State ex rel. Wilhoit v. Seay
| Decision Date | 24 March 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 28645.,28645. |
| Citation | 248 S.W.3d 135 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri ex rel. Weldon WILHOIT, Bradley Jones, and Ronald Walker, Relators, v. The Honorable William Camm SEAY, Circuit Court of Crawford County, Missouri, Circuit Judge, Division 42, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Theodore A. Bruce, Jefferson City, for relators.
John D. Beger, Brendon J. Fox, Rolla, for respondent.
Sean Wood sued individually Weldon Wilhoit, Bradley Jones, and Ronald Walker (collectively, "Relators"), under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for civil rights violations that allegedly arose during a disciplinary action against him by the Missouri State Highway Patrol. In response to Wood's allegations, Relators filed a motion for summary judgment with the circuit court, contending that they were immune from suit under qualified immunity, however, the circuit court denied Relators' motion. Relators requested from this Court a preliminary writ of prohibition on August 6, 2007, which was granted on September 6, 2007. Relators now seek to make that writ of prohibition absolute on the theory that each of the above-named Relators have qualified immunity from suit. We agree and make absolute the writ of prohibition with directions for the circuit court to dismiss the suit against Wilhoit, Jones, and Walker.
"Public officials are provided qualified immunity for their official acts `insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Foremost Ins. Co. v. Public Service Com'n of Missouri, 985 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Mo.App. W.D.1998) (quoting Rustici v. Weidemeyer, 673 S.W.2d 762, 772 (Mo. banc 1984)). It is appropriate to grant a writ of prohibition where defendant is immune from suit as a matter of law and the trial court refuses to grant summary judgment. State ex rel. Missouri Highway and Transp. Com'n v. Dierker, 961 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Mo. banc 1998). This is appropriate because "[q]ualified immunity is `an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.'" Scott v. Harris, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, n. 2, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)). Where the facts are uncontested and the trial court wrongly decides an issue as a matter of law and thereby deprives a party of an absolute defense, prohibition is particularly appropriate. State ex rel. Feldman v. Lasky, 879 S.W.2d 783, 784-85 (Mo.App. E.D. 1994).
After a summary judgment based on qualified immunity is denied, this Court applies the same standard of review as for a final order granting summary judgment. Dierker, 961 S.W.2d at 60. The record is reviewed de novo in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment is sought. Id.
Sean Wood was employed as a trooper with the Missouri State Highway Patrol beginning January 1, 1997. On September 8, 1997, Wood allegedly subjected M.B. to two separate acts of sexual contact by the use of forcible compulsion. At the time of the alleged incident Wood was a full-time employee of the Missouri State Highway Patrol and, as such, was subject to all rules and regulations for employees of the Missouri State Highway Patrol. On September 28, 2000, Wood was charged with violating specific General Orders of the Missouri State Highway Patrol as a result of the alleged September 8, 1997 incident. Thereafter, in accordance with section 43.150,1 an administrative hearing was scheduled before the Disciplinary Board for October 11, 2000, by a personal order issued by Colonel Wilhoit, acting in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Missouri State Highway Patrol. Wood received notice of the scheduled hearing on September 28, 2000.
Before the hearing, an investigation was conducted by the Missouri State Highway Patrol; on September 11, 2000, Wood was interviewed, as part of an internal affairs investigation, by Captains Walker and Jones, of the Missouri State Highway Patrol, about the allegations made by M.B. Prior to the interview, Wood was advised of his Garrity2 warnings and Wood's counsel was present during the interview. Neither Walker nor Jones testified in the criminal case against Wood, nor provided information to the investigators or prosecutors in that case regarding their interview of Wood.
On October 6, 2000, Wood requested a continuance of the disciplinary hearing so that he could take depositions related to his defense, however, the continuance was denied by Superintendent Wilhoit, and the hearing was held as scheduled. Wood knew about the hearing, but did not attend it and offered no reason for not attending. Although Wood submitted his resignation before the hearing, expecting it to be accepted, it was not. After the hearing, the Disciplinary Board issued written findings of fact and conclusions of law finding that on September 8, 1997, Wood subjected M.B. to two separate acts of sexual contact by the use of forcible compulsion.
In addition to the hearing before the Disciplinary Board, on July 26, 2000, the Director of the Department of Public Safety filed a complaint with the Administrative Hearing Commission seeking to discipline the peace officer certification of Wood pursuant to Chapter 590 RSMo.3 A hearing was held before the Administrative Hearing Commission on January 11, 2002. Wood did not appear at that hearing either. On January 28, 2002, the Administrative Hearing Commission issued an Order finding that on September 8, 1997, Wood "subjected M.B. to sexual assault at her residence by physically overpowering her and touching her breasts and genitals without her consent." Regarding a second incident on February 8, 2000, where Wood allegedly supplied alcohol to a minor and subsequently lied about it to Springfield Police Department investigators, the Administrative Hearing Commission found that "[o]n February 23, 2000, Wood provided the Springfield Police Department with a signed statement, which stated that it was a record of evidence, whereby Wood intentionally lied in a deliberate attempt to conceal his actions of February 8, 2000." Wood did not appeal from the decision of the Administrative Hearing Commission, but did bring the pending lawsuit against Relators.
Wood claimed in his original lawsuit that Wilhoit violated his constitutional rights by denying him due process of the law when Wilhoit denied Wood's request for a continuance of his disciplinary hearing on October 6, 2000. He further alleged that Walker and Jones violated his constitutional rights when Wood was ordered to present himself on the morning of September 11, 2000, for an administrative interview and, during the course of that interview, he was forced to divulge matters allegedly protected by attorney-client privilege. The claims against Wilhoit, Walker and Jones are initially reviewed to determine whether the alleged facts show that any of their conduct violated Wood's constitutional rights. An officer's conduct is shielded by qualified immunity when he makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004).
In resolving questions of qualified immunity, courts are required to resolve a Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). If, and only if, the court finds a violation of a constitutional right, "the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established . . . in light of the specific context of the case." Ibid.
Scott v. Harris, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1774 (2007). The purpose of this rule is to excuse the liability of an officer who makes a reasonable mistake in the exercise of his official duties. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Public Service Com'n of Missouri, 985 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Mo.App. W.D.1998). Qualified immunity does not apply, however, to those discretionary acts done in bad faith or with malice. Davis v. Board of Educ. of City of St. Louis, 963 S.W.2d 679, 688-89 (Mo.App. E.D.1998).
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1 § 10 of the Missouri Constitution protect against the deprivation of life, liberty and property without due process of law. "The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard `at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965)). Administrative agencies acting in an adjudicative capacity must adhere to the requirements of procedural due process. Fitzgerald v. City of Maryland Heights, 796 S.W.2d 52, 59 (Mo.App. E.D. 1990). In order to invoke the mandates of due process under these clauses, a person must have been deprived of a property interest recognized by the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Moore v. Board of Educ. of Fulton School, 836 S.W.2d 943, 947 (Mo. banc 1992).
Wood has alleged a deprivation of his right to continued employment. Whether a state employee has a protected property right in continued employment is initially a matter of state law. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Where the state affords an employee the right to a hearing and that he can only be discharged for cause, the employee's interest is protected. See Skeets v. Johnson, et al., ...
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