State ex rel. Trenholm v. Yelle

• Citation: 25 P.2d 569,174 Wash. 547
• Decision Date: 02 October 1933
• Docket Number: 24646.
• Parties: STATE ex rel. TRENHOLM v. YELLE, Auditor.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

25 P.2d 569

174 Wash. 547

STATE ex rel. TRENHOLM v. YELLE, Auditor.

No. 24646.

Supreme Court of Washington

October 2, 1933

Department 2.

Original proceeding for a writ of mandamus by the State of Washington on the relation of Samuel Trenholm, against Cliff Yelle Auditor of the State of Washington.

Writ denied.

MAIN J., dissenting.

John H. Dunbar, of Olympia, for relator.

G. W. Hamilton, Atty. Gen., and John W. Hanna, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

STEINERT Justice.

The relator seeks a writ of mandate from this court to compel the state auditor to issue to him a warrant in the sum of $1,000. His claim is rested upon a certain provision of the general appropriation act passed by the Legislature of 1933, which, so far as is material here, reads as follows:

'Sec. 2. The following sums, * * * are hereby appropriated out of any of the monies in the several funds in the state treasury hereinafter named: * * *

'From the Accident Fund.

'For the relief of Samuel Trenholm .... $1,000.00.

'In full settlement of claim for injuries.' Chapter 190, Laws of 1933, § 2, pp. 848, 867.

Pursuant to the passage of that act, relator prepared and presented to the state auditor his voucher for the payment of the claim and demanded a warrant for the amount previously appropriated. The state auditor, however, on advice of the Attorney General, refused to issue the warrant. Upon application made by relator, an alternative writ issued from this court directing the state auditor to pay the warrant or else to show cause why he should not be commanded to do so. The auditor appeared by demurrer to relator's application and also by answer to both the application and the alternative writ. The matter is Before us on these pleadings.

It is the settled rule in this state that the courts will not inquire into the validity of an act of the Legislature, unless it appears on the face of the act itself, or from facts of which the court may take judicial notice, that the act is invalid. Farquharson v. Yeargin, 24 Wash. 549, 64 P. 717; State ex rel. Govan v. Clausen, 108 Wash. 133, 183 P. 115; State ex rel. Lister v. Clausen, 108 Wash. 146, 183 P. 120. There is no dispute, in this case, as to the rule itself. The only question here is whether it appears on the face of the act, or from facts of which the court may take judicial notice, that the appropriative provision is invalid.

The act in question discloses upon its face that the payment is to be made from the accident fund. We will, of course, take judicial notice of the fact that the 'fund' referred to is the accident fund set up and provided for under the Workmen's Compensation Act, Rem. Rev. Stat., title 50, chap. 7 (section 7673 et seq.), particularly section 7676, as amended by chapter 193, § 1, Laws of 1933. There is no other fund of the state known or denominated as the 'accident fund.'

Rem. Rev. Stat. § 7705, which is a part of our present Workmen's Compensation Act, provides: 'Disbursement out of the funds shall be made only upon warrants drawn by the state auditor upon vouchers therefor transmitted to him by the department and audited by him. The state treasurer shall pay every warrant out of the fund upon which it is drawn. * * *' (Italics ours.) In this case, no voucher has been issued by the department or transmitted to, or audited by, the state auditor, and, of course, no warrant has been issued by that officer.

The purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as originally enacted, and as amended from time to time by later statutes, has been, and is, to provide compensation for workmen injured in extrahazardous occupations as defined by the act. To that end, the act has created and established two funds known as the 'accident fund' and the 'medical aid fund,' respectively. The industries of the state engaged in extrahazardous work are required to pay into the accident fund certain premiums according to the schedule provided. The workmen so engaged are required to pay a certain percentage of their wages into the medical aid fund for its maintenance. These funds are therefore trust funds drawn from particular sources and devoted to special purposes. By the act itself the fund is impressed with a trust. 'The fund thereby created shall be termed the 'accident fund' which shall be devoted to the purpose specified for it in this act.' Rem. Rev. Stat. § 7676, p. 700. Re-enacted in chapter 193, § 1, Laws of 1933, pp. 909, 925. These funds are therefore not subject to appropriation by the Legislature for purposes other than those contemplated by the act, nor by methods that run counter to the effective operation of the act.

Chapter 193, p. 909, Laws of 1933, also clearly expresses the intent of the Legislature that the accident fund shall be self-supporting. Section 1 of the act contains this language, on page 925 of the session laws: 'It is the intent that the accident fund created under this section shall ultimately become neither more nor less than self-supporting, exclusive of the expense of administration. * * *'

The Workmen's Compensation Act, by its terms, created certain boards and officers who are vested with the authority, and charged with the duty, of administering the act. It also set up a complete method of procedure by which those entitled to the benefits of the act may be assured of, and secure, the same. The procedure so prescribed also provides a complete method whereby a claimant feeling aggrieved by the decision of the department having supervision over such claims may appeal to the courts. It cannot be gainsaid that the spirit, purpose, and operative method of the Workmen's Compensation Act has now become the established policy of this state. We are fully justified, therefore, in considering that policy in determining the intention of the Legislature in passing subsequent legislation which may be thought to affect such policy. State ex rel. Wolfe v. Parmenter, 50 Wash. 164, 96 P. 1047, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 707. Courts will be very reluctant to overturn an antecedent policy by extending the operation of a dubious statute and thereby introducing a flagrant departure from the original aim. Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction (2d Ed.) Vol. 2, §§ 487, 488. As stated in 25 R. C. L. p. 919: 'An act will not be construed to repeal or modify earlier legislation, if, giving such effect to the act, an apparent purpose would appear to disturb an established system of written law, covering a vital field in our system of government. It would be most unreasonable to suppose that a legislative body intended, by doubtful inference, to repeal salutary provisions in a very early statute which, in numerous enactments, it has cautiously preserved.'

If the administrative method and the procedure prescribed by the Workmen's Compensation Act be interfered with, the whole purpose of the act may be destroyed. If the...