State ex rel. v. Bates
| Decision Date | 26 July 1907 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 15,103-(25).,s. 15,103-(25). |
| Citation | 102 Minn. 104 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. JOHN D. BRADY v. WILLIAM J. BATES.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
This is a proceeding on the part of the relator to oust the respondent from the office of sheriff of St. Louis county because of alleged violations of the corrupt practices act. The alleged misconduct which was charged grew out of the following transactions: In the spring of 1906 the respondent, Bates, then sheriff, one Miles, and one Armstead were conspicuous possibilities for the Republican nomination for the next term as the sheriff of St. Louis county. Miles showed to Bates a letter which he claimed to have received from Armstead. That letter set forth that Armstead had great political strength with respect to the nomination for sheriff in the approaching primary election, that Armstead was not anxious to mix in the fight, and that, if Miles would run, Armstead would stay out and do all he could to help Miles. The result of the interview was an agreement in words and figures as follows:
Respondent, having also signed this contract, paid Miles at the time $75, and afterwards $375 more. Armstead filed April 3 for the nomination for sheriff, Miles on April 2, and respondent on April 18. Bates, having received the highest number of votes in September, was declared the Republican nominee, was elected in November to the said office of sheriff, and received a certificate of election to that effect. Pursuant to section 350, R. L. 1905 (), Bates filed his affidavits of expenditures, in which he did not set forth the item of $450 paid to Miles, and in which he swore that his total expenditures made in furtherance of his candidacy amounted to $305. If he was a candidate, within the meaning of the law, when he entered into the agreement with Miles, his expenditures exceeded the amount he was authorized by law to expend.
On this state of facts John D. Brady, relator herein, applied to this court for a writ of quo warranto, upon an information setting forth the foregoing facts, and that he had received the next highest number of votes cast for the office of sheriff, for which Bates had received the highest actual number of votes cast as aforesaid. Thereupon the writ issued, and the matter came duly on for hearing.
Edward T. Young, Attorney General, and Baldwin, Baldwin & Dancer, for relator.
H. B. Fryberger, for respondent.
JAGGARD, J. (after stating the facts as above).
The essential question in this case is whether or not the respondent, Bates, was a candidate for the office of sheriff of St. Louis county at the time at which he entered into the agreement with Miles. If he was then a candidate, within the meaning of the corrupt practices act, he would not be entitled to hold the office, and other questions would be presented. If he was not a candidate at that time, and was not within the prohibitions or requirements of the corrupt practices act, then the relator is entitled to no relief.
The corrupt practices act is chapter 277, p. 664, Laws 1895. It plainly distinguishes between a "candidate for nomination to any elective office" and a "candidate for any elective office." Section 348, R. L. 1905, limits and defines the items of authorized and legal expenses of a candidate for nomination. Section 349 prescribes the limit which candidates for elective offices may respectively expend. Section 350 requires the filing of affidavits of expenditures by "a candidate for nomination or election to any elective office." Section 379 makes it a misdemeanor on the part of every candidate for nomination or election to fail to file a verified statement of his expenditures. It is not material here whether, as a result of this verbal difference, the limitations provided in section 349 upon the expenses of a candidate for an elective office apply also to a "candidate for nomination" under section 348; for it must be conceded that, under either construction, the present incumbent would not be entitled to hold his office if he was, in a legal sense, a candidate when he entered into the agreement with Miles. If these were the only statutory requirements on the subject, the case at bar, apart from the constitutional question, would come within the principle of Leonard v. Com., 112 Pa. St. 607, 4 Atl. 220. At page 624 of 112 Pa. St. and page 224 of 4 Atl., Paxson, J., said:
While it is clear, however, that a man may be and usually is a candidate long before he is, and although he may never be, a nominee, the time is wholly uncertain when he becomes a candidate, in the absence of statutory determination of such time. He may in his own mind be in that venturesome state for many years before any one else is apprised of such intention, and in such case his ambition would not make him a candidate. Nor does he become such if he merely counsel with his friends on the subject. His candidacy must be manifested by some act of his own, the gist of which is that he holds himself out as a candidate. Very often he crosses the Rubicon when he publishes his formal announcement in the local press, or to an organization, or in any public manner. This, however, is not ordinarily necessary. He may become a candidate by soliciting votes, without any declaration. Combe v. Pitt, 5 Geo. III, 1 Black, 523; 1 Hawk. P. C. 315, note 4. A man may be elected to a public office without ever having been a candidate in the legal sense. In Morris v. Burdett, 2 M. & S. 212, the mere fact that a poll was going on and votes sought or given for defendant was held not to have made him a candidate. Having taken no part, directly or indirectly, and not having, by himself or by any other, held himself out as a candidate, it was held that he could take his place in the House of Commons without being charged under the statute with the expenses of the hustings. Bayle, J., defined a candidate as a person desirous of obtaining the suffrages of the electors, and who holds himself out as such. See, however, Regina v. Chisholm, 5 Ont. Pr. 328. It is apparent, in the nature of things, as it is a familiar experience, that, in the absence of statutory prescription on the subject, the time when a man becomes a candidate is extremely vague and indefinite.
The consequences of the violation of the corrupt practices act are serious, both in respect to the individual candidate, who may be punished, and to the public, whose expressed wish may be defeated. It is important, as a matter of public policy, that its salutary provisions should be enforced. It is essential to its successful administration that the time at which its provisions go into effect should be definitely determined. In view of the indefiniteness as to such time under the ordinary convention system of nominations, the legislature may reasonably be regarded as having intended to remedy this defect when it legislated on the subject of direct primaries. "The words `primary election,' we may say, are as well understood to mean the act of choosing candidates by the respective political parties to fill the various offices." Olds, J., in State v. Hirsch, 125 Ind. 207, 24 N. E. 1062, 9 L. R. A. 170. The statutory provisions on "nomination by direct vote" are sections 181-203, inclusive, R. L. 1905. They provide distinctly for the election of party nominees, and prescribe the means by which the candidates for office of the various political parties are selected. They do not, however, purport to "prevent the nomination of candidates by groups, individuals, or so-called political parties, which cannot be recognized as such by certificate of voters to the number hereinafter specified." The law clearly defines who is a candidate under its terms, and how and the time at which an aspirant becomes a candidate. Section 184 provides that at least twenty days before a primary election any person eligible becomes a...
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