BUFORD, Justice.
This cause is
before us on petition to clarify our order of March 16, 1945
denying writ of quo warranto on information filed by the
Attorney General of Florida.
This information
alleges that on January 15, 1944, the respondent made and
entered into an agreement with Local Union No. 57 of the
United Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers, Damp and
Waterproof Workers Association, a labor union operating in
Dade County, Florida, and by said agreement specifically
contracted with said labor union as follows:
'Article 1. The
terms of this agreement are hereby recognized and accepted as
binding on both parties hereto and shall apply in the manner
and under the conditions specified herein to the application
preparing for application, removing when material is to be
used again and supervising the removal when material is to be
replaced, of all roofing, damp or waterproofing, insulating
materials when used in connection with the above named
materials and all other work in connection with or incidental
thereto included in the jurisdictional claims of the United
Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers, Damp and Waterproof
Workers Association, and none but journeymen roofers and
waterproofers and apprentices who have a membership card of
permit and referral card from Local No. 57 shall be employed
on said work.
'Article 2
Sec. I--Local No. 57 hereby agrees to furnish at all times to
the above named contractor, duly qualified journeyman
roofers, waterproofers or apprentices to meet the necessary
requirements in sufficient numbers as may be necessary to
properly executed work contracted for by the Contractor in
the manner and under conditions specified in this agreement.
'Sec. II.
Whenever after reasonable notice (48 hours) Local No. 57 is
unable to furnish a sufficient number of qualified roofers,
waterproofers or apprentices to meet the necessary
requirements of the Contractor, then the Contractor may
secure from other sources such additional journeyman roofers
or waterproofers as may be necessary, it being
understood that these men shall be eligible for and shall
comply with the requirements of membership in Local No. 57,
and thus become parties to this agreement.
'Article 3. No
member or permit man of Local No. 57 may work for any other
than a bona fide roofing or waterproofing contractor who has
signed this agreement and no member of any firm or company of
roofing or waterproofing contractors may work as described in
Article 1 of this agreement, without a legal permit from
Local No. 57. These permits to be limited as to time and work
to be done and will only be issued in cases of emergency.
'Article 4. No
member or permit man of Local No. 57 may do lump, job or
piecework
and no Contractor who is a party to this agreement may
sub-let or sub-contract any work as described in Article 1 of
this agreement, to any other than a bona fide roofing
contractor, who uses Union Labor exclusively.
* * *
* * *
'Article 8.
Contractors who take work in another Local's territory
shall take half their crew from this Local and obtain half of
the crew from the Local where the job is located. If there is
a difference in the wage scale, the higher scale shall be
paid to the members of Local 57.
* * *
* * *
'Article 10. *
* * All foremen shall be members of Local No. 57 and shall
receive a minimum of $1.00) one dollar per day above regular
rate.
* * *
* * *
'Article 12.
Apprentices shall serve an apprenticeship of two years,
except when deemed competent, he may be promoted to
journeyman without regard to time serviced, with consent of
Local No. 57. He may work on composition roofing only and
under the direct supervision of a composition journeyman. Not
more than two apprentices may work with each journeyman.
* * *
* * *
'Article 17. Should any Contractor who is a party to this
agreement subsequently repudiate this agreement or any other
agreement of a Local Union affiliated with the Roofers United
Association and operate as an unfair shop, Local No. 57
agrees not to consider an application from such Contractor to
again become a party to this agreement, without the written
approval of two-thirds of the Contractors who are operating
under this agreement.'
It then alleges
that in November, 1944, the following amendment to Section 12
of the Constitution was adopted:
'Section 12. No
person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense, nor compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken without just compensation. The right of
persons to work shall not be denied, or abridged on account
of membership or non-membership in any labor union, or labor
organization; provided, that this clause shall not be
construed to deny or abridge the right of employees by and
through a labor organization or labor union to bargain
collectively with their employer. (Italics supplied)'
It then alleges
that the said agreement is nevertheless being arbitrarily
continued in force.
