State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lyde
Decision Date | 05 October 2018 |
Docket Number | Case No. 2D17-1014 |
Citation | 267 So.3d 453 |
Parties | STATE FARM AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Marielle LYDE, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Anthony J. Russo and James Michael Shaw, Jr., of Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig, LLP, Tampa; and Robert L. Kaleel of Kaleel & Kaleel, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellant.
David M. Caldevilla of de la Parte & Gilbert, P.A., Tampa; and Anthony D. Martino of Clark & Martino, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee.
State Farm Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) appeals the final summary judgment requiring it to pay the higher of the two limits for uninsured motorist coverage (UM coverage) provided in the identical policies issued on Marielle Lyde's (the daughter) vehicle and Margarita Nieves's (the mother) vehicle in connection with injuries that the daughter sustained while driving her vehicle in a crash with an uninsured motorist. State Farm argues that the trial court erred in disregarding an exclusion for UM coverage under the mother's policy authorized under section 627.727(9), Florida Statutes (2012). As explained below, we agree, reverse the final summary judgment and the order granting the daughter's motion for summary judgment, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The mother and daughter reside together. The mother owns a Kia Sorento, and the daughter owns a Kia Soul. State Farm issued an insurance policy for the mother's vehicle that lists the mother as the only named insured on the declarations page and that has a UM coverage limit of $100,000 per person. State Farm also issued an insurance policy for the daughter's vehicle that lists both the daughter and mother as named insureds on the declarations page and that has a UM coverage limit of $25,000 per person.
Apart from the amounts of coverage and the named insureds, the policies are identical versions of State Farm Policy Form 9810A. Many of the terms used in the policy are terms of art defined in the policy itself.1 In the general provisions, State Farm agrees to provide insurance according to the terms of this policy based, in part, "on payment of premium for coverages chosen." In the applicable UM coverage section, the "Insuring Agreement" provides, "We will pay compensatory damages for bodily injury an insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle" and specifies that the "bodily injury for which we will pay compensatory damages must be," in pertinent part, "sustained by an insured" and "caused by an accident that involves the operation, maintenance, or use of an uninsured motor vehicle." The "Exclusions" section, however, provides, in pertinent part, that One of the sections that follows is titled "If Other Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage Applies," and provides, in pertinent part:
In May 2013, the daughter was driving her vehicle when she was involved in a crash with an uninsured motorist. State Farm tendered $25,000 as the limit for UM coverage on the daughter's policy. The daughter filed the underlying action against State Farm, seeking, in pertinent part, declaratory relief and damages for breach of contract. She claimed that she is an insured under both her policy and her mother's policy and that she is therefore eligible for UM coverage under both policies. She further claimed that under subsection 1.b. of the section titled "If Other Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage Applies," she was entitled to claim the higher UM coverage limit under the two policies. Thus, she claimed that she was entitled to the $100,000 limit under the mother's policy and that State Farm had wrongfully denied her UM benefits in excess of the $25,000 limit under her policy.2
State Farm admitted that the daughter was an insured under both policies and that she was entitled to UM coverage under her policy, but it denied that she was entitled to UM coverage under the mother's policy. In its operative third affirmative defense, State Farm asserted that the mother's policy provides for "non-stacking" UM coverage "pursuant to the named insured's execution of the Selection/Rejection Form giving rise to a conclusive presumption of a knowing informed rejection of stacking coverage under Florida Statute § 627.727(9)."3 State Farm further asserted that the daughter was excluded from UM coverage under the mother's policy based on exclusion 2.a. because she was occupying a vehicle that the daughter owned, not the Sorento identified on the declaration's page of the mother's policy. State Farm also claimed that the daughter's reliance on the "If Other Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage Applies" provision is misplaced because UM coverage does not apply on the mother's policy. Rather, as provided by section 627.727(9) and the Selection/Rejection Form, that provision applies when occupying a motor vehicle "not in the household or owned by a resident relative."
After filing its answer and affirmative defenses, State Farm moved for summary judgment, again conceding the daughter's entitlement to $25,000 in UM benefits under her policy but contending that she and her mother both had knowingly rejected "stacking" coverage under both her policy and her mother's policy, as reflected on the three Selection/Rejection Forms that State Farm attached to the motion and that State Farm claimed had been approved by the Office of Insurance Regulation (OIR). Thus, State Farm asserted, consistently with section 627.727(9)(b), the UM coverage exclusion under 2.a.—for bodily injury that an insured sustains while occupying a vehicle owned by a resident relative that was not "your car" or a newly acquired car—precluded the daughter from recovering under the mother's policy.
The daughter did not formally respond to the motion but instead filed her own motion for summary judgment. Relying on the provision of the policy that governs "If Other Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage Applies," the daughter argued that she was entitled to the $100,000 under the mother's policy because she was an insured under both policies. The daughter argued further that exclusion 2.a. was not consistent with 627.727(9) and was therefore contrary to public policy. Alternatively, the daughter argued that even if the exclusion were valid, reading it in conjunction with the "If Other Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage Applies" provision created ambiguity in the contract that required construction in her favor and allowed her to recover the $100,000 under the mother's policy. The daughter's motion made no mention of any "application" or Selection/Rejection Form.
In addition to the daughter's and the mother's policies and declarations pages, the summary judgment evidence before the trial court included the three Selection/Rejection Forms that State Farm had filed with its motion for summary judgment: one for the mother's policy signed on September 14, 2010;4 one for the daughter's policy signed on August 19, 2011; and another for the daughter's policy signed on April 4, 2012.5 The template for those three forms was identical, and State Farm also filed a September 24, 2010, letter from OIR approving that template. State Farm also filed the affidavit of Kristin Spencer, the Florida underwriter for its automobile policies. Spencer averred, among other things, that the mother had signed another Selection/Rejection Form on April 2, 2012, which "has been separately filed with the Court," and that "[a]t all times, the language in the Selection/Rejection Form has been approved by the State of Florida." Contrary to her averment, however, only the mother's September 14, 2010, Selection/Rejection Form had been filed, and no other version of it was subsequently filed.
After receiving State Farm's response in opposition to the daughter's motion, the trial court granted the daughter's motion and denied State Farm's motion. The court explained:
Therefore, the trial court determined that the daughter "is entitled to the highest applicable limits of coverage available between the two UM policies for which she is an insured, to wit: $100,000." State Farm timely appeals the trial court's final judgment awarding the daughter $75,000.
State Farm argues that the trial court erred in granting the daughter's motion for summary judgment because the unambiguous language of the mother's policy excludes the daughter from UM coverage in this circumstance and, therefore, rendered the election clause under "If Other Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage Applies" inapplicable. State...
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