State ex rel. Tulis v. Lee
Docket Number | E2021-00436-COA-R3-CV |
Decision Date | 23 May 2022 |
Parties | STATE OF TENNESSEE EX REL. DAVID JONATHAN TULIS v. BILL LEE, GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE ET AL. |
Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Session February 15, 2022
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Hamilton County No. 20-0685 Pamela A. Fleenor, Chancellor
In this mandamus action, the petitioner/relator, acting on relation to the state, sought to have the trial court, inter alia, issue writs requiring the state governor and county health department administrator to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 68-5-104, which pertains to "[i]solation or quarantine." The relator named the governor and health department administrator as respondents in both their official and "personal" capacities. Upon the respondents' respective motions to dismiss the petition and following a hearing, the trial court entered separate orders granting the motions to dismiss as to each respondent, finding, as pertinent on appeal, that (1) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as to the claim against the governor in a mandamus action, (2) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as to the claim against the health department administrator because the relator lacked standing, and (3) the relator otherwise failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted. The trial court also granted the health department administrator's motion for a reasonable award of attorney's fees and costs in defending against the lawsuit in her personal capacity pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-113. The relator filed motions to alter or amend, which the trial court denied following a hearing in orders certified as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. The relator timely appealed. Concluding that (1) the trial court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction is dispositive as to the action against the governor in his official capacity, (2) the relator's lack of standing is dispositive as to the action against the county health administrator in her official capacity, and (3) the relator's actions against both respondents in their personal capacities failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted, we affirm the trial court's dismissal orders. We clarify, however, that the relator's lack of standing with respect to his claim against the county health administrator did not equate to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the trial court.
Tenn R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court
David Jonathan Tulis, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee, Pro Se.
Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter Andrée S. Blumstein, Solicitor General; and Janet M. Kleinfelter, Deputy Attorney General, Public Interest Division, for the appellee, Bill Lee, Governor of Tennessee, in his personal capacity and in his official capacity.
Rheubin M. Taylor, County Attorney, and Sharon McMullan Milling, Assistant County Attorney, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellee, Rebekah Barnes, Administrator, Hamilton County Health Department, in her personal capacity and in her official capacity.
OPINION
The petitioner, David Jonathan Tulis ("Relator"), acting in relation to the State of Tennessee and proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing a "Petition in equity and for writ of mandamus" in the Hamilton County Chancery Court ("trial court") on October 2, 2020. Relator named as respondents Tennessee Governor Bill Lee ("Governor Lee"), "in his personal capacity and in his official capacity," and Hamilton County Health Administrator Rebekah Barnes ("Administrator Barnes"), "in her personal capacity and in her official capacity" (collectively, "Respondents"). Relator's petition and attached affidavit spanned thirty-nine pages and included many broad allegations regarding governmental officials' handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, particularly measures implemented by Respondents. Under an opening section of his petition entitled, "Statement of the Case," Relator set forth his overall grievance:
(Paragraph numbering omitted.)
We note that the issuance of a writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, State ex rel. Weaver v. Ayers, 756 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Tenn. 1988), and that "[t]he general rule regarding the issuance of a writ of mandamus is that the writ is not issued to control or coerce discretionary power by a board or officer, but will lie to enforce the performance of an official duty and to compel the exercise of power," Tusant v. City of Memphis, 56 S.W.3d 10, 18 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). The statute primarily relied upon by Relator to allege that Respondents were in dereliction of duty, Tennessee Code Annotated § 68-5-104 (2013), addresses "[isolation or quarantine" and provides:
The statute was initially enacted in 1905. Relator appears to primarily contend that Respondents have not been able to produce information concerning "a case" of Covid-19 and its "source or cause" as set forth in subsection (a)(1) of the statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-5-104(a)(1).
In his petition, Relator "demand[ed]" that the trial court:
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