State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Figler Family Chiropractic, P.A.
| Decision Date | 30 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 4D15–2716.,4D15–2716. |
| Parties | STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. FIGLER FAMILY CHIROPRACTIC, P.A., a/a/o Linda Manners, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Nancy W. Gregoire of Kirschbaum, Birnbaum, Lippman & Gregoire, PLLC, Fort Lauderdale, and Matthew D. Hellman of Matt Hellman, P.A., Plantation, for petitioner.
No appearance for respondent.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company seeks second-tier certiorari review of a circuit court opinion rendered in its appellate capacity. We note that the case presents an issue of first impression. We deny the petition, concluding the appellate court properly interpreted Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(c).
Figler Family Chiropractic, P.A. ("Plaintiff") sued State Farm in county court for failing to make full payment for personal injury protection benefits for services rendered to State Farm's insured. State Farm denied that the treatment was related or medically necessary, and filed a doctor's affidavit, stating that he reviewed various medical records and concluded that certain portions of the treatment rendered by Plaintiff were not reasonable, related, or medically necessary. State Farm filed the affidavit during discovery using a notice of filing stating its intent to rely upon the affidavit "for any purpose permitted pursuant to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and Florida Evidence Code."
Thereafter, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether the treatment was reasonable, related, and necessary. State Farm filed nothing specifically to oppose the motion; however, at the hearing on the motion, it sought to rely on the doctor's affidavit. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, concluding State Farm's filing did not comply with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(c), which requires the adverse party to identify, by a certain time before the hearing, the summary judgment evidence on which it intends to rely. Subdivision (c) of the summary judgment rule states, in pertinent part:
The motion shall state with particularity the grounds upon which it is based and the substantial matters of law to be argued and shall specifically identify any affidavits, answers to interrogatories, admissions, depositions, and other materials as would be admissible in evidence ("summary judgment evidence") on which the movant relies. The movant shall serve the motion at least 20 days before the time fixed for the hearing, and shall also serve at that time a copy of any summary judgment evidence on which the movant relies that has not already been filed with the court. The adverse party shall identify, by notice served pursuant to rule 1.080 at least 5 days prior to the day of the hearing, or delivered no later than 5:00 p.m. 2 business days prior to the day of the hearing, any summary judgment evidence on which the adverse party relies. To the extent that summary judgment evidence has not already been filed with the court, the adverse party shall serve a copy on the movant pursuant to rule 1.080 at least 5 days prior to the day of the hearing, or by delivery to the movant's attorney no later than 5:00 p.m. 2 business days prior to the day of hearing.
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c) (emphasis added).
The county court entered a final judgment for Plaintiff, and State Farm appealed to the circuit court.
State Farm argued that the trial court erred in interpreting rule 1.510, claiming the rule does not require the adverse party to file a notice in response to a motion for summary judgment if the evidence upon which it seeks to rely is already in the record. It contended the trial court was injecting into the rule the requirement that the adverse party's notice must be served only after the moving party moves for summary judgment, when the rule states that notice may be served any time before the summary judgment hearing, providing it is timely.
Plaintiff argued that the trial court correctly enforced the plain language of the rule because State Farm failed to identify by notice, between the filing of the summary judgment motion and the hearing, the summary judgment evidence on which it relied, and that a randomly-filed notice of filing does not comply with the rule. Plaintiff pointed to the 2005 rule amendment, which required the movant and the adverse party to notify each other of the summary judgment evidence on which the party relies. In adopting the amendment, our supreme court stated:
Subdivision (c), Motions and Proceedings Thereon, of rule 1.510, Summary Judgment, is amended to state that a motion for summary judgment must specifically identify evidence upon which it relies, and require that any evidence not already on file with the court must be served with the motion. Additionally, the amendment provides that the adverse party must also notify the opposing party of any summary judