State ex rel. W. Va. DHHR v. Carpenter
| Decision Date | 26 April 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 29774.,29774. |
| Citation | 211 W.Va. 176,564 S.E.2d 173 |
| Parties | STATE of West Virginia ex rel. WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES, Bureau for Child Support Enforcement and Jennifer Dawn Shepard, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees, v. James B. CARPENTER, Defendant Below, Appellant. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Michele L. Rusen, Rusen & White, Parkersburg, West Virginia, Attorney for Appellant.
Kimberly D. Bentley, Assistant General Counsel, Charleston, Daniel B. Douglass, II, Law Office of Daniel B. Douglass, II, Parkersburg, West Virginia, Attorneys for Appellee, West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Bureau for Child Support Enforcement.
C. Blaine Myers, Myers & Powell, Parkersburg, West Virginia, Attorney for Appellee, Jennifer Dawn Shepard.
James Carpenter, appellant/defendant below (hereinafter referred to as "Mr. Carpenter"), appeals from an order of the Circuit Court of Wood County. The circuit court's order required Mr. Carpenter to reimburse the Department of Health and Human Resources, Bureau for Child Support Enforcement (hereinafter referred to as "DHHR"), appellee/plaintiff below, $4,878.59 for birth and medical expenses paid on behalf of Jennifer Dawn Shepard (hereinafter referred to as "Ms. Shepard"), appellee/plaintiff below. Mr. Carpenter has raised numerous contentions in opposition to such payment. Essentially, Mr. Carpenter is alleging that he and Ms. Shepard should each be required to pay the reimbursement. Alternatively, Mr. Carpenter argues that a determination should be made of his ability to pay for the birth and medical expenses of his child. After reviewing the briefs and record in the case, the circuit court's order is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part, and the case is remanded.
This case arose as a result of the birth of a child to Ms. Shepard and Mr. Carpenter. Though not married, Ms. Shepard and Mr. Carpenter were living together in 1997 when Ms. Shepard became pregnant. During her pregnancy, Ms. Shepard sought and obtained medical financial assistance from DHHR. On November 9, 1997, Ms. Shepard gave birth to their child. Mr. Carpenter acknowledged paternity of the child immediately after the child was born. However, in 1998, Mr. Carpenter moved out of the home he shared with Ms. Shepard.
In 1999, the instant action was filed against Mr. Carpenter. The action sought to establish child support for the parties' child, as well as reimbursement of the birth and medical expenses paid by DHHR. The case was heard by a family law master1 on May 5, 1999, who submitted recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law to the circuit court. This recommendation included a requirement that Mr. Carpenter reimburse the full amount of the birth and medical expenses paid by DHHR on behalf of Ms. Shepard. Mr. Carpenter objected to he being solely responsible for payment of these expenses. The circuit court remanded the issue for the family law master to explain the reason for requiring Mr. Carpenter to be exclusively responsible for the birth and medical expenses. The family law master reconsidered the issue and again recommended Mr. Carpenter reimburse DHHR the full amount of birth and medical expenses. By order entered August 11, 2000, the circuit court adopted the family law master's recommended findings and conclusions. It is from these rulings that Mr. Carpenter now appeals.
This Court employs a three-pronged standard of review of appeals involving domestic relations matters. We set out this standard in Syllabus point 1 of Burnside v. Burnside, 194 W.Va. 263, 460 S.E.2d 264 (1995), as follows:
In reviewing challenges to findings made by a family law master that also were adopted by a circuit court, a three-pronged standard of review is applied. Under these circumstances, a final equitable distribution order is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard; the underlying factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law and statutory interpretations are subject to a de novo review.
By this standard, we review the arguments of the parties.
Mr. Carpenter has postured a number of reasons as to why it was error to require him to pay the full amount of reimbursement owed to DHHR for birth and medical expenses. The circuit court, in part, relied upon this Court's holding in Kathy L.B. v. Patrick J.B., 179 W.Va. 655, 371 S.E.2d 583 (1988), to hold Mr. Carpenter exclusively responsible for the reimbursement.
The decision in Kathy L.B. involved the birth of a child born out of wedlock. The mother of the child sought, among other things, reimbursement for birthing and medical expenses from the biological father of the child. The lower tribunals denied such relief. On appeal, this Court noted that nothing in the paternity statutes precluded recovery of birthing and medical expenses from the biological father as child support payment. Consequently, we held in Syllabus point 1, in part, of Kathy L.B. that "[i]n a paternity action ... the mother may recover the birth expenses ... from the child's natural father." 179 W.Va. 655, 371 S.E.2d 583.
