State ex rel. Turner v. United Buckingham Freight Lines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 October 1973
• Docket Number: UNITED-BUCKINGHAM,No. 55706,55706
• Citation: 211 N.W.2d 288
• Parties: STATE of Iowa ex rel. Richard TURNER, Attorney General of Iowa, Appellee, v.FREIGHT LINES, INC., Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 288

211 N.W.2d 288

STATE of Iowa ex rel. Richard TURNER, Attorney General of Iowa, Appellee, v. UNITED-BUCKINGHAM FREIGHT LINES, INC., Appellant.

No. 55706.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 17, 1973.

Frank W. Davis, Jr., Des Moines, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., John E. Beamer and Larry M. Blumberg, Asst. Attys. Gen., Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered en banc.

McCORMICK, Justice.

Defendant trucking company, an interstate common carrier, appeals trial court's decree enjoining it from violating Code § 321.457(6). That simple misdemeanor statute prohibits 'double-bottom' trucks more than 60 feet in length from operating on Iowa highways. Plaintiff's petition in equity alleged defendant deliberately violated the statute so often its conduct in doing so is a nuisance which should be enjoined. Trial court found that between July 1, 1970, and October 8, 1971, a period of approximately 15 months ending five days before the State's petition was filed in this case, defendant breached the statute 1730 times. Violations were occurring at an increasing rate. The court held defendant's conduct constituted a nuisance and entered a decree April 13, 1972, enjoining future violations. We affirm the trial court.

Defendant asserts trial court erred (1) in finding violations of the statute are a trespass, (2) in concluding defendant's repeated violations are a public nuisance, and (3) in granting the injunction. We do not find it necessary to answer the first contention because we believe trial court's decree must be upheld on the basis of answers to the second and third contentions. We need not adopt trial court's premise in order to sustain its conclusion. Van Hosen v. Bankers Trust Company, 200 N.W.2d 504, 509 (Iowa 1972). We determinative issues are whether a court of equity can enjoin violation of a traffic law which a defendant has repeatedly and intentionally violated and, if so, whether in this case it should do so.

I. Is defendant's conduct subject to injunction? Apart from the issue of trespass, defendant contends its violations of § 321.457(6) cannot be enjoined because they do not constitute a public nuisance. This contention rests on assertions that violations of a criminal statute cannot be enjoined and that the record in this case is devoid of evidence of injury or damage required to support an injunction.

As to the first assertion we recently observed 'where * * * a statutory enactment is regulatory in nature having for its primary purpose the promotion of public interest and welfare, then attendant criminality neither gives nor ousts jurisdiction in equity.' Sound Storm Ent., Inc. v. Keefe, In & For Fayette Cty., 209 N.W.2d 560, 566 (Iowa 1973). Although a court of equity will not enjoin the commission of acts simply because they are crimes, it will enjoin them 'if they affect public rights or privileges or endanger public health, regardless of whether such acts are denounced as crimes.' State v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 253 Minn. 236, 245, 92 N.W.2d 103, 110 (1958); see 42 Am.Jur.2d Injunctions, § 157 at 918.

A concise statement of the general rule appears in an annotation at 40 A.L.R. 1145, 1147:

'The principle underlying the cases is that the government may enjoin certain acts which amount to a crime or a violation of the criminal statutes, not because the act complained of is a crime, but in spite of the fact that it is a crime. In other words, when the state * * * seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of a court of equity to protect by injunction some right, or to remedy some wrong, the inquiry is, as it is in cases of an individual seeking the aid of the 'strong arm of equity,' Do the facts presented show the need of the intervention of equity for the protection of rights cognizable by equity? And if this inquiry is answered in the affirmative the injunction will issue, though it may, as an incident to its promulgation, restrain the commission of a crime.'

Clearly, conduct amounting to violation of a criminal statute can in a proper case be enjoined. Defendant's contrary assertion in untenable.

We also believe § 321.457(6) is the kind of statute which regulates conduct subject to equitable jurisdiction. It is a traffic law enacted under the legislature's police power to promote public safety and welfare. Specifically, as a statute limiting the length of trucks on our highways, it is intended to keep the highways safe for other motorists. See Wood Brothers Thresher Co. v. Eicher, 231 Iowa 550, 560, 1 N.W.2d 655, 660 (1942).

It is not part of the State's burden to establish that the legislative policy manifest in the statute is justified or that defendant's repeated deliberate violations did in fact cause accidents. We recently said, 'The State has an interest in seeing that the law is not continually violated. Where a statute is openly, publicly, repeatedly, continuously, persistently and intentionally violated a public nuisance is created.' State ex rel. Turner v. Younker Brothers, Inc., 210 N.W.2d 550, 564 (Iowa 1973). The public is injured when the integrity of the statute is thereby undermined. Whether such conduct is denominated a public nuisance or not, the need for equitable intervention may thus be established. The label is not controlling. State ex rel. Beck v. Basham, 146 Kan. 181, 186, 70 P.2d 24, 26--27 (1937), and citations; see also National Ass'n of Let. Car. v. Independent Post S. of A. Inc., 336 F.Supp. 804 (W.D.Okl.1971); Planning and Zoning Com'n v. Zemel Brothers, Inc., 29 Conn.Sup. 45, 270 A.2d 562 (1970); Montana Milk Control Board v. Rehberg, 141 Mont. 149, 376 P.2d 508 (1962).

We hold a court of equity has power to enjoin violation of a traffic law like § 321.457(6) which a defendant has repeatedly and intentionally violated. Although our review of the record in this equity case is de novo, trial court's findings of fact are not controverted. In sending its overlength trucks into this state at a rate of more than 25 a week for 15 months, incurring fines of more than $30,000, defendant was not acting through inadvertence or mere carelessness. We find defendant did openly, publicly, repeatedly, continuously, persistently, and intentionally violate the statute to the detriment of public interest in its integrity and purpose. We therefore reject defendant's assertion there is no evidence of injury or damage.

Trial court was right in concluding defendant's conduct was of a nature subject to injunction.

II. Should defendant be enjoined in this case? In resisting issuance of an injunction in this case, defendant contends the State failed to establish a threat of irreparable injury. This contention is based on arguments no past injury has been shown and no evidence was offered to show any likelihood of future violations. Defendant offered evidence there was only one violation of the statute in the five month period between the commencement of the suit and the date of trial.

Defendant's argument relating to past injury has already been answered. It appears defendant takes the novel position the public policy of this state is satisfied when its laws are violated so long as the offender pays the price for his transgressions. Under that approach, where the price is treated as small enough to be absorbed as an acceptable cost of doing business, a statute which is intended to deter violations becomes a licensing statute under which such violations are committed with impunity. Our traffic laws are designed to prohibit and prevent unlawful conduct rather than license it. If they fail in their purpose as to a particular offender, the strong arm of a court of equity may intervene to vindicate the public interest in the integrity of its laws.

We would be more impressed by defendant's argument concerning future obedience to the statute without an injunction if the chilling effect of a possible injunction had not been required to stop past misconduct. The record demonstrates a threat of irreparable injury in that § 321.457(6) 'does not offer a speedy, adequate remedy at law to prevent the practice(s) detailed here.' State ex rel. Turner v. Younker Brothers, Inc., supra, 210 N.W.2d at 565; see Planning and Zoning...