State ex rel. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Dierker

• Decision Date: 27 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. 80014,80014
• Citation: 961 S.W.2d 816
• Parties: 157 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2385 STATE ex rel. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY and Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, Relators, v. Honorable Robert H. DIERKER, Judge, Circuit Court, St. Louis City, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 816

961 S.W.2d 816

157 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2385

STATE ex rel. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY and Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, Relators, v. Honorable Robert H. DIERKER, Judge, Circuit Court, St. Louis City, Respondent.

No. 80014.

Supreme Court of Missouri En Banc.

Jan. 27, 1998.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 24, 1998.

Dan H. Ball, James W. Erwin, David A. Dick, St. Louis, for Relators.

Joseph L. Bauer, Jr., Michael L. Nepple, Leonard P. Cervantes, St. Louis, for Respondent.

Jerome J. Schlichter, Steven L. Groves, Nelson G. Wolff, James Holloran, Holloran Law Firm, Robert F. Ritter, Gary & Ritter, P.C., St. Louis, H. Chris Christy, N. Little Rock, for Amicus Curiae.

COVINGTON, Judge.

This Court issued a preliminary order in prohibition to determine the scope of federal pre-emption under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. secs. 151 et. seq. (RLA), as it might affect respondent's orders prohibiting relators, Union Pacific R.R. Co. and Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. (the railroad), from attempting to enforce provisions of collective bargaining agreements. The preliminary order is made absolute.

Plaintiffs in the underlying suit are employed by the railroad and in significant respects are representative of several hundred plaintiffs who have filed negligence suits for personal injuries under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA ), 45 U.S.C. secs. 51-60, against their employers. The labor unions of which plaintiffs are members are parties to collective bargaining agreements with the railroad.

Plaintiff Harper filed an FELA suit on June 7, 1996, in the circuit court of the City of St. Louis seeking damages for personal injuries he allegedly sustained at work on April 17, 1996. Although Harper remains an employee of the railroad, he has not worked since May of 1996. On May 14, 1996, before Harper filed his FELA action, the railroad, by means of a form letter presented to him, directed Harper to provide a "doctor's note" documenting the following information: (1) his current medical condition; (2) his current medical treatment plan; (3) the date he could be expected to return to work in his normal duties or in a restricted capacity; and (4) the expected work restrictions, if any, recommended by his treating doctor for any return to work in a full or restricted capacity. On June 1, 1996, again before Harper filed his FELA action, he received a notice of a formal investigation and disciplinary hearing set for June 4, 1996, regarding his alleged failure to comply with the previous directive. On July 2, 1996, after filing his FELA action, Harper filed his motion for a protective order and for sanctions to prevent the railroad from requiring him to provide a "doctor's note" or thereafter be subjected to an investigation and disciplinary hearing. The railroad's formal investigation and disciplinary hearing was never held, and the court did not immediately hear Harper's motion for protective order. Seven months later, on February 3, 1997, the railroad sent directly to Harper (not to his attorney), another letter similar to the May 14, 1996, form letter that required him to provide his supervisor with a "doctor's note" obtained within the past thirty days. In response, Harper submitted a "doctor's note" dated November 22, 1996. On February 14, 1997, the railroad sent Harper another letter that noted that the information he had submitted had not been obtained during the past thirty days. This letter directed Harper to comply with the previous directive to provide information obtained within the prior thirty days. Harper did not submit any additional "doctor's notes." On February 26, 1997, respondent heard Harper's motion for protective order originally filed on July 2, 1996.

The facts in Plaintiff Stewart's case vary slightly from those in Harper's case. Stewart also filed an FELA suit in the same court on August 29, 1996, for injuries he allegedly sustained at work on January 12, 1996. Stewart is currently an employee of the railroad, but he is not actively working. After his alleged injury in January 1996, Stewart worked regularly through April 1996, when he began missing work. Beginning with a letter dated October 7, 1996, after Stewart had filed his FELA action, the Railroad sent Stewart letters approximately every thirty days extending his medical leave of absence and requiring him to continue to provide updated "doctor's notes" to determine his fitness for duty and to support his leave of absence. The railroad, upon receiving the required information from Stewart's doctor, repeatedly extended his leave of absence for thirty day periods. In a letter dated December 18, 1996, however, the railroad directed Stewart to contact his supervisor to arrange for a fitness for duty evaluation. On January 6, 1997, the railroad sent Stewart a letter to notify him that an "FCE," a test administered by a physical therapist or other health care provider to gather information used to determine a person's ability to perform various job-related tasks, had been scheduled for him for January 16, 1997. In response, Stewart filed his motion for a protective order to prevent the railroad from requiring him to attend the FCE or thereafter be subjected to an investigation based upon his failure to attend. On January 15, 1997, respondent heard Stewart's motion for protective order.

