State ex rel. v. McKay

• Citation: 52 S.W.2d 229
• Decision Date: 22 June 1932
• Docket Number: No. 5103.,5103.
• Parties: STATE ET AL., EX REL. AND TO USE OF DRAINAGE DIST. No. 8 OF PEMISCOT COUNTY, APPELLANTS, v. McKAY ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

52 S.W.2d 229

STATE ET AL., EX REL. AND TO USE OF DRAINAGE DIST. No. 8 OF PEMISCOT COUNTY, APPELLANTS, v. McKAY ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

No. 5103.

Springfield Court of Appeals. Missouri.

June 22, 1932.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Pemiscot County. — Hon. John E. Duncan, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Sharon J. Pate and Von Mayes for appellant.

Charles Claflin Allen, Jr., Gallivan & Finch, Ward & Reeves and C.G. Shepard for respondents.

COX, P.J.

Action by Drainage District No. 8 of Pemiscot county upon bond of defendant, McKay, County Treasurer of Pemiscot county and Treasurer for the drainage district to recover back certain costs that accrued in the sale of certain lands in District No. 8 under judgments foreclosing the lien of the district for delinquent taxes due the district and which had been paid by the treasurer out of the sinking fund of said district upon warrants issued therefor. The facts were fully pleaded in the petition, answer and reply. The defendants then moved for judgment on the pleadings which motion the court sustained and rendered judgment for defendants. Plaintiff appealed.

The pleadings showed that at the sale the district became the purchaser at a bid which did not exceed the amount necessary to satisfy the judgment as the statute now provides it may do. [Section 11020, Revised Statutes 1929.] The exact amount of the bid is not stated but no question is raised as to that. It is insisted by appellant that the district could not pay costs that accrued in the foreclosure suit out of funds held by it in the sinking fund for the redemption of bonds of the district and since the warrants issued to pay these costs show upon their face that they were issued upon that fund for the purpose of paying costs, their illegality was apparent upon their face and for that reason the treasurer could not legally pay them and when he did pay them he became liable upon his bond to the district for the amount paid. Questions of estoppel and the effect of a final settlement by the treasurer with the county court are raised but in the view we take of this case, it will not be necessary to pass upon those questions.

The statute, section 11020, Revised Statutes 1929, under authority of which the district purchased the land provides as follows: "Drainage or levee districts heretofore or hereafter incorporated under any of the drainage or levee laws of this State where lands are offered for sale for their own taxes or assessments due thereon, shall be and are hereby authorized to buy such lands at not to exceed the amount of such taxes, assessments, interest, penalties and costs... ." This is followed by other provisions not material here. The last clause of the section contains a proviso as follows: "Provided, however, that no district shall have power to make any expenditures or disbursements of any kind or character under the provisions of this article out of any maintenance fund of such district." The authority of the district to pay the costs involved in this action depends upon the construction to be given this statute. Before passing directly to that question we shall call attention to a rule of construction that appears to us to be applicable here, to-wit: "A statute or ordinance will not be given a construction which will make it unreasonable or which will result in an absurdity." In Stack v. Banking Company, 283 Mo. 396, 223 S.W. 89, quotations from a number of cases in our Supreme Court are given which sustain that rule, a few of which are as follows:

In Lumber Co. v. R.R., 216 Mo. 658, 672, 116 S.W. 530, it is said that the court is often required to "look less at the letter or words of the statute than at the context or subject matter, the consequences and effects and the reason and spirit of the law in endeavoring to arrive at the will of the lawgiver."

In Keeney v. McVoy, 206 Mo. 42, 68, 103 S.W. 496, it is said: "The letter of the statute may be enlarged or restrained according to the true intent of the framers of the law."

In Gist v. Construction Company, 224 Mo. 369, 379, 123 S.W. 921: "It is a fundamental principle that laws ... are presumed passed in a spirit of justice and for the welfare of the community. It follows they should be so interpreted, if possible, as to further that purpose."

In St. Louis v. Christian Bros. College, 257 Mo. 541, 552, 165 S.W. 1057, it was held, "It is permissible in arriving at the intent of the law maker to...