State ex rel. White v. Davis

• Decision Date: 22 November 2005
• Docket Number: No. WD 64791.,WD 64791.
• Citation: 174 S.W.3d 543
• Parties: STATE of Missouri ex rel. Dan WHITE, Clay County Prosecutor, Relator, v. The Honorable Elizabeth DAVIS, Judge of Division 5 of the Circuit Court of Clay County, Missouri, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

174 S.W.3d 543

STATE of Missouri ex rel. Dan WHITE, Clay County Prosecutor, Relator, v. The Honorable Elizabeth DAVIS, Judge of Division 5 of the Circuit Court of Clay County, Missouri, Respondent.

No. WD 64791.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

August 2, 2005.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied October 4, 2005.

Application for Transfer Denied November 22, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Andrew W. Hassell, Office of Attorney General, Jefferson City, for Appellant.

Ruth E. Smalley, Office of Public Defender, Liberty, for Respondent.

RONALD R. HOLLIGER, Presiding Judge.

Dan White, the Clay County Prosecutor (hereinafter "Relator"), seeks a writ of certiorari asking this court to quash the grant by respondent of a habeas corpus writ ordering the release of Joshua Trowbridge from confinement in the Clay County Jail. Trowbridge was confined pursuant to a capias warrant issued by the Honorable Rex A. Gabbert, another judge of that circuit, pending a probation revocation hearing. Trowbridge argued that on the face of the record he was being illegally held because his probation term had expired.

Relator contends that Judge Davis exceeded her jurisdiction in granting the writ on two grounds. First, relator argues that habeas corpus relief was unavailable to Trowbridge because he had other adequate remedies available to seek relief. As part of that argument the relator contends that respondent had no right to use habeas corpus to interfere in a pending case. A corollary of that argument is that the respondent by means of habeas corpus was, in effect, exercising appellate jurisdiction over another division of the same court and/or prohibition (which the relator argues the habeas relief amounts to) when such relief is reserved exclusively to the appellate courts and the Supreme Court. Finally the State argues in the alternative that the grant of relief was inappropriate because Trowbridge's probation had not expired prior to the initiation of the probation revocation proceedings.

We granted certiorari and now deny the State's request to quash the writ of habeas corpus.

Factual and Procedural Background

On August 16, 2002, Trowbridge pleaded guilty to the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance. The plea judge suspended imposition of sentence and placed Trowbridge on a two-year term of probation, with participation in the county drug court program.

Trowbridge's term on probation was not without incident. On September 6, 2002, he violated conditions imposed by the drug court and was placed in the Clay County Jail for seventy-two hours. On July 18, 2003, a probation violation report was filed, resulting in the suspension of Trowbridge's probation on August 15, 2003, as well as the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. A second probation violation report was filed on August 29, 2003. A probation revocation hearing was held before Judge Gabbert on September 26, 2003. At that time, Trowbridge admitted violating terms of his probation because of his failure to return to in-patient drug treatment.

An "amended sentence and judgment" entered by Judge Gabbert following the September 26 hearing forms the crux of the underlying dispute between Trowbridge and the State. The amended judgment recited that imposition of sentence was suspended and indicated that Trowbridge was ordered to complete a two-year term of probation. The parties, here, disagree as to whether this amended judgment served to extend Trowbridge's probation (pursuant to Section 559.036.3, RSMo) or whether it was merely recapitulation of the terms from the original judgment with regard to probation with an additional requirement of institutional drug treatment. If it was not sufficient to extend his probation, then Trowbridge's probation would expire in mid-August 2004.

The "amended sentence and judgment" purported to place Trowbridge in the custody of the Department of Corrections for 120 days for institutional drug treatment pursuant to Section 559.115, RSMo 2000.¹ Such placement is, of course, impossible without the imposition of a sentence. Because Trowbridge had a suspended imposition of sentence he could not be placed in the 559.115 program. Section 217.785, RSMo, however, permits the placement of a defendant in an institutional drug treatment program as a condition of probation without revocation or, as in this case, imposition of a sentence. Upon completion of that program the defendant returns to community supervised probation automatically without further action of the court. Although there is no documentation in the file changing the terms and description of the drug treatment placement, Trowbridge apparently entered the institutional treatment phase under 217.785 and returned to regular probation thereafter.

