State Ex rel. Wilcox v. Ryder
| Decision Date | 12 June 1914 |
| Docket Number | 18,704,18,707,18,708 - (21,22,23) |
| Citation | 147 N.W. 953,126 Minn. 95 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. RICHARD S. WILCOX v. ANNA M. RYDER; STATE ex rel. RICHARD S. WILCOX v. C. E. GILBERT and Another; STATE ex rel. RICHARD S. WILCOX v. A. M. WHITFORD and Another |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Three actions in the district court for Ramsey county under Laws 1913, p. 815, c. 562, for abatement of bawdy houses. The cases were tried before Dickson, J., who made findings and ordered judgment in favor of plaintiff restraining the maintenance of the houses, and against plaintiff in respect to the seizure and sale of the furniture, fixtures, musical instruments and movable property in the houses, in respect to the effectual closing of the houses for one year or at all and in respect to the recovery of the penalty of $300. From the judgment entered pursuant to the order for judgment plaintiff appealed. Reversed in part.
Abatement of nuisance -- equity jurisdiction -- disorderly house.
1. Independently of statute, the jurisdiction of equity extended to abatement of nuisances long prior to the enactment of Laws 1913, c. 562, relating to abatement of bawdy houses, and the legislature had power, subject only to constitutional limitations, to extend such jurisdiction to the general subject-matter of such act.
Statute -- presumption of validity.
2. In the enactment of statutory law, the legislature is presumed to have intended to keep within constitutional bounds, and, unless a statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, it must be sustained.
Act construed not penal.
3. Laws 1913, c. 562, held intended by the legislature to be a civil, as distinguished from a penal, act, especially in view of the fact that, when it was enacted, the criminal aspect of maintenance of bawdy houses was already fully covered by existing statutes which had not resulted in efficient repression or suppression of the evil aimed at.
Right to trial by jury.
4. Since the constitutional right to jury trial merely preserves such right as it existed when the Constitution was adopted, and is inapplicable to actions based upon equitable causes of action or for equitable relief alone, Laws 1913, c. 562, being manifestly intended to repress the nuisance of bawdy houses by equitable attack upon the property of those engaged in or abetting them, and not to punish offenders by infliction of personal penalties, except as for contempt, does not violate the constitutional guaranty of jury trial merely because the thing declared a nuisance, and against which the remedies of the act are provided, would, in its maintenance, have constituted a crime at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
Act constitutional.
5. The act is not penal, either in its general aspect, or in its details, with reference to forfeiture and sale of personal property used in maintaining the nuisance, the closing, to all purposes for one year, of premises in which the lewd business is carried on, the imposition of a money exaction against the property and persons participating in the nuisance, or otherwise; and hence it neither violates the Constitution, as denying jury trial in criminal proceedings, nor contravenes constitutional limitations as to excessive fines and unusual punishments, right to be confronted by witnesses, testifying against one's self, and bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.
Court has jurisdiction to grant full relief.
6. Viewed as a civil action, proceedings under the act, being equitable, do not require a jury trial, and the court, having properly assumed jurisdiction thereof, had power to grant full relief, incidental as well as primary.
Act unaffected by validity of section 7.
7. Section 7 of the act, relating to the right of the owner of the premises to obtain release thereof by giving bond and paying costs, is unnecessarily drastic, but the other sections are not affected thereby even if it be held invalid.
Forfeiture.
8. The act is not invalid as entailing unconstitutional forfeitures of estate upon conviction for an offense, the legislature having power to provide for specific forfeitures for specific acts, including total destruction, in a proper case, of property per se innocent; nor does it authorize summary forfeitures and penalties without sufficient notice and hearing.
Police power.
9. The act, in its remedial details as well as its general purpose, is a proper exercise of the police power, under the test that a police measure must fairly tend to accomplish the purpose of its enactment and must not go beyond the reasonable demands of the occasion.
