State ex rel. Whaley v. Gaertner, 42071.

• Decision Date: 09 September 1980
• Docket Number: No. 42071.,42071.
• Citation: 605 S.W.2d 506
• Parties: STATE ex rel. Fred O. WHALEY, Petitioner, v. Hon. Carl R. GAERTNER, Judge, Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

605 S.W.2d 506

STATE ex rel. Fred O. WHALEY, Petitioner, v. Hon. Carl R. GAERTNER, Judge, Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Respondent.

No. 42071.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.

April 22, 1980.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer Denied June 20, 1980.

Application to Transfer Denied September 9, 1980.

Prudence W. Kramer, Sommers & Holloran, Inc., St. Louis, for petitioner.

G. Keith Phoenix, Shepherd, Sandberg & Phoenix, Parks G. Carpenter, St. Louis, for respondent.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied June 20, 1980.

CLEMENS, Senior Judge.

Original proceeding in mandamus to compel respondent judge to set aside his order by which he dismissed relator's petition against Ford Motor Corp. on the ground of improper venue in St. Louis City. The issue now raised concerns proper venue when both defendants are corporations. Respondent judge dismissed the petition as to Ford Motor Corp. for improper venue.

Relator Fred O. Whaley was the plaintiff and he now seeks our order to compel respondent to resume jurisdiction. Whaley is a St. Louis County resident and it was there he was injured by an allegedly defective Ford truck. The two corporate defendants were the Ford Motor Company, a Delaware corporation, as manufacturer of the truck, and the Gene Taylor Ford Company, a Missouri corporation, who sold plaintiff the truck.¹

As to Ford, summons was served in St. Louis City on the "C T Corporation System" whom Ford, as a foreign corporation, had designated its registered agent for service of process. (Sect. 351.630 1. RSMo. 1969).

On Ford's motion the respondent judge dismissed plaintiff's petition as to Ford on the ground of improper venue. We granted a temporary writ of mandamus to compel respondent judge to resume jurisdiction over Ford. The cause has now been briefed and submitted. We find the temporary writ was improvidently granted.

Both parties agree the core of this issue is the venue provision, Section 508.040 RSMo. 1969. With our emphasis added it reads: "Suits against corporations shall be commenced either in the county where the cause of action accrued² .... or in any county where such corporations shall have or usually keep an office or agent for the transaction of their usual and customary business."

Relator now contends, and respondent agrees, that the issue is whether under the quoted statute the "C T Corporation System" is Ford's agent for the transaction of Ford's "usual and customary business". Respondent contends the "C T Corporation System" is not such an agent.

In interpreting this language, we determine the legislative intent "from the words used, if possible, and in doing so the words should be given their plain and ordinary meaning so as to promote the object and manifest purpose of the statute." Pedroli v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 524 S.W.2d 882 1-2 (Mo.App.1975). We give meaning to every statutory word and "when the language of a statute is unambiguous and conveys a plain and definite meaning, the courts have no business foraging among such statutory construction rules to look for or impose another meaning." DePoortere v. Commercial Credit Corp., 500 S.W.2d 724 1-4 (Mo.App.1973).

The respondent judge ruled—and relator does not contend otherwise—that "Ford conducts no business in the City of St. Louis". The respondent judge further "takes notice of the commonly known fact the C T Corporation is an entity which exists for the sole purpose of acting as registered agent for foreign corporations. The scope of its agency is to receive and transmit notices and process. It does not transact any of the usual or customary business of its clients." In dismissing plaintiff's petition as to Ford the respondent judge concluded: "Accordingly, this Court holds that in the absence of any office or agent for the transaction of its usual and customary business in the City of St. Louis, the mere fact that a corporation has denominated C T Corporation with its office in the City of St. Louis as its registered agent and legal place of residence is not sufficient to confer venue over such corporation in the City of St. Louis under 508.040."

Relator challenges the respondent's ruling that the existence of "C T Corporation System" in St. Louis City did not confer venue there over Ford. He relies on three cases we have considered.

Relator relies on the word "agent" as discussed in Pagliara v. Stussie, 549 S.W.2d 900 (Mo.App.1977). That case did not concern the issue now before us-service of summons on a registered agent. Instead, the status of the individual agent served there-as distinguished from service on the registered...