State ex rel. Young v. Brill

• Decision Date: 12 April 1907
• Citation: 111 N.W. 639,100 Minn. 499
• Parties: STATE ex rel. YOUNG, Atty. Gen., v. BRILL et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

100 Minn. 499

111 N.W. 639

STATE ex rel. YOUNG, Atty. Gen.,

v.BRILL et al.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 12, 1907.

For per curiam opinion, see 111 N. W. 294.

Syllabus by the Court

Chapters 51 and 54, pp. 189, 192, Sp. Laws 1883, in so far as they require the judges of the district court, or a majority of them, to appoint the members of the board of control of the county of Ramsey, are unconstitutional, because they assume to impose upon members of the judicial department powers and functions which are by the Constitution of the state assigned to another department of the government.

ELLIOTT, J.

In 1872 the Legislature enacted a special law, entitled ‘An act to authorize the county of Ramsey and city of St. Paul to issue bonds to build an almshouse and hospital and for other purposes.’ It provided for the erection, maintenance, and operation of an almshouse and hospital at the joint expense of the city and county, and placed them under the control of three directors, who were to be appointed by the board of county commissioners and the common council of the city. These directors were given the usual powers of executive and administrative officers, and were charged with the ‘duties now enjoined upon the overseers of the poor by the general statutes of the state.’ In the following year the original act was so amended as to provide for the erection of a hospital separate from the almshouse, but both institutions were left under the control of the directors. Chapter 45, p. 233, Sp. Laws 1873. In 1876 another statute provided that these directors, who were then referred to as the ‘board of control,’ should be citizens and freeholders of the county of Ramsey. Chapter 77, p. 154, Sp. Laws 1876. In 1883 the method of appointing the members of this board was changed, and it was provided that ‘the judges of the district court of the Second judicial district, county of Ramsey and state of Minnesota, or a majority of them, are hereby authorized and empowered at any time they may deem proper, to appoint three directors, citizens and freeholders of said county of Ramsey, who shall constitute the board of control of said county and each shall hold his appointment at the pleasure of the authority appointing them.’ Sp. Laws 1883, p. 192, c. 54. At the same session of the Legislature this act was amended by adding the words: ‘Provided, that the terms of office of the three directors as constituted by this act, shall expire on the first day of July, 1883, and thereupon said judges of the district court shall appoint one director for a term of one year, one director for a term of two years, and one director for a term of three years, and thereafter as such terms expire, directors shall be appointed for terms of three years and it is hereby required that the auditor of Ramsey county and the comptroller of the city of St. Paul shall each examine the books and affairs of said board of directors and make a full report thereon to the board of county commissioners of Ramsey county and the common council of the city of St. Paul, respectively, at least once in each year.’ Sp. Laws 1883, p. 189, c. 51. The almshouse and hospital which were erected under the authority conferred by these statutes have been managed by the directors, or so-called ‘board of control,’ who have also performed the usual duties of overseers of the poor.

From time to time the judges of the district court made certain appointments under the statutes, but now refuse to fill a vacancy which has occurred in the board, for the reason, as alleged, that the statute originally and as amended is unconstitutional, because it attempts to confer powers and impose duties other than judicial upon the judiciary. The relator, the Attorney General of the state, presented an information to this court and prayed that a writ of mandamus issue commanding the judges of the district court to fill the vacancy now existing in the board of control of Ramsey county. An order to show cause was thereupon issued, and upon the return day the respondents appeared and moved to discharge the order and dismiss the action on the ground that the several acts of the Legislature referred to in the information, so far as they, or any of them, purport to confer or impose upon the respondents the duty of appointing the members or directors of the said board of control, are unconstitutional. The relator contends that the duties imposed by these statutes are judicial in character; that, even if they are not judicial, they may properly be imposed upon the courts by the Legislature without violating any constitutional provision; that the Legislature may require the members of the judicial department of the state government to perform any services which will not interfere with the proper exercise of the powers which are expressly conferred upon them by the Constitution; and that no distinction in this respect is made between judicial and nonjudicial functions. The argument is plausible, and is urged with ability and ingenuity.

1. The question involved in this case is of such importance that we feel justified in stating the history of the doctrine of the separation of powers, and examining with some care and at considerable length the cases in which it has been considered.

(a) The tendency to sacrifice established principles of constitutional government in order to secure centralized control and high efficiency in administration may easily be carried so far as to endanger the very foundations upon which our system of government rests. That system, devised and elaborated with infinite care and wide knowledge of history and political theory, rests upon certain conceded fundamental principles. The structure which was erected is not simple. It is complex; the parts interrelated and dependent. It was deliberately framed and adopted for the purpose of effecting a change from the system which prevailed on the continent of Europe and to a certain extent in the colonies, and which had earnest and skillful advocates among political writers such as John Milton in England, Turgot in France, and Franklin in America, who argued for a sovereign legislative body, in which all political power should be vested. But the people were not willing to trust everything to a single person or collection of persons. They had heard that a wise and benevolent despot is the best of all possible rulers, but they had learned that rulers are not always wise and benevolent. A single legislative body, with full control over executive and judicial action, was to their minds as full of possible danger as a single despotic ruler. They were unwilling to trust any man or body of men with the uncontrolled exercise of all the powers of government.

Constitution making began with the states and culminated in the Constitution of the nation. The idea that the powers of the government should be distributed among different bodies of men had taken possession of the minds of the statesmen and people of the formative period. They were familiar with the contrary theory, and with the works of the political writers in which such theories were advocated. But they believed, with Paley, that ‘the first maxim of a free state is that the law should be made by one set of men and administered by another; in other words, that the legislative and judicial character be kept separate. When these offices were united in the same person or assembly, particular laws are made for particular cases, springing oftentimes from particular motives and directed to private ends. Whilst they are kept separate, general laws are made by one body of men without foreseeing whom they may affect; and, when made, they must be applied by the other, let them affect whom they will.’ They had read in Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws that ‘when the legislative powers are united in the same person or in the same body of magistrates there can be no liberty. * * * Again, there is no liberty if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subjects would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression. There would be an end to everything were the same man or body * * * to exercise these powers, that of executing the public resolutions and that of trying the causes of individuals.’ Their Blackstone taught them that ‘in this distinct and separate existence of the judicial power in a peculiar body of men, nominated, indeed, by, but not removable at, the pleasure of the crown, consists the one main preservative of public liberty, which cannot long subsist in any state unless the administration of common justice be in some degree separated from the legislative and excutive power.’ Paley's Moral Philosophy, bk. 6, c. 8; Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, bk. 2, c. 6; Blackstone, Comm. bk. 4, p. 140. In speaking of the old Constitution of Virginia, Jefferson said: ‘All the powers of government, legislative, executive, and judicial, result to the legislative body. The concentrating these in the same hands is the precise definition of a despotic government. It will be no alleviation that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands and not a single one.’ Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, p. 195; Story, Const. Law, vol. 1, § 525.

Prior to 1787 twelve commonwealths adopted Constitutions, and of these six inserted therein a general clause distributing the principal governmental powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial departments. The first Constitution of Massachusetts, adopted in 1780 (part 1, art. 30), provided that ‘in the government of this commonwealth the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers of either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers or either of them; the judiciary shall never...