State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Morgan

• Decision Date: 03 June 1988
• Docket Number: No. 45382,45382
• Citation: 368 S.E.2d 509,258 Ga. 276
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO. v. MORGAN.

Page 509

368 S.E.2d 509

258 Ga. 276

STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO. v. MORGAN.

No. 45382.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

June 3, 1988.

Stephen L. Cotter, Lynn M. Roberson, Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, for State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.

Roy E. Barnes, Mike Treadaway, Robert E. Flournoy III, Marietta, for Betty Jean Morgan et al.

CLARKE, Presiding Justice.

We must decide whether voluntary intoxication may render a person incapable of forming an intent or expectation of injuring another so as to place his act outside an exclusion in a homeowner's insurance policy. The Court of Appeals held intent and expectation to be a question of fact and approved its submission to a jury. State Farm & Casualty Co. v. Morgan, 185 Ga.App. 377, 364 S.E.2d 62 (1987). We agree.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied heavily upon its earlier holding in Thrift-Mart, Inc. v. Commercial Union, etc., Cos., 154 Ga.App. 344, 268 S.E.2d 397 (1980). In that case the court submitted the issue to the jury but the jury decided in favor of the insurance company. The Court of Appeals overruled Gaynor v. Travelers Insurance Co., 12 Ga.App. 601, 77 S.E. 1072 (1913).

This case began as a declaratory judgment action by State Farm and asked for an interpretation of the insurance policy which excludes coverage for injuries expected or intended by the insured. It is important to remember that the legal issues here rise from contract law and not tort or criminal law. Consequently, policy considerations differ from those in tort and criminal cases. Public policy does not prevent a party from assuming by contract duties more burdensome than those imposed by law because of a party's right to refuse the contract. The fact that the insurer drafts the policy adds validity to this statement.

The question of intent or expectation here uniquely fits the pattern of those issues of material fact which are not appropriate issues for summary judgment but are decided by the trier of fact. OCGA § 9-11-56(c). Even in criminal cases the question of the ability to form intent because of voluntary intoxication can be a jury question. Blankenship v. State, 247 Ga. 590, 277 S.E.2d 505 (1981); Ely v. State, 159 Ga.App. 693, 285 S.E.2d 66 (1981).

The words of the contract express a plain and understandable meaning. We decline to overprint those words with limitations which they fail to express and by doing so deprive the jury of its right to decide facts. If the company desires to broaden the exclusion, it may do so. But this task falls to the policy drafter and not to the courts. The policy here deals simply with presence of intent or expectation and not with factors contributing to or subtracting from intent or expectation.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except MARSHALL, C.J., and WELTNER and BELL, JJ., who dissent.

WELTNER, Justice, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals recites that the insured, C.W. Belt, "was a chronically heavy drinker who, apparently without provocation, shot and killed Kevin [his son] and Susan Belt [his daughter-in-law] and then killed himself." State Farm & C. Co. v. Morgan, 185 Ga.App. at 377, 364 S.E.2d 62.

The brief filed on behalf of the surviving child contains the following statement of fact: "On March 23, 1983, Kevin Ward Belt, Susan Belt and their five-year-old son, Gregory Belt, were temporarily residing with C.W. Belt and his wife, Ruby Belt, in their...