State ex rel. Turner v. Scott

• Decision Date: 20 September 1978
• Docket Number: No. 61093,61093
• Citation: 269 N.W.2d 828
• Parties: STATE of Iowa ex rel. Richard C. TURNER, Attorney General of Iowa, Appellant, v. John Richard SCOTT, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 828

269 N.W.2d 828

STATE of Iowa ex rel. Richard C. TURNER, Attorney General of Iowa, Appellant, v. John Richard SCOTT, Appellee.

No. 61093.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Sept. 20, 1978.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., and George W. Murray, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

Lee H. Gaudineer of Austin, Myers, Peterson & Gaudineer, Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered en banc.

REES, Justice.

This is an appeal from the judgment and decree of the trial court dismissing the quo warranto action brought by the State of Iowa on the relation of Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, to remove the defendant, John Richard Scott, from his seat as senator from the 24th senatorial district. The trial court dismissed the action on the basis that the court lacked authority to interfere with the Senate's determination of the defendant's qualifications, unless a substantial violation of constitutional rights had been established. In this appeal, the Attorney General contends he is empowered to bring this action in order to protect the constitutional rights of the people of this state, which he claims were violated by the Senate's seating of an unqualified candidate. We affirm the trial court.

Defendant John Richard Scott was elected to the Iowa Senate from the 24th district by defeating the incumbent, William Winkelman, in the general election in November 1976. During the course of the campaign, the incumbent Winkelman contended as a campaign issue that defendant was not qualified to represent the district, as he did not meet the inhabitancy requirement of the Iowa Constitution. Neither Winkelman nor anyone else contested the election, although the Attorney General did attempt to deny the defendant the issuance of a certificate of election.

On the first day of the following legislative session, the credentials committee of the Senate determined that defendant was qualified to assume the seat to which he had been elected and the vote of the Senate followed, seating the defendant.

On January 11, 1977, the Attorney General instituted the present quo warranto action, challenging the defendant's right to hold the office and claiming the defendant was not qualified since he had not been an inhabitant of the state for the one-year period preceding his election as required by Article III, §§ 4 and 5, of the Iowa Constitution. Scott appeared specially, alleging among other things: that the Attorney General lacked standing to challenge Scott's qualifications; that the Legislature held the sole power to judge the qualifications of its members; and that since no timely election contest had been instituted, the court was without jurisdiction to entertain any challenge to Scott's election. Ruling on the special appearance was deferred and the Attorney General then amended his petition to allege that the seating of Scott denied substantial constitutional rights, notably, equal protection and due process to the electorate of Iowa and especially other senators and potential candidates for the Senate. The defendant then answered, incorporating in his answer the allegations of his special appearance.

At the evidentiary hearing in the trial court, Senator Willits, a member of the credentials committee of the Senate, testified that he, together with certain Senate staff and other members of the Senate, had conducted research on the issues concerning defendant's qualifications and concluded that the Iowa Constitution did not require senators to be inhabitants of the state for one year prior to their election. While it is not apparent from the record that the full Senate relied upon this opinion, the Senate was informed of the opinion and Willits testified the majority of the credentials committee had concluded the only way to challenge Scott's right to hold office was by an election contest instituted pursuant to chapters 57 and 59, The Code. Willits further testified the credentials committee concluded that since no election contest had been initiated, the committee was powerless to question Scott's qualifications. The record further discloses that when the credentials committee report was made available to the Senate that body considered an amendment to the report which would have seated every elected member of the Senate except the defendant. During debate on the merits of the amendment, the qualifications of Scott were discussed; specifically, the question as to whether he was an inhabitant of the state for a one-year period prior to his election as required by the Iowa Constitution. After debate, the amendment lost by a vote of 25 to 24.

With respect to the inhabitancy issue, evidence was introduced at trial which established that the defendant was born and raised in his Senate district, attended the University of Iowa, returned to the family farm during the summers, and, after receiving his law degree, worked for the Justice Department in Washington, D.C., from January 5, 1970 until May 17, 1976. Defendant testified he returned to the family home during holiday and vacation periods.

The defendant further testified that during the years 1970 to 1976 he paid resident income taxes imposed by the District of Columbia or the State of Virginia, and did not pay Iowa income tax during such years. He testified that he held shares in a family farm corporation owning property in Pocahontas County, owned no real estate in Washington or Virginia, owned a car licensed in Washington, and held a District of Columbia driver's license.

Defendant testified he paid fees to the Iowa Clients Security Fund as a government lawyer and had been suspended from the practice of law by this court in 1974 for failure to pay the required fees, but was later reinstated. Although he stated that his recollection was that he had voted by absentee ballot in either the 1972 or 1974 general election in Johnson County, no record of his having voted in either of said elections was made available to the court. Defendant stated it was always his intention to return to Iowa and not to abandon his Iowa domicile.

On the basis of the foregoing record, the trial court dismissed the petition, concluding that the opinion of the credentials committee that the one-year inhabitancy requirement for House members was not required for Senate members was incorrect even though the inhabitancy requirement is not mentioned in Article III, § 5 of the Iowa Constitution, which states that the qualifications of residency and citizenship for House members apply also to Senate members. The court further concluded that the drafters of the Constitution intended the one-year inhabitancy requirement for House members to be applicable to Senate members since the court could find no basis for differentiating representatives and senators.

The court further found the credentials committee conclusion, that the only permissible means by which to challenge the defendant's right to hold office was by an election contest pursuant to chapters 57 and 59, The Code, was binding on the court unless some substantial deprivation of constitutional rights had been established, and held that the quo warranto action could not be maintained to attack defendant's qualifications since no election contest had been brought under the statutes cited above.

The trial court also held that generally "the courts may not interfere in the judicial functioning of a legislative body acting under Article III, § 7 of the Iowa Constitution", and concluded the Senate's determination to seat Scott was not reviewable by the court unless it was established the action of the Senate deprived someone of substantial constitutional rights. Trial court found the Attorney General had not established a deprivation of substantial constitutional rights and "that such constitutional rights apply to persons only." Although it may have been unnecessary to so determine, the trial court found the defendant was an inhabitant of Iowa for the year preceding his election.

The following issues are presented for review:

(1) Whether the within quo warranto action presents a justiciable controversy properly within the court's jurisdiction.

(2) Whether the plaintiff has standing to maintain this action and whether this issue was preserved for review.

(3) Whether inhabitancy for one year preceding election is a prerequisite qualification in order for a candidate to qualify for the office of state senator.

(4) Whether the trial court erred in determining the defendant met the inhabitancy qualification of the Iowa Constitution.

I. The defendant, Scott, asserts the judicial branch has no jurisdiction to entertain this cause and that, therefore, an action in quo warranto will not lie for the purpose of determining whether a person elected to the office of state senator is qualified to hold that office. He contends that the Iowa Senate has the sole authority to determine the qualifications of its members under Article III, § 7 of the Iowa Constitution, which provides:

"Each house shall choose its own officers, and judge of the qualification, election, and return of its own members. A contested election shall be determined in such manner as shall be directed by law."

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