State ex rel. Wors v. Hostetter
| Decision Date | 07 February 1939 |
| Docket Number | 35164 |
| Parties | State of Missouri at the relation of Charles W. Wors, Relator, v. Jefferson D. Hostetter, William Dee Becker and Edward J. McCullen, Judges of the St. Louis Court of Appeals |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Rehearing Granted, Reported at 343 Mo. 945 at 960.
Writ quashed.
Foristel Mudd, Blair & Habenicht for relator.
(1) The court erred in holding that relator by his act in applying to the Compensation Commission for compensation against his employer, the Terminal Company, and accepting compensation under such award became estopped to pursue his common-law action against Midwest as a third person, and in so holding the court, in its opinion, is in conflict with the last controlling decision of this court, to-wit: Gieseking v Railroad Co., 94 S.W.2d 375. (2) The court erred in holding that although Midwest was not a party to the proceedings before the Compensation Commission, yet the award of the Commission was res adjudicata and conclusive against relator on the issue whether, at the time of his injury, he was engaged in interstate commerce, and in so holding the court conflicted with the following decisions Bell v. Hoagland, 15 Mo. 360; National, etc., Co. v. Lbr. Co., 325 Mo. 807; Summett v. City Realty Co., 208 Mo. 501; State ex rel. v. Holtcamp, 330 Mo. 608; Hauser v. Hoffmann, 32 Mo. 334; Cooley v. Warren, 53 Mo. 169. (3) The court in its opinion construed Section 3308 as creating a secondary liability of Midwest for the injuries of the plaintiff and that that in turn brought Midwest into such privity with the Terminal Company, with respect to relator's injuries, as made the award binding against plaintiff on the issue whether he was, at the time of his injury, engaged in interstate commerce. In such construction of the statute the opinion conflicts with the following controlling decisions of this court: Meyering v. Miller, 330 Mo. 892; State ex rel. v. Caulfield, 333 Mo. 277; O'Malley v. Life Ins. Co., 75 S.W.2d 839; Bowers v. Mo. Mut. Assn., 333 Mo. 505; Cummins v. Pub. Serv. Co., 334 Mo. 684; Thompson v. Lamar, 17 S.W.2d 968; State ex rel. v. Trimble, 329 Mo. 500; St. Louis v. Senter Comm. Co., 337 Mo. 247; State ex rel. v. Haid, 332 Mo. 704. (4) Where the facts upon which jurisdiction depends are agreed upon, or undisputed, the question of jurisdiction becomes a matter of law and may be urged in a collateral proceeding. State ex rel. v. Falkenhainer, 309 Mo. 224; State ex rel. v. Homer, 249 Mo. 65. (5) A judgment as respects its conclusive effect must bind both parties or it binds neither. Bell v. Hoagland, 15 Mo. 360; Henry v. Woods, 77 Mo. 281; St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 69 Mo. 76.
Anderson, Gilbert, Wolfort, Allen & Bierman for respondents.
(1) There is no conflict with the Supreme Court of Missouri or the Supreme Court of the United States in holding that the finding under Workmen's Compensation Act, unappealed from, is conclusive. State v. Mo. W. C. C., 8 S.W.2d 899; Railway v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, 70 L.Ed. 757. The latter case holds that even where two proceedings are pending, one under Workmen's Compensation laws, and the other for recovery under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, that the first proceeding finally determined bars the other; that final determination that the injury was one covered by Workmen's Compensation Act barred claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Railway v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, 70 L.Ed. 757. Even where a person may have two courses open to pursue remedy for an injury, if he follows one to judgment that bars the other, even though the parties suable are not the same. Smoot v. Judd, 184 Mo. 508. By accepting the award relator is precluded from disputing the jurisdiction and finding of the Workmen's Compensation Commission that his injury was one covered by the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act. McCune v. Goodwillie, 204 Mo. 334. (2) It was not necessary for Midwest Industrial Development Company to be formally made a party to the proceeding before the Workmen's Compensation Commission. Relator could have made it a party defendant with the Illinois Terminal Company. As between the Illinois Terminal Company and the Midwest Industrial Development Company, the Illinois Terminal Company was liable over to the Midwest Industrial Development Company, hence the judgment against the Illinois Terminal Company and the acceptance of the money by the relator discharged all liability of the Midwest Industrial Development Company. Long v. Mason, 273 Mo. 266, 200 S.W. 1062; Kansas City to use of Mo. Pac. Railroad Co. v. So. Sur. Co., 203 Mo.App. 148, 219 S.W. 727; Stearn Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 399, 32 L.Ed. 788. Wors, Midwest Industrial Development Company and Illinois Terminal Company all elected to come under the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act, and hence were bound by its