This did not end Trowbridge's difficulties on probation. On June 3, 2004, Trowbridge was, again, ordered to spend forty-eight hours in the Clay County Jail following the filing of a probation violation report. Another probation violation report was filed on September 29, 2004, that alleged that Trowbridge was using methamphetamine. A third violation report was filed on October 7, 2004, alleging that he violated the terms of his probation by failing to report, to advise his probation officer of his current address, to enter a treatment program, and to submit to drug surveillance. The report also alleged that Trowbridge had absconded from supervision. Judge Gabbert issued a capias warrant, leading to Trowbridge's arrest on October 20, 2004. Another probation violation report was filed on November 2, 2004, adding allegations of marijuana and alcohol use, as well as failure to appear in court.

A motion to dismiss was filed by Trowbridge, arguing that his probation had expired as a matter of law on August 16, 2004, and that Judge Gabbert lacked jurisdiction to conduct probation revocation proceedings. At a hearing held on November 4, 2004, Judge Gabbert declined to permit argument on the motion to dismiss and denied Trowbridge's oral motion for release from custody pending the revocation hearing. The probation revocation hearing was continued until December 2, 2004.

Trowbridge then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on November 8, 2004, which was assigned to Judge Davis, the respondent in the present matter. That writ petition alleged that Trowbridge's detention in the Clay County Jail was illegal because his probation had expired and the Circuit Court of Clay County had no jurisdiction to revoke his probation. Argument was held on the writ petition on November 18, 2004. Judge Davis granted the writ petition the following day, ordering Trowbridge released from the Clay County Jail.

Daniel White, the Clay County Prosecutor, then filed the present writ of certiorari seeking that the writ of habeas corpus be quashed.

Discussion

Here, Trowbridge sought and obtained a writ of habeas corpus from Judge Davis to obtain his release from custody on the basis that he was illegally confined.² Given that there is no appeal from such a grant, the State may obtain review by filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the appropriate appellate court. State ex rel. Beaird v. Del Muro, 98 S.W.3d 902, 906 (Mo.App.2003). We grant review in such matters as a matter of course and of right. Id. Following review, we may either quash the writ of habeas corpus, or uphold the actions of the habeas court. Id. Our review is limited to a determination of whether the habeas court exceeded the bounds of its jurisdiction. Id. We review only questions of law, not of fact, and are generally limited to the record before the habeas court. Id. at 907. Questions of sufficiency of the evidence, however, are questions of law and may be considered by this court in conducting its review. Id.

Relator presents two arguments in support of its petition for certiorari relief. First, the State contends that Judge Davis both lacked jurisdiction and exceeded her jurisdiction in granting Trowbridge's petition for writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he had other adequate remedies available to him. As part of this argument the State also contends that respondent had no jurisdiction to interfere in a pending probation revocation proceeding before Judge Gabbert. Alternatively, the State contends that Judge Davis exceeded her jurisdiction in granting habeas relief because Trowbridge's probation had been properly extended in September 2003 and thus the circuit court still had jurisdiction to revoke his probation.

Relator argues that Trowbridge's appropriate remedy was a writ of prohibition filed in this court.³ Although prohibition is an available remedy in a situation such as this, it is not the exclusive means of relief. Historically habeas corpus has been frequently used in probation revocation situations. In Beaird, for instance, this court affirmed the issuance of a habeas corpus writ by a circuit court judge with regard to an individual incarcerated following a probation revocation proceeding before another judge of the same court. Id. at 910. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was brought after revocation but challenged not the expiration of probation but the procedure used in the revocation hearing (notice was inadequate). The habeas relief, therefore, returned the probationer to his pre-revocation status where revocation proceedings could be resumed.

Obviously, this case comes to us in a different procedural posture than Beaird in that Trowbridge's probation has not been revoked but, he argues, has expired.⁴ Is the difference significant? Relator argues that the remedies available to an individual facing probation revocation differ at various stages of the proceeding. Considering those remedies is important, the relator urges, as "[t]he relief available under a writ of habeas corpus has traditionally been very limited, and courts are not required to issue this extraordinary writ where other remedies are adequate and...