State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Geary

• Decision Date: 26 January 1994
• Docket Number: No. 920766-CA,920766-CA
• Citation: 869 P.2d 952
• Parties: STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Brandon GEARY and Brad Edwards, Defendants and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

Page 952

869 P.2d 952

STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Brandon GEARY and Brad Edwards, Defendants and Appellant.

No. 920766-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Jan. 26, 1994.

Robert A. Echard (argued), Robert A. Echard & Associates, Ogden, for defendants and appellants.

Lowell V. Smith, Daniel D. Andersen (argued), Hanson, Epperson & Smith, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.

Before GREENWOOD, JACKSON and GARFF, ¹ JJ.

AMENDED OPINION ²

GREENWOOD, Judge:

Appellant Brandon Geary (Geary) appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (State Farm). We affirm.

FACTS

On September 4, 1989, Brad Edwards (Edwards) and his friend, Christopher Orchard (Orchard), were driving towards Syracuse, Utah, intending to dove hunt in that area. While stopped at a convenience store, Edwards and Orchard were approached by Geary and a friend. Apparently, the encounter became confrontational. An automobile chase ensued, with Geary and his friend pursuing Edwards and Orchard. At one point, Edwards stopped his vehicle and told Geary that he would shoot him if Geary did not leave him alone. Edwards then drove away but Geary continued to follow. After further chasing, the two vehicles stopped near an intersection of two dirt roads in the Syracuse area. Edwards instructed Orchard to load the shotgun located in the front seat of the car. After Orchard loaded the shotgun, Edwards grabbed it and intentionally pointed it in the direction of Geary. Edwards told Geary, "Leave me alone or I'll shoot you." Geary said, "You ain't going to shoot me" and started laughing. Thereafter, Edwards intentionally fired the shotgun once in Geary's direction; the blast struck the ground near Geary's vehicle. Edwards then intentionally fired a second shot, again in Geary's direction, which struck him in the head, neck, and chest with approximately 132 pellets.

As a result of this incident, Edwards was arrested and charged with attempted homicide. He pleaded guilty to a lesser charge of aggravated assault, a third degree felony. Based on his guilty plea, the district court sentenced Edwards to prison for zero to five years.

In a subsequent civil lawsuit, filed on May 8, 1990, Geary sought money damages from Edwards for the injuries he inflicted with the shotgun blast. ³ Four months later, in September, 1990, Edwards's insurer, State Farm, filed a declaratory action seeking a judicial determination as to whether it had a duty to defend Edwards or provide coverage under Edwards's homeowners policy. ⁴ State Farm contended that the policy's exclusionary clause relieved it of any duty to defend or provide coverage for Edwards because he intentionally shot Geary.

In March 1992, State Farm filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in the declaratory action and Geary filed a motion in opposition. ⁵ Subsequently, on July 8, 1992, the trial court granted State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment in the declaratory action. In its ruling, the trial court stated that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that there was no coverage under Edwards's policy because he intentionally shot and injured Geary. The trial court relied on Edwards's guilty plea to aggravated assault to support its finding that Edwards intentionally injured Geary. Geary appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment, arguing (1) that it improperly used Edwards's guilty plea to establish his intent to injure Geary, ⁶ and (2) that the question of whether Edwards intended to injure Geary is a genuine issue of material fact.

ISSUE ON APPEAL

The sole issue we address on appeal is whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment by ruling that as a matter of law State Farm had no duty under Edwards's homeowners policy to provide coverage for Geary's injuries.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). As entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law, we need give no deference to the trial court's determination of the issues. Id. "However, we may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied on below." Id. (citing Hill v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992)); accord Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988).

ANALYSIS

The analysis of this case requires a two-step process. First, we must determine whether the shooting incident was an "occurrence" under Edwards's homeowners policy. Second, if the shooting was an "occurrence," we must next determine whether the policy's exclusionary clause applies. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Freeman, 432 Mich. 656, 443 N.W.2d 734, 737 (1989).

Was There an "Occurrence" Under the Policy?

