State Farm and Cas. Co. v. Sanders

Decision Date14 October 1992
Docket NumberNo. IP 90-1829 C.,IP 90-1829 C.
Citation805 F. Supp. 1453
PartiesSTATE FARM AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Fred Carl SANDERS, and Jan M. Faber, individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Matt J. Faber, Deceased, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

John Beeman, Patricia Polis McCrory, Harrison & Moberly, Indianapolis, for plaintiff.

Douglass R. Shortridge, John C. Ruckelshaus, Ruckelshaus Roland Hasbrook & O'Connor, Indianapolis, for defendant.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BARKER, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Request for Trial by Jury (with attached exhibits), filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441, and Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant Jan Faber's Answer, defendant Fred C. Sanders' Answer and Compulsory Counterclaim, plaintiff/counterclaimant State Farm's Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Request for Trial by Jury to Defendant/Counterclaimant Sanders' Counterclaim, Magistrate Judge J. Patrick Endsley's Entry of November 13, 1991, which granted State Farm's Motion to Strike the "bad faith allegation" in defendant Sanders' Counterclaim, the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Memorandum in Support thereof, Submission of Evidence in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and related papers, defendant Sanders' Answer Brief in Opposition to the plaintiff's Motion, Verification of defendant Sanders' Affidavit in Opposition to the plaintiff's Motion, Affidavit of Douglass R. Shortridge in Opposition to the plaintiff's Motion, defendant Sanders' Citation of Additional Authority in Opposition to plaintiff's Motion, and the plaintiff's Reply Brief.

The Court having considered the foregoing pleadings and papers, and being duly advised, concludes that the State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted. The Court finds that the insurance policy issued by State Farm and Casualty Company to Fred Carl Sanders (Policy No. 14-09-5329-1) excludes coverage for Sanders' potential liability in Faber v. Sanders, Cause No. 41C01-8908-CP00231F, which is pending in the Johnson County (Indiana) Circuit Court. Plaintiff State Farm and Casualty Company shall not be required to defend or indemnify defendant Sanders in said action. Sanders shall take nothing by way of his counterclaim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

MEMORANDUM ENTRY
I. Factual Background

On or about July 1, 1988, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (hereinafter "State Farm") issued a homeowners policy (policy number XX-XX-XXXX-X) to Fred Carl Sanders (hereinafter "Sanders"), who then resided at 2968 Arthington Boulevard, Indianapolis, Indiana. Defendant Sanders' Answer to Request No. 6 of State Farm's First Request for Admissions. Sanders' policy, which was in effect from July 1, 1988, to and including July 1, 1989, contained the following pertinent provisions:

HOMEOWNERS POLICY
Definitions
"You" and "your" mean the "named insured" shown in the Declarations. Your spouse is included if a resident of your household. "We", "Us" and "Our" mean the Company shown in the Declarations.
* * * * * *
SECTION II — LIABILITY COVERAGES
COVERAGE L — PERSONAL LIABILITY
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which this coverage applies, caused by an occurrence, we will:
1. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the insured is legally liable; and,
2. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice. We may make any investigation and settle any claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our obligation to defend any claim or suit ends when the amount we pay for damages, to effect settlement or satisfy a judgment resulting from the occurrence equals our limit of liability.
COVERAGE M — MEDICAL PAYMENTS TO OTHERS
We will pay the necessary medical expenses incurred or medically ascertained within three years from the date of an accident causing bodily injury. Medical expenses means reasonable charges for medical, surgical, x-ray, dental, ambulance, hospital, professional nursing, prosthetic devices and funeral services. This coverage applies only:
1. to a person on the insured location with the permission of an insured;
* * * * * *
SECTION II — EXCLUSIONS
1. Coverage L and Coverage M do not apply to:
a. bodily injury or property damage:
(1) which is either expected or intended by an insured; or
(2) to any person or property which is the result of willful and malicious acts of an insured:
* * * * * *
SECTION II — CONDITIONS
3. Duties After Loss. In case of an accident or occurrence, the insured shall perform the following duties that apply. You shall cooperate with us in seeing that these duties are performed:
a. give written notice to us or our agent as soon as practicable, which sets forth:
(1) the identity of this policy and insured;
(2) reasonably available information on the time, place, and circumstances of the accident or occurrence; and,
(3) names and addresses of any claimants and available witnesses;
b. immediately forward to us every notice, demand, summons, or other process relating to the accident or occurrence;
c. at our request, assist in:
(1) making settlement;
(2) the enforcement of any right of contribution or indemnity against a person or organization who may be liable to an insured;
(3) the conduct of suits and attend hearings and trials; and,
(4) securing and giving evidence and obtaining the attendance of witnesses.
* * * * * *

