State ex rel. Town of Marine v. Brown

• Decision Date: 19 January 1894
• Citation: 57 N.W. 659,56 Minn. 269
• Parties: STATE EX REL. TOWN OF MARINE v. BROWN, COUNTY AUDITOR.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

56 Minn. 269

57 N.W. 659

STATE EX REL. TOWN OF MARINE

v.BROWN, COUNTY AUDITOR.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 19, 1894.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. The proviso attached to section 1, c. 180, Gen. Laws 1893, construed as applying to new towns set off from others prior to the passage of the act.

2. Held, also, that the subject is sufficiently expressed in the title of the act.

3. Also, that the legislature has the power, even after the division of a town, to apportion among its parts uncollected taxes levied before the division.

Appeal from district court, Washington county; Williston, Judge.

Action by the state, at the relation of the town of Marine, for mandamus to compel Charles H. Brown, as auditor of Washington county, to issue to its treasury a warrant on the county treasurer for a sum alleged to be due and payable to such town. A peremptory writ of mandamus was granted as prayed, and, from an order denying a new trial, respondent appeals. Reversed. Kueffner, Fauntleroy & Searles, for appellant.

A. B. Darelius, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

The main contention in this case is as to the construction of Gen. Laws 1893, c. 180, (and particularly of the proviso in the first section,) entitled “An act to amend section 114, c. 8, Gen. St. 1878, relating to the powers of county commissioners.” The entire section, before and after amendment, so far as here material, is as follows, the new or amendatory matter being distinguished from the original section by italics: “Sec. 114. Such board (of county commissioners) shall, in addition to the powers above enumerated, have power to set off, organize and vacate towns and change boundaries thereof in their respective counties. *** Such board of county commissioners shall also have power, whenever a town of their county shall be divided, or have any part set off or stricken therefrom, to apportion pro rata according to the assessed valuation among the several parts of the town so divided any funds then belonging to such town or to which such town is entitled and not raised or theretofore appropriated for a purpose inconsistent with such apportionment. And such board shall also have power, whenever a town of their county shall be divided or have part stricken therefrom to apportion in like manner, but with due regard for the purposes for which the same shall have been levied, all taxes then levied or assessed for the benefit of the town so divided, and remaining uncollected, and to provide for the payment thereof when collected in pursuance of the apportionment or allotment by them made. Provided, that all taxes collected from real and personal property in said newly organized towns after the passage and approval of this act, shall be paid by the county treasurer to the treasurer of such newly organized towns for the use and benefit of such town or towns.” Both parties admit (and in this we agree with them) that the provisions of the amendatory act preceding the proviso are in all respects prospective, and have reference only to the towns thereafter set off. Plaintiff claims that the proviso is also wholly prospective, and only applies to towns set off after the passage of the act. On the other hand, the defendant, while admitting that it is prospective as to the date of the collection of the taxes, claims that it is retroactive, so as to apply to “new,” as distinguished from old or original towns set off before the passage of the amendatory act.

The act is so badly worded that we have been greatly puzzled as to what it does mean, and are unable to place any construction upon it that is satisfactory to ourselves. We have not much difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the words “after the passage and approval of the act,” contained in the proviso, have reference to the date of the collection of the taxes; but much can be said in favor of the contention of the plaintiff that grammatically the words “said newly organized towns” refer back to the preceding provisions of the amendatory act, and hence, equally with them, apply only to towns set off after the passage of the act....