State ex rel. West v. City of Des Moines

• Decision Date: 21 January 1896
• Citation: 65 N.W. 818,96 Iowa 521
• Parties: STATE EX REL. WEST v. CITY OF DES MOINES.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

96 Iowa 521

65 N.W. 818

STATE EX REL. WEST

v.CITY OF DES MOINES.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 21, 1896.

Appeal from district court, Polk county; C. P. Holmes, Judge.

Quo warranto to test the right of the defendant city to exercise corporate authority over certain territory added to said city by legislative enactment. Prior to 1890 the corporate limits of the city of Des Moines embraced eight square miles. By an act of the 23d general assembly approved March 3, 1890, it is provided “that the boundaries of all cities in this state, which had by the state census of 1885, a population of thirty thousand or more, are hereby extended two and one-half miles in each direction from the present boundaries of said cities. Such extension being so made as to leave the boundaries hereby created in a perfect rectangle; that all territory embraced within said extended boundaries, whether the same is contained in cities, incorporated towns or otherwise, shall be and become a part of the city and subject to its jurisdiction and authority; and the corporate character of any annexed territory within the extended boundaries herein specified, shall cease and determine.” Other sections of the act provide for the payment of the indebtedness of the cities so enlarged, and of the indebtedness of the cities within the annexed territory; for the exemption from taxation of lands used in good faith for agricultural or horticultural purposes; for the reorganization of the wards of said cities, and for elections therein. By the census of 1885, only the city of Des Moines was affected by the act, and, with the territory thus annexed, it embraces 54 square miles. In the added territory were only 1 city and 7 incorporated towns. These 8 corporations embraced, including 1 1/2 square miles of platted land not incorporated, 13 square miles, which, with 33 square miles of unplatted and unincorporated land, make the added territory to the city 46 square miles. The provisions of the act by which the municipal governments other than that of the city of Des Moines were to become extinct, and the entire territory become one corporation or municipality, were observed, so that in April, 1890, the change was complete, since which time the city of Des Moines has been thus constituted, and has exercised throughout said territory the rights and functions of a city government, including the levy and collection of taxes; establishing, opening, vacating, changing, and improving streets; the making of contracts; and the creating and payment of debts. In March, 1894, the state of Iowa, on the relation of A. G. West, filed in the district court of Polk county its information, in the nature of a quo warranto, reciting the provisions of the act of the 23d general assembly; that it has application alone to the city of Des Moines; that the act is unconstitutional and void, as being repugnant to the constitution of the state, in that it is a local or special law amending the charter of the city of Des Moines; that it, in effect, creates a corporation by the enactment of special laws; and that, if it is to be deemed a general law, it has not had, and cannot have, uniform operation. It is alleged in the information that, because of the invalidity of the act by which the city limits were enlarged, the acts of the city, as to the added territory, are without authority of law; and it is asked that they be so adjudged, and that the city be ousted from the exercise of such authority. To the information there was a demurrer, and the parties stipulated the facts; and the case, in that condition, was submitted to the court, which sustained the demurrer as to some parts, and overruled it as to others. By the ruling, the facts as stated in the information, together with those stipulated, were held insufficient to justify a decree for plaintiff, and from a judgment dismissing the petition the plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.Gatch, Connor & Weaver, for appellant.

J. K. Macomber, A. P. Chamberlain, and Hugh Brennan, for appellee.

GRANGER, J.

1. It is first said that the relator, A. G. West, has not sufficient interest to authorize him to invoke the action of the court in behalf of the state. Mr. West is not a citizen of Des Moines, as enlarged; but he is the owner of land within the added territory, but not in any of the corporations as they were before the annexation. The assessed valuation of his land is $80, and it is estimated that he pays city taxes thereon to the amount of $1.31. This is thought to be too trifling an interest to permit him to institute the action. The law provides that when the county attorney, on demand, refuses or neglects to commence such an action, any citizen of the state having an interest in the question may apply to the court in which the action is commenced, or to the judge thereof, for leave to do so, and upon obtaining such leave he may prosecute the action to final judgment. Code, § 3348. This provision of the law was complied with, and leave granted by the district court. This action is conclusive upon us. The law does not define what the interest shall be, and, conceding that it must be a substantial one, it was a question for the district court. It was a question to be settled before the suit was commenced. The language of the law is that “upon obtaining such leave he may prosecute the action to final judgment.” Certainly the question of fact, as to the extent of the interest, is one confided to the court to which application is made.

2. The constitutional questions as to the validity of the law making the annexation are important. The parties, in argument, concede that the learned judge who tried the case below held the law to be unconstitutional, but denied the relief asked on the ground of laches or estoppel. Appellee, however, in this court, insists that such a holding was erroneous, and the questions are for consideration. Logically, the first question is whether or not the act is general, or local and special, in its application. It will be seen that the act, in terms, is made to apply to all cities which had, by the state census of 1885, a population of 30,000. If the act had specified the city of Des Moines as the one whose boundaries were to be extended, there would be no question that the law is local in its application. The law, as enacted, just as explicitly confines its application to the city of Des Moines as if the city had, in words, been named, for it was the only city in the state having the requisite population. Appellee contends that because of the language of the act, by which it is to apply to “all cities in this state, which had, by the state census of 1885, a population of 30,000 or more,” it is a law of general application. The constitutional language is, after stating certain exceptions, “All laws shall be general and of uniform operation throughout the state.” It is not necessary to an observance of this provision that the law should operate uniformly on all the people of the state, nor, when the legislation pertains to cities, is it important that it should operate uniformly on all cities throughout the state. But if the law is made to operate upon a particular condition as to persons or property, and is operative whenever and wherever the same conditions exist, affixing the same consequences, then it is a general law in its operation, even though it only operates on one of the conditions or classes specified. To illustrate, we may instance the laws regulating banking, insurance, agricultural societies, and the like. If the law is so framed that it does and can apply to but one bank, company, or society, in its operation, it is special legislation. General legislation looks not alone to the present, but to the future; and a law which at a given time operates as to only one bank, company, or society, because there is but one such, but is so framed as to operate on the same conditions, when and where they arise in the state, is a general law, and of uniform operation. See McAunich v. Railroad Co., 20 Iowa, 338;Express Co. v. Ellyson, 28 Iowa, 370;Von Phul v. Hammer, 29 Iowa, 222;Haskel v. City of Burlington, 30 Iowa, 232. This rule is one of general recognition. As applied to cities, if the act is such that it is operative, because of its terms, to but a single city, it is local legislation. Town of McGregor v. Baylies, 19 Iowa, 43;Owen v. City of Sioux City (Iowa) 59 N. W. 3. Counsel for the defendant city cite the above cases, with many others announcing the same rule, and on them base the claim that the act under consideration is of general application, even though there is but one city to which it can apply. It is true that in many of the cases cited, where the law has been held of general application, there was but one city of the class intended to come within the rule of the legislative act; but it is not true that in any of the cases a law, though general in terms, where it could in no event become operative on but a single city, has been held to be a general law. Had the act in question been made applicable to all cities of over 30,000 inhabitants, without a qualification that, under known facts, would exclude its operation as to any other such city, the case would be different. But because a law thus arbitrarily extending city limits could not be made of general application, because of the absence of conditions to justify it, it was made to apply only to cities of that number of inhabitants at a particular date in the past, when there was but one such city to which it could apply, so as to avoid the possibility, even, of any other city coming within its provisions. The act is singularly specific in this respect, not even permitting any chances as to what might be the actual population of other cities but making it dependent on the census return of 1885, known at the time the act was passed, which clearly proves that only the city of Des Moines was intended as the subject of such legislation....