PERSONAL INJURY ENDORSEMENT

For the additional premium, under COVERAGE L — PERSONAL LIABILITY, the definition of bodily injury is amended to include personal injury.
"Personal Injury" means injury arising out of one or more of the following offenses:
1. False arrest, false imprisonment, wrongful eviction, wrongful detention, malicious prosecution;
2. Liable, slander, defamation of character or invasion of rights of privacy.
* * * * * *
Section II Exclusions does not apply to personal injury.
Personal injury does not apply:
* * * * * *
2. to injury caused by a violation of a penal law or ordinance committed by or with the knowledge or consent of any insured;
* * * * * *
7. to injury which is either expected or intended by you;
8. to any person or property which is the result of your willful and malicious act no matter at whom the act was directed.

State Farm Homeowners Policy, pp. 1, 12-14, 16 (attached as Exhibit A to State Farm's First Request for Admissions); Defendant Sanders Answer State Farm's First Request for Admissions, p. 1, Request No. 1.

Sanders, who had been in the Navy from 1965 to 1968, served in Vietnam. Sanders' Deposition of August 1, 1990, p. 64 (attached as Exhibit D to State Farm's Second Request for Admissions) (hereinafter "Sanders' Deposition"). He had owned a shotgun while he was growing up and was accomplished at skeet shooting. Sanders' Deposition, pp. 92, 100. Sanders testified that he could "hit" twenty-five (25) out of twenty-five (25) on a "good day." Id., p. 92. Sanders owned a number of guns including a Browning over and under shotgun, a Browning single shot shotgun, a Remington shotgun, a "foreign made" single shot shotgun, a twenty-two caliber rifle, and two pistols. Id., p. 86.

On August 14, 1988, Sanders' dog, Luke, chased a boy who was riding his bicycle in the vicinity of Sanders' residence. Sanders' Deposition, pp. 121-222. The boy became frightened and jumped on top of a car that was parked in front of the house which was occupied by Sanders' neighbor, Perry Evans. Evans left his house to talk to the boy about what had happened, while Sanders sat on his porch. Sanders' Deposition, pp. 126-127. Sanders refused Evans' subsequent request to discuss what had occurred. Id., at 121-122, 128. Evans then left the scene. Id., at 134.

Approximately one hour later, Officer Matt J. Faber, of the Indianapolis Police Department, arrived in his police car and talked to Evans. Sanders' Deposition, p. 135. Officer Faber then walked to Sanders' house and attempted to engage Sanders in a discussion about Sanders' dogs and the leash laws. Id., at 136, 139. Sanders responded by agreeing to keep his dogs "penned up." Id., at 139. When Officer Faber remarked that Sanders would not like it if his neighbors permitted their dogs to run loose, Sanders said, "What the hell is going on?" Id., at 139-140. Sanders inquired of Faber whether he was under arrest, and Faber told him that he was not. Id. When Sanders told Evans, "Look nigger, there's no need to be starting a bunch of trouble," Officer Faber told Sanders there was no need to "say anything" to Evans. Id., at 145.

Sanders then informed Officer Faber that he (Faber) did not know the "history of the situation between Sanders and Evans," and that Faber should stay out of it. Id., at 147. Sanders then requested and was given Officer Faber's name and badge number. Id. Again, Sanders asked if he was under arrest. Id. When Faber told him that he was not under arrest, Sanders began walking away, telling Officer Faber that he was going in his house. Id., at 148. Officer Faber told him not to. Id. While Sanders was standing in the doorway of his house, Officer Faber grabbed him and attempted to keep him from entering the house. Id., at 149.

When Officer Faber was unable to enter the Sanders' house, he told Sanders that he was calling for backup. Sanders' Deposition, pp. 159-160. Sergeant Knapp responded and, after arriving at the scene, asked Sanders to "come on out and talk," but Sanders refused. Id., at 167. Eventually, the officers broke down the door. Id., at 182-185. Sanders proceeded to the back bedroom of his house where he kept one of his shotguns, which he picked up and inspected, by breaking the breech and observing a shell inside, to determine that it was loaded. Id., at 182-183.

Sanders exited his bedroom and entered the hallway, almost bumping into Officer Faber in...

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