State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Williams

• Decision Date: 10 August 1984
• Docket Number: No. C7-83-1077,C7-83-1077
• Citation: 355 N.W.2d 421
• Parties: STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellant, v. Tony WILLIAMS, Defendant, Harry Keller, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 421

355 N.W.2d 421

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellant, v. Tony WILLIAMS, Defendant Harry Keller, Respondent.

No. C7-83-1077.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug. 10, 1984.

Syllabus by the Court

1. When an insured under a homeowner's insurance policy repeatedly inflicts nonconsensual sexual acts upon a physically disabled adult victim, intent by the insured to inflict bodily harm is inferred as a matter of law.

2. Since the intentional act exclusion and facts beyond the complaint indicate no coverage exists, the insurer has no duty to defend or indemnify the insured in either the declaratory judgment or main action.

R.D. Blanchard, Laura S. Underkuffler, Minneapolis, for appellant.

David Hvistendahl, Northfield, for Keller.

Edward R. Soshnik, Minneapolis, for Williams.

Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument.

KELLEY, Justice.

In this declaratory judgment action, appellant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm) seeks to avoid its duties of defense and indemnity under a homeowner's insurance policy issued to respondent Harry Keller. In a separate action brought by Tony Williams (the main action), Williams alleges that Keller assaulted and battered him and inflicted emotional distress by committing nonconsensual sexual acts upon him. ¹ The trial court held that State Farm had duties to defend and indemnify respondent in the main action and further that State Farm had a duty to pay reasonable attorney fees incurred by Keller in defense of the declaratory judgment and the main action. We reverse.

Tony Williams was almost 23 years old at the time respondent Keller allegedly began committing nonconsensual sexual acts upon him. ² Williams has suffered from cerebral palsy since birth. While dependent upon the use of a wheelchair, he nonetheless lived independently in an apartment in Northfield at the time of the alleged sexual acts. Respondent Keller was a professor of physics at St. Olaf College until shortly after the sexual encounters at issue ended, at which time he resigned from his position at St. Olaf.

Although Williams has never been enrolled as a St. Olaf student, a computer programmer in the employ of the college helped Williams obtain a computer through the Minnesota Department of Vocational Rehabilitation to assist Williams in developing computer programming employment skills. This computer programmer introduced Williams to respondent Keller.

Keller began visiting Williams at the latter's apartment in Northfield to discuss Williams' mathematical training and to help him to learn computer programming. These visits were generally on a weekly basis in 1980 and 1981. At various times during these weekly meetings, which occurred until June 1981, Keller engaged in oral sodomy and masturbation of Williams. Williams claims this conduct was offensive, that he never consented to it, and that he repeatedly urged Keller to stop it. Finally, Williams complained to the Northfield police in September 1981. Keller has admitted he had sexual contact with Williams but claims it only lasted from February through June 1981, and he likewise contends Williams consented to the activities.

Appellant State Farm and respondent Keller entered into the following stipulation of facts:

1. That defendant Harry Keller intended to have sexual contacts with Tony Williams and to enter into a sexual relationship with him. The nature of the sexual activities is described in the parties' depositions which are incorporated herein by reference.

2. That defendant Keller did not intend to inflict bodily injury or mental suffering by reason of his sexual contacts with Tony Williams.

3. That Tony Williams did not sustain physical injury by reason of defendant Keller's sexual relations with him.

4. That defendant Keller did not intend to cause Tony Williams to have mental suffering.

5. That Tony Williams alleges that the sexual contacts made by defendant Keller were objectionable and accomplished without his consent.

6. That defendant Keller believed that all sexual contacts with Tony Williams were made with Williams' consent.

1. The State Farm homeowner's policy issued to respondent Keller contains the following liability insurance coverage:

COVERAGE L--PERSONAL LIABILITY

If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which this coverage applies, we will:

a. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the insured is legally liable; and

b. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice. We may make any investigation and settle any claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our obligation to defend any claim or suit ends when the amount we pay for damages resulting from the occurrence equals our limit of liability.

This liability coverage, however, is subject to a standard intentional act exclusion which specifically denies coverage for "bodily injury * * * which is expected or intended by the insured." ³ The policy defines bodily injury as "bodily harm, sickness or disease, including required care, loss of services and death resulting therefrom."

Respondent Keller claims that since State Farm has stipulated that "Keller did not intend to inflict bodily injury," his specific intent is not a basis for excluding coverage. He relies on cases holding that coverage is precluded if the insured has specific intent to cause bodily injury or if the character of the act is such that an intention to inflict injury can be inferred as a matter of law. Iowa Kemper Insurance Co. v. Stone, 269 N.W.2d 885 (Minn.1978); Caspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 213 N.W.2d 327 (1973).

State Farm asserts that specific intent to cause bodily injury is not required to exclude coverage in this case. It urges that Williams' claim in the main action based on assault and battery alleges an "offensive contact" battery as distinguished from a battery resulting in physical injury. Restatement (Second) Torts Sec. 18 (1965). The offensive contact itself is the bodily harm, claims State Farm; thus, in "offensive contact" batteries such as those alleged in the main action, even though not resulting in physical injury, this court should hold the intent to do the act excludes coverage, especially when the act involves the violation of a criminal statute, such as here. See Minn.Stat. Sec. 609.293, subd. 1 (1982).

Although this court has never addressed the issue raised by State Farm in the context of an intentional sexual assault, we have held in other contexts that unintended injuries resulting from intentional acts are not within the intentional act exclusion. Farmers...