State ex rel. Wilms v. Blake
| Decision Date | 21 March 1945 |
| Docket Number | 30158. |
| Citation | 144 Ohio St. 619,60 N.E.2d 308 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. WILMS v. BLAKE et al. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Mandamus will not lie to control discretion unless it be clearly shown that the refusal to perform the desired act is an abuse of such discretion.
2. The action of an administrative officer or board within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred by law is presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to be valid and to have been done in good faith and in the exercise of sound judgment.
3. A writ of mandamus will not issue to require the Industrial Commission to allow a claim for additional compensation for the death of a workman claimed to have been caused by his employer's violation of a specific safety requirement even though the undisputed facts show that the death of the decedent occurred while in the course of employment, where the context of the specific safety requirement, the violation of which is charged, is susceptible of such interpretation that a justifiable difference of opinion may exist as to whether there was, under the facts, a violation of such requirement.
This is an action in mandamus originating in this court to require the Industrial Commission to make an additional award to the relatrix and to her son, Paul W Wilms, Jr., as dependents of Paul W. Wilms, because of the latter's death which she claims resulted from the violation of a specific safety requirement by his employer the O. H. Dickman Fish Company, at Cincinnati, on May 4, 1940. $The relatrix in her petition alleged that Paul W. Wilms was fatally injured in the course of his employment, while operating a hydraulic elevator between the second and third floors of the building occupied by the fish company on East Second street, when a barrel, which was resting on the platform floor of the elevator car, came in contact with the beam which supported the third floor of the building at the shaftway, as a result of which the elevator car platform supporting Wilms gave way and he fell to the bottom of the elevator shaft, sustaining injuries causing his death within an hour after the accident.
The relatrix further alleged that she and her son, as dependents and surviving next of kin of Paul W. Wilms, were, on July 6, 1940, awarded workmen's compensation on account of the death of Paul W. Wilms, in the sum of $4,992; that specific safety requirement bulletin No. 110 of the Industrial Commission, covering the construction, operation and maintenance of elevators, provides in part that 'all power freight elevators having a lifting capacity exceeding 3,000 pounds * * * shall be constructed with steel or wrought-iron suspension frames'; that the frame which supported the elevator car involved in this accident was constructed of wood; and that the hydraulic machinery of the elevator had a lifting capacity of more than 5,000 pounds.
Relatrix further alleged that on October 17, 1940, she, on behalf of herself and her infant son as dependents of Paul W. Wilms, filed with the commission an application for an additional award under Section 35, Article II of the Constitution, setting forth the fact that the death of Paul W. Wilms was caused by the failure of his employer to comply with the aforementioned safety requirement relating to suspension frames of power freight elevators; and that there was no conflict in the evidence relating to the suspension frames which supported the platform of the car of the elevator, or with regard to the lifting capacity of the hydraulic machinery thereof, or with regard to the aforesaid requirement as to the elevator in question.
Relatrix further alleged that after several hearings and after an order had been made by the commission allowing the additional award, it vacated that order on August 24, 1944, for the stated reason that 'the proof shows that the decedent's injuries and subsequent death were not caused by the employer's violation of any specific safety requirement'; and that since her claim was supported by uncontradicted evidence, the commission has committed an obvious and flagrant abuse of discretion in disallowing her application.
The commission filed an answer admitting most of the material facts set out in relatrix's petition, but denying that the proof showed decedent's injuries and subsequent death were caused by the employer's violation of any specific requirement, and that the commission abused its discretion in denying relatrix's application for an additional award.
By stipulation of counsel, the case was heard on the pleadings and record of the proceedings before the Industrial Commission in the claim of relatrix.
Floyd Anderson, of Cincinnati, for relatrix.
Thomas J. Herbert and Hugh S. Jenkins, attorneys general, Robert E. Hall, of Columbus, and C. G. L. Yearick, of Newark, for respondents.
The commission denied relatrix's application for additional compensation on the ground that her decedent's death was not caused by the violation of a specific safety requirement. No appeal can be taken from the disallowance of a claim by the commission in this type of case. Section 35, Article II of the Constitution, provides, in part, as follows: 'Such board [Industrial Commission] shall have full power and authority to hear and determine whether or not an injury disease or death resulted because of the failure of the employer to comply with any specific requirement for the protection of the lives, health or safety of employes, enacted by the General Assembly or in the form of an order adopted by such board, and its decision shall be final.'
The relatrix now seeks to circumvent this obstacle and to secure indirectly a review of the action of the commission in disallowing her claim, by bringing and prosecuting this action. To do so, however, and to invoke the jurisdiction of this court, the relatrix recognizes that it is incumbent upon her to charge in her petition, as she does, and to establish by evidence, the fact that the Industrial Commission, in disallowing her claim, committed not merely an error in law but an abuse of discretion. It is well settled that mandamus will not lie to control discretion unless it be clearly shown that the refusal to perform the desired act is an abuse of such discretion. 25 Ohio Jurisprudence, 1003, Section 28 et seq.; State ex rel. Greenward Realty Co. v Zangerle, 135 Ohio St. 533, 21 N.E.2d 662; State ex rel. Christman v. Skinner, 127 Ohio St. 55, 186 N.E. 738; State ex rel. Weaver v. Board of Trustees of Ohio State University, 126 Ohio St. 290, 185 N.E. 196; State ex rel. Coen v. Industrial Commission, 126 Ohio St. 550, 186 N.E. 398; ...
To continue reading
Request your trial