Plaintiffs' motions for protective orders asked the court to prevent the railroad from requiring them to provide medical documentation or to attend an FCE or thereafter be subjected to an investigation for failure to comply with the directives.

On March 17, 1997, respondent, citing the court's authority to control actions of the parties within the discovery arena, issued the challenged Rule 56.01 protective order against the railroad made applicable to both plaintiffs' cases. The order prohibits the railroad from directly communicating with plaintiffs concerning their health or employment status, from requiring plaintiffs to attend physical ability tests or other medical examinations, from disciplining plaintiffs for failing to comply with such requests, or from altering their employment status while their FELA suits are pending, unless it is for affirmative misconduct. Respondent expressed his intent to adhere to a uniform rule applicable in the circuit court of the City of St. Louis in all FELA cases: upon request by a plaintiff, a similar order will be issued unless the railroad can show affirmative misconduct or fraud on the court by the plaintiff. Relying in substantial part upon the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of the RLA, and upon affidavits that demonstrate that it is the regular practice of the railroad to require a medical evaluation for employees injured on or off the job, the railroad sought a writ of prohibition.

The issue is whether the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in fashioning relief through a Rule 56.01 protective order applicable to numerous FELA cases filed in the circuit court of the City of St. Louis. Resolution of the issue depends in substantial part upon a determination of whether the RLA's mandatory arbitration provision confers exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute upon an RLA adjustment board. 45 U.S.C. sec. 153 First (i) and Second.

The power of the United States Congress to pre-empt state law derives from the Supremacy Cause of Article VI of the United States Constitution. Whether a federal law pre-empts a certain state action is a question of congressional intent. Hawaiian Airlines Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 2243-44, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994). "The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone." Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1909-10, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (quoting Retail Clerks Int'l. Ass'n, Local 1625 AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103, 84 S.Ct. 219, 222-223, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963)).

The RLA provides a comprehensive framework for the resolution of labor disputes in the railroad industry. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562, 107 S.Ct. 1410, 1413-14, 94 L.Ed.2d 563 (1987). The RLA establishes mandatory administrative procedures that govern two classes of labor disputes. Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 252, 114 S.Ct. at 2243-44. Case law employs the terms "major disputes" and "minor disputes" to distinguish the two classes. "Major disputes," although not relevant here, arise "out of the formation or change of collective bargaining agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." Atchison, 480 U.S. at 562, 107 S.Ct. at 1413-14; see also 45 U.S.C. sec. 151(a), 152 Seventh and sec. 156. "Minor disputes," which are relevant in this case, compose the second class of disputes. Minor disputes "gro[w] out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 252-3, 114 S.Ct. at 2243-44; see also 45 U.S.C. sec. 151(a), sec. 152 Sixth, 153 First (i). Minor disputes involve "controversies over the meaning of an existing collective bargaining agreement in a particular fact situation." Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 33, 77 S.Ct. 635, 636-37, 1 L.Ed.2d 622 (1957). Succinctly stated, "major disputes seek to create contractual rights, minor disputes to enforce them." Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n., 491 U.S. 299, 302, 109 S.Ct. 2477, 2480, 105 L.Ed.2d 250 (1989).

Courts look beyond the four corners of a collective bargaining agreement to determine what is a major or a minor dispute. In Consolidated Rail, where the only issue involved whether a controversy was a major or minor dispute, the United States Supreme Court determined that although neither party could point to an express provision of the collective bargaining agreement for support, the power to conduct return-from-leave physical examinations was an implied collective bargaining agreement term. Con...