Richard D. O'Brien, County Attorney, and Patrick J. Ryan, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
Thomas J. Newman, James Cormican, James Schoonmaker, William F. Hunt, S. J. Donnelly and Harry Weiss, for respondents.
Three separate actions under Laws 1913, p. 815, c. 562, for abatement of bawdy houses. The complaints were sufficient in form and substance to authorize full relief under the statute, and all defendants, except Towne, upon whom no service of summons was made, answered to the following effect: Defendant Gilbert admitted that she resided in and worked as housekeeper of the house claimed to be a nuisance, but denied the other allegations of the complaint. Defendant Drewry admitted ownership of the premises, alleged the leasing thereof to one Harrigan, and denied acquaintance or dealings with defendant Gilbert, and knowledge or notice of her occupancy of the premises or the use thereof alleged. Defendant Ryder admitted ownership, occupancy and control of the building, and denied all other allegations. Defendant Whitford, charged with maintenance of the house, denied the charge, and defendant Towne, alleged to be the owner thereof, did not appear. The court found that defendants Whitford and Ryder were engaged as claimed, that defendant Harrigan was lessee from defendant Drewry and owned the personal property used therein, defendant Gilbert being his housekeeper, aiding and abetting in the conduct of the business, and, further, that defendant Drewry, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have ascertained and known of the use made of such premises. No findings were made against defendant Towne. Plaintiff was found entitled to injunctions perpetually restraining all defendants, except Towne, from further conducting or maintaining the public nuisances alleged, but no other relief, and appealed from the judgments entered accordingly.
Defendants' point as to insufficiency of the assignments of error, is overruled because nonprejudicial, and we proceed to the merits. All questions raised hinge upon the constitutionality, effect, and construction of the act referred to, which, being too voluminous to quote in full, may be summarized as follows:
Sec. 1. "Whosoever shall erect, establish, continue, maintain, use, own or lease" any building, etc., used for lewdness, etc., is guilty of a nuisance, and such building, etc., and also the movable personalty so used itself, constitutes a nuisance subject to abatement as such.
Sec. 2. "An action in equity" to perpetually enjoin the nuisance and to restrain all parties from maintaining or allowing it, may be maintained in the name of the state upon relation of the county attorney or any citizen of the county; defendants to be served as in other actions, and the court, or judge in vacation, "shall," without requiring bond, allow a temporary injunction if satisfied by affidavits, or other evidence previously ordered to be produced, of the existence of the nuisance, and, upon application for such writ, an ex parte restraining order may issue, restraining all persons from interfering with the movable property used in conducting the nuisance, the same to be served by handing to and leaving with the person in charge of the property or residing in the premises a copy thereof, or by posting a copy on the premises, etc., or by both. The serving officer shall forthwith make return into court and also inventory the movable property. Three days written notice shall be given defendants of the hearing of the application for the temporary injunction, which, however, issues as a matter of course if the case be continued upon their application. Defendants notified shall serve answers before date set for hearing, and extension of time to answer, though allowable by the court, shall not prevent issue of the temporary writ. Injunction granted binds all defendants throughout the judicial district and its violation constitutes contempt.
Sec. 3. Action is triable as other actions in the district court. Evidence of general reputation of the place is admissible to prove existence of the nuisance, and "shall be prima facie evidence" thereof and of knowledge thereof and acquiescence and participation therein by all persons in possession of the property used in conducting the same or having any interest therein.
Sec. 4. Contempt in proceedings under the act or in violating any injunction or restraining order issued thereunder, is punishable, after summary trial, "by a fine of not less than one hundred nor more than one thousand dollars or by imprisonment in the county jail not less than three nor more than six months or by both fine and imprisonment."
Sec 5. Upon proof, in either the equity action or in a criminal proceeding in the district court, of the existence of the nuisance, an order of abatement shall be entered as part of the judgment in the case, directing removal of all the movable personalty referred to, and sale of such thereof as belongs to defendants notified or appearing, and also "the effectual closing of the building or place against its use for any purpose" for one year unless sooner...
To continue reading
Request your trial