State ex rel. Van Orden v. Floyd Circuit Court
Decision Date | 09 December 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 1080S384,1080S384 |
Citation | 412 N.E.2d 1216,274 Ind. 597 |
Parties | STATE of Indiana ex rel., Julie VAN ORDEN, Relator, v. FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT and The Honorable David W. Crumbo, Judge, Respondents. |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Charles L. Berger, Evansville, for relator.
Theo. L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Palmer K. Ward, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for respondents.
On March 25, 1980, defendant-relator Julie Van Orden was charged in Vanderburgh Circuit Court with the knowing and intentional killing of Russell Lloyd. Thereafter, defendant moved for a change of venue from the county. This motion was granted, and Floyd County was ultimately selected to receive the case. On July 17, 1980, defense counsel petitioned the respondent court for the appointment of an expert trained in psychiatry to assist him in the preparation of the defense. In response to this petition, and after hearing oral argument on the matter, the respondent court ordered defendant Van Orden examined by two psychiatrists to determine whether she is competent to stand trial. The court's order was made pursuant to Indiana Code § 35-5-3.1-1 et seq. (Burns 1979 Repl.).
On September 2, 1980, the respondent court held a hearing to determine relator's competency. Prior to the taking of evidence, defense counsel requested that defendant's competency be determined by a jury, arguing that such a procedure is required under the United States and Indiana Constitutions. The respondent court denied this request and proceeded, over objection, to hear evidence on this issue. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that defendant Van Orden is not capable of understanding the charge against her nor of meaningfully assisting her counsel in the preparation of her defense. Pursuant to the statutory provisions cited above, respondent ordered relator committed to the State Department of Mental Health. The court also denied defense counsel's request that this order be stayed pending the presentation of the case to this Court.
Thereafter, on September 26, 1980, defense counsel presented to this Court a verified petition for a writ of mandate. This petition alleged that respondent Judge Crumbo, as judge of the Floyd Circuit Court, had exceeded his jurisdiction in denying relator a jury trial on the issue of her competency to stand trial. At the initial hearing on this matter, this Court unanimously decided that no writ of mandate should issue. This opinion is in furtherance of that decision.
Relator presents two separate grounds as to why she should be accorded a jury trial on the issue of her competency to stand trial. Each of these grounds is constitutional in nature. First, she asserts that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a jury trial on this question. Second, she argues that a jury trial is required by article one, section twenty of the Indiana Constitution. We find these arguments to be without merit.
Ind. Code § 35-5-3.1-1 et seq. (Burns 1979 Repl.) establishes the procedure to be followed in determining this issue. Section 35-5-3.1-1 provides:
Thus, this section establishes that the necessary findings as to the accused's competence are to be made by the trial judge. Section 35-5-3.1-2 provides for the resumption of the proceedings when the defendant attains the necessary level of competency. Section 35-5-3.1-3 states, however, that the superintendent of the institution must certify within ninety days of commitment his belief as to whether there is a substantial probability that the defendant will reach the necessary levels of competency in the "foreseeable future." This section further provides:
Finally, § 35-5-3.1-5 provides:
"In no event shall the defendant be retained by the department of mental health pursuant to this chapter longer than a period of nine months."
Thus, a defendant may be institutionalized under these statutes for up to nine months, but commitment proceedings under Ind. Code § 16-14-9.1-1 et seq., must be initiated no later than six months after the defendant is first committed pursuant to these statutes.
We may quickly dispose of relator's argument that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a jury trial on this issue. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a jury trial in "criminal prosecutions." The proceeding to determine a person's competency to stand trial is simply not a "criminal prosecution." This hearing is, by definition, merely a preliminary procedure employed in some cases to insure full compliance with due process requirements. Drope v. Missouri, (1975) 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 846, 43 L.Ed.2d 103; Jackson v. Indiana, (1972) 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435; Pate v. Robinson, (1966) 383 U.S. 376, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815. In fact, this competency hearing is not required as a matter of course in every case. E.g., Parsley v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 297, 354 N.E.2d 185. Those cases in which the United States Supreme Court has discussed and applied the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial dealt specifically with the guilt-determining and incarceration phases of a criminal prosecution. See Baldwin v. New York, (1970) 399 U.S. 66, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437; Duncan v. Louisiana, (1968) 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491. Even in Bloom v. Illinois, (1968) 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522, which recognized a right to a jury trial in certain contempt cases, the Court was careful to equate criminal contempt with traditional...
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