terms as a matter of contract. Daggett v. Steel Co., 65 S.W.2d 1041. Under the election of Wors, Illinois Terminal and Midwest Industrial Development Company, all were privies by virtue of the contract terms of the act and adjudication is binding on privies. Summet v. Brokerage Co., 208 Mo. 501, 106 S.W. 614; State ex rel. v. Holtcamp, 330 Mo. 617, 51 S.W.2d 13. After injury the only question to be determined was whether the injury was one covered by the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act. On Wors' application this was determined, and it was held that the injury was covered by the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act. There is nothing in the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act that authorizes an employee to split his right to recover under the Act. When he begins a proceeding under that act everything that can be determined in that proceeding must be determined, and the determination is conclusive. The question whether the injury was one to which the Compensation Act applied was one question which had to be adjudicated. Every question is considered as adjudicated which could have been adjudicated. City v. Powell, 73 S.W.2d 412. And a finding that as to one primarily liable precludes a dispute of the same question as to one secondarily liable, or jointly liable. Stevens v. Oberman Mfg. Co., 70 S.W.2d 899; McGinnis v. Railroad Co., 200 Mo. 347. And this is the rule not only in Missouri, but in other states also. Moore v. Ry. Co., 109 S.W. 497; Spencer v. Dearth, 43 Vt. 98; Jenkins v. Ry. Co., 71 S.E. 1012; Sonnentheil v. Moody, 56 S.W. 1001; Williams v. McGidde, 13 Minn. 53; Eastland County v. Davidson, 13 S.W.2d 673. Liability cannot exist as to Illinois Terminal Company because under the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act, and as to the Midwest, because the injury was not under the act.
Maurice J. O'Sullivan and Leo T. Schwartz, amici curiae; J. Francis O'Sullivan of counsel.
Where an owner having work done in the usual course of business on its premises carries workmen's compensation insurance, and requires all subcontractors to carry such insurance on their employees, and pays the premium therefor by inclusion in the contract price, may an employee of one of its subcontractors prosecute an action at common law against said owner on the theory that it is a "third party," under the compensation act? The controlling statute is Section 3308, Revised Statutes 1929. The Workmen's Compensation Act was enacted for the general economic betterment of labor and in the interest of the general public, to promote the continued life and earning power of the individual, for the prevention of pauperism, with its concomitants of vice and crime. Such legislation bears so close a relation to the protection of lives and safety of those concerned that it is considered as coming within the category of police regulations. The objects and purposes sought to be accomplished have been comprehensively stated many times, so we deem repetition unnecessary. For the legislative history, analysis of the situations producing the legislation, consideration of the economic and social conditions and the evils sought to be remedied, reference is made to the following cases: N. Y. Central Railroad Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 37 S.Ct. 247, 61 L.Ed. 667, L. R. A. 1917D 1, Ann. Cases 1917D, 629; Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co., 131 Md. 265, 101 A. 710; Maltz v. Jackoway-Katz Cap Co., 336 Mo. 1000, 82 S.W.2d 912; Stone v. Blackmer & Post Pipe Co., 224 Mo.App. 319, 27 S.W.2d 460. On the ground of natural justice, it was deemed not unreasonable for the State to relieve the employer from responsibility for damages measured by common-law standards, and in lien thereof to require him to contribute a reasonable amount and according to a reasonable and definite scale by way of compensation for the loss of earning power incurred in the common enterprise, irrespective of the question of negligence, instead of leaving the entire loss to rest where it might chance to fall -- that is, upon the injured employee or his dependents. The system was substituted to provide a definite and easily ascertainable compensation to supplant the former system under which an employee often assumed the risk of injury and in others had the right to recover an amount more or less speculative only upon proof of negligence, which in many cases was difficult to establish.
Jacob M. Lashly for Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, amicus curiae.
(1) Court of Appeals in deciding and construing certain sections of the Compensation Act (Secs. 3308-3309, R. S. 1929) to mean that an owner of premises on which work is carried on or a remote contractor remains at all times a "statutory employer" of all employees of a subcontractor or a contractor who has contracted with such owner or remote contractor to carry on certain work thereon regardless of whether the injured or complaining employee is insured by his...
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