Kathy L.B. involved the payment of birth expenses under our paternity statute. This prior decision also establishes a basis for the trial court's determination that Mr. Carpenter is obligated to reimburse DHHR for birthing and medical expenses as Kathy L.B. and the instant case both involved children born out of wedlock and biological fathers who did not provide financial support for birth and medical expenses. However, in Kathy L.B., the mother actually made the payments. In the instant case, DHHR made the payments. Therefore, a simple comparison of these facts suggests that it would be inconsistent for this Court to require a biological father to pay birth and medical expenses when the mother actually bore the costs, but to relieve the father of such an obligation when DHHR pays such expenses because of the mother's indigence.
On appeal to this Court, Mr. Carpenter contends that the requirement under Kathy L.B., that the biological father of a child born out of wedlock has the exclusive burden of paying birth expenses, is inconsistent with W. Va.Code § 48-12-102.2 We disagree. The relevant language in W. Va.Code § 48-12-102 (2001) (Repl.Vol.2001) provides that "[i]n every action to establish or modify an order which requires the payment of child support, the court shall ascertain the ability of each parent to provide medical care for the children of the parties." Kathy L.B. is not inconsistent with the equitable cost sharing provided under W. Va.Code § 48-12-102 because Kathy L.B. addressed the issue of payment of past birth expenses paid by a mother for a child born out of wedlock. On the other hand, W. Va.Code § 48-12-102 was intended to provide for establishing, if possible, joint payment of prospective health insurance coverage for children.3See Syl. pt. 2, Ball v. Wills, 190 W.Va. 517, 438 S.E.2d 860 (1993) (). Thus, W. Va. Code § 48-12-102 does not apply to an action brought by a mother or DHHR that seeks reimbursement for past birth expenses.
Mr. Carpenter next argues that he is being unlawfully discriminated against on the basis of his gender, because Ms. Shepard is not obligated to assume part of the costs of the birth and medical expenses. We will review this equal protection claim under rational basis scrutiny.4 See Syl. pt. 4, in part, Carvey v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 206 W.Va. 720, 527 S.E.2d 831 (1999) ( . Accord Syl. pt. 4, Gibson v. West Virginia Dep't of Highways, 185 W.Va. 214, 406 S.E.2d 440 (1991); Syl. pt. 4, Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale Grocery Co., 174 W.Va. 538, 328 S.E.2d 144 (1984); Syl. pt. 7, Atchinson v. Erwin, 172 W.Va. 8, 302 S.E.2d 78 (1983).
In response to this argument, DHHR has presented several reasons for its policy of not seeking reimbursement from unwed mothers for birth and medical expenses. Before DHHR makes the determination to provide payment for birth and medical expenses for a woman, the woman must prove that she is indigent under DHHR guidelines. In other words, Ms. Shepard became eligible for assistance from DHHR only because a determination was made that she could not pay the birth and medical expenses for her child.5 DHHR also asserts that it does not look at the income of a woman after a child has been born in order to determine whether the woman is in a better financial situation that may enable her to pay the reimbursement. Rather, DHHR has taken a policy position that pregnant indigent women may be discouraged from seeking necessary medical benefits if they would later be obligated to repay monies awarded. Thus, DHHR contends that its failure to seek reimbursement from Ms. Shepard was not because she was a woman but because it had determined that she was financially unable to pay.6See In re Comm'r of Soc. Servs. of Franklin County, 207 A.D.2d 162, 623 N.Y.S.2d 14, 16 (1995),
modified sub nom., ...
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In re Destiny GA, 30315.
...We recently held in Syllabus Point 3 of State ex rel. Dept. of Health and Human Resources, Bureau for Child Support Enforcement v. Carpenter, 211 W.Va. 176, 564 S.E.2d 173 (2002) The right of the Department of Health and Human Resources, Bureau for Child Support Enforcement to request the b......
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Aldona B. v. Southern
...by respondent pursuant to this Court's decision in State ex rel. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources v. Carpenter, 211 W.Va. 176, 564 S.E.2d 173 (2002). The circuit court distinguished Carpenter because, in that case, there was a prior determination that the mother was un......
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Preglimony.
...the trial court's discretion to grant or deny pregnancy and birthing costs); State ex rel. Dep't of Health & Human Res. v. Carpenter, 564 S.E.2d 173, 176 (W. Va. 2002) (requiring a biological father to reimburse the Department of Health and Human Resources for $4,879 in birth and medica......