State ex rel. Warfield v. Becht
| Decision Date | 20 March 1877 |
| Citation | 23 Minn. 411 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, ex rel. Henry Warfield, v. John C. Becht |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Habeas corpus. The case is stated in the opinion.
The writ of habeas corpus is discharged, and the relator remanded.
Davis O'Brien & Wilson, for petitioner.
J. N Granger, for respondent.
It is shown, by the return to the writ of habeas corpus, that the relator is held in custody by virtue of a warrant of commitment, issued by a judge of the district court to the respondent, who is sheriff of Ramsey county. It further appears that, upon certain proceedings supplementary to execution, under Gen. St. c. 66, title 24, the relator (against whom the money judgment upon which the execution issued had been recovered) had been ordered by the district court in which such proceedings were pending to deliver up certain property to a receiver, and, although duly notified of such order, the relator had, after due demand, wholly failed and neglected to comply with it; that thereupon he had been arrested, upon a warrant duly issued, and had been brought into court, and, upon a hearing, it had been adjudged that he was guilty of contempt in disobeying the order aforesaid. It was thereupon further ordered and adjudged that a fine of $ 25 be imposed upon him, and that he be committed to the common jail of Ramsey county for the term of one month, or until he be discharged by due process of law. The warrant of commitment under which the relator is held, as before mentioned, was issued, and the relator committed thereunder, in pursuance of this order and adjudication.
The proceedings which resulted in the commitment were had under the provisions of Gen. St. c. 66, § 307, and Gen. St. c. 87. Section 307 enacts that if any person disobey an order of a judge, in proceedings supplementary to an execution, he may be punished for a contempt. Section 1, chapter 87, makes disobedience of any lawful judgment, order, or process of a court a contempt of its authority; and subsequent sections of the same chapter provide for a regular course of proceedings, in accordance with which a person charged with contempt may be brought before the court, the charge investigated and determined, and the person charged punished if found guilty.
It is contended on behalf of the relator that the commitment in this case, and the statutes under which it was had, are obnoxious to certain provisions of our bill of rights.
The provisions referred to are found in sections 4, 6, 7, and 12, of the 1st article of our state constitution. Section 12, which is principally relied on, declares that "no person shall be imprisoned for debt in this state," etc. In the case at bar the imprisonment is for contempt in refusing to obey an order of the court. It is true that the order relates to the debt evidenced by the judgment against the relator, but this in no way alters the fact that the imprisonment is for the contempt, not for the debt. And the contempt does not consist in the relator's neglect or refusal to pay the debt, but in his disobedience of the order directing him to hand over certain property to the receiver. The fact that the property in question is to be handed over, for the purpose of being applied to the payment of the judgment, is in no way important. The commitment is, nevertheless, in no proper sense imprisonment for debt.
Section 7 of the bill of rights declares that no person shall be deprived of liberty without "due process of law." By due process of law is to be understood "law in its regular course of administration through courts of justice." 2 Kent 13; Baker v. Kelley, 11 Minn. 480; Rowan v. State, 30 Wis. 129; Sedgwick Const. Law, 2d ed., 474, and note; Cooley Const. Lim. 351. The commitment in this case was by due...
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