 Ind. 314, 325, 123 N.E. 409. Pittsburgh C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Welch, 1913, 54 Ind.App. 335, 338, 101 N.E. 748.

Of course, essential exhibits filed with a pleading may be considered by this court if they will assist in curing uncertainties in pleadings. Blount v. Rick, 1886, 107 Ind. 238, 243, 5 N.E. 898, 8 N.E. 108. Penn-American Plate Glass Co. v. Harshaw, Fuller & Goodwin Co., 1910, 46 Ind.App. 645, 650, 90 N.E. 1047.

In the absence of any motion in the court below to require the plaintiff to state the facts necessary to sustain the conclusions that must be intended from the pleadings noted, the objection now asserted must be deemed waived. § 2-1005, Burns' 1946...