It then alleges:
'That the
respondent did not make such contract under any directive of
the National War Labor Board and is not engaged in work
contributory to the war effort by the national government.
That the respondent is engaged solely in installing and
repairing roofs in Dade County, Florida, for private
individuals and private corporations.', and prays,
'Whereupon the
said Attorney General of the State of Florida, for and in
behalf of the said State and the people thereof, prays the
advice of this Court in the premises and that due process of
law issue against the said Dade County Roofing Co., Inc., in
this behalf, and that the Court will declare that the
complained of portions of said agreement are null and void as
being in conflict with the Constitution and laws of Florida;
and that the Court will oust the respondent
from usurping and exercising its corporate franchises,
privileges and rights by doing business under and with the
aid of said complained of portions of said agreement,
contrary to law.'
We are not
unmindful of the principle enunciated in State ex rel. Landis
et al. v. S. H. Kress & Co., 115 Fla. 189, 155 So. 823,
824, stated as follows:
'In quo
warranto by Attorney General to oust foreign corporation from
permit to do business in state, court has no discretion but
to issue the writ, irrespective of sufficiency in law of the
allegations of the information.'
This enunciation
has theretofore been stated in State by Ellis, Attorney
General, ex rel. Moodie v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 39 So.
929, and was reiterated in State ex rel. Landis, Attorney
General, v. Valz, 117 Fla. 311, 157 So. 651.
However, since the
rendition of the opinions, we have adopted rules of the
Supreme Court calculated to bring to quicker conclusion the
determination of matters presented here. Amongst others is
Rule 27, which provides:
'Rule 27.
Extraordinary Writs, Mandamus, Certiorari, Prohibition, Quo
Warranto, Habeas Corpus, and Stay Writs.
'(1) The
provisions of Rule 27 are applicable to Rule 28 to 33, both
inclusive.
'(a) When
Heard. Notice.--All applications for writs of mandamus,
certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
other writs necessary to the complete exercise of the
jurisdiction of this Court as authorized by Section 5,
Article 5 of the Constitution shall be made as herein
provided and may be heard any Monday at 9:30 A. M., provided
five days notice of such application shall have been given to
the adverse party and proof thereof filed with the Clerk of
this Court.
'(b) Writs
Raising Issue of Fact Not Heard.--Application raising
questions of facts which will require the taking of testimony
to determine will not be entertained.
'(c) Brief
Served on Respondent. Copy of every brief required with any
application shall be furnished the adverse party.
'(d) If presented in person, not exceeding ten minutes to
the side will be allowed for argument. If more time is
desired the cause will, on application of either party, be
set for a day certain and the full time given.'
This rule was
adopted for the purpose of simplifying procedure and
eliminating much useless pleading in this Court.
So it is that under
this Rule we may now proceed to examine an information in quo
warranto (after notice and opportunity for being heard by the
opposite party) and, on the showing made, determine whether
or not a prima facie showing for relief as prayed is made by
the information, and thereupon either issue or deny the writ.
Such was the course followed in the instant case resulting in
the entry of our Order of March 16, 1945, supra.
In proceeding thus
we followed our enunciation in State ex rel. Watson,
Attorney General, v. Hurlbert, Fla. 20 So.2d 693,
wherein we held:
'Where
information in quo warranto filed in the name of state on
relation of Attorney General sets out with particularity the
facts upon which alleged usurpation of office is predicated
and such facts show a legal right to the office in
respondent, information will be adjudged insufficient and
writ denied.'
As above stated
the relator sought judgment of this Court declaring that the
quoted provisions of the involved contract or agreement were
null and void as being in conflict with the Constitution.
This presents or tenders an issue which this Court is without
original jurisdiction to determine as it is in effect an
effort to reform a contract which is a matter of chancery
jurisdiction...