To determine whether Edwards's homeowners policy provides coverage, we turn to the express language of the policy. It states, under Section II--Liability Coverages, that State Farm will pay "[i]f a claim is made or a suit is brought against an insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage ... caused by an occurrence." The policy defines an "occurrence" as "an accident, including exposure to conditions, which results in ... bodily injury." Therefore, an "occurrence" covered by the policy includes only those injuries to property or person resulting from an "accident," and not an intentional occurrence.

It is undisputed that Edwards intentionally pulled the trigger on the shotgun that injured Geary. However, the parties dispute whether Edwards intentionally or accidentally injured Geary. Seemingly, the resolution of this "occurrence" issue hinges on whether we focus on either the shooting or the injury as accidental or intentional. For the reasons explained below, we are persuaded by the case law which focuses on the accidental or intentional nature of the shooting, rather than the ensuing injury.

The Utah Supreme Court, defining the words "accident" or "accidental" as used in an accidental death insurance policy, stated that

"[t]he word is descriptive of means which produce effects which are not their natural and probable consequences.... An effect which is the natural and probable consequence of an act or course of action is not an accident, nor is it produced by accidental means. It is either the result of actual design, or it falls under the maxim that every man must be held to intend the natural and probable consequence of his deeds."

Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 669 P.2d 410, 415 (Utah 1983) (quoting Richards v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 58 Utah 622, 636, 200 P. 1017, 1023 (1921)). Although Hoffman focused on whether the death of the insured was accidental, it noted that injury or death is not accidental when a gun is used, coupled with threats of death or serious bodily injury. Id. at 418. While instructive, Hoffman fails to resolve this issue because it involved an accidental death policy, not a homeowners policy. Furthermore, Hoffman focused on whether the insured's death was accidental rather than on whether the insured's intentional shooting of a gun was an "occurrence." Thus, we look to case law from other jurisdictions to provide additional insight.

The Washington Court of Appeals, in a case involving a similar definition of "occurrence," ⁷ adopted the following rule:

"[T]o recover under a policy insuring against death or injury by accidental means, (1) it is not enough that the result was unusual, unexpected or unforeseen, but it must appear that the means was accidental; and (2) accident is never present when a deliberate act is performed, unless some additional, unexpected, independent, and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of injury or death."

Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Dotts, 38 Wash.App. 382, 685 P.2d 632, 633-34 (1984) (quoting Johnson v. Business Men's Assurance Co. of Am., 38 Wash.2d 245, 228 P.2d 760 (1951)).

In Safeco, the insured slapped another man in the face to get his attention. Later that day, the man who had been struck lapsed into a coma and died five days later. At the ensuing criminal trial for manslaughter and assault, the insured testified he did not intend to hurt the deceased nor was he angry with him. The personal representative of the deceased's estate subsequently brought a civil suit against the insured to recover under a mobile homeowners liability policy. In ruling that there was no insurance coverage, the Washington appellate court focused on the deliberate act of slapping the deceased in the face. The court noted that it was undisputed that the insured deliberately slapped the victim and that he "subjectively did not intend or expect the 'result' of death." Id. 685 P.2d at 634. Nonetheless, the court ruled that there was no "occurrence" or "accident" to which coverage would apply because of the court's rule that "an accident is 'never present' when a deliberate act is performed absent an 'independent' unforeseen act." Id. at 635.

In another jurisdiction, the Hawaii Supreme Court found no "occurrence" ⁸ under a homeowners policy where an individual fired a rifle in the direction of another individual, intending only to frighten him, but actually shot him in the leg. Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Blanco, 72 Haw. 9, 804 P.2d 876, 881 (1990). In ruling that the insurance company had no duty to defend or provide coverage under the policy, the Hawaii Supreme Court stated:

[W]e do not see how it logically can be said that ... the injury ... was the result of an accident. Given the best possible interpretation, Garcia fired the rifle in Saturnino's direction intending to frighten him. That physical injury might result from such an action is certainly something which a reasonable man in Garcia's position should have anticipated and expected.

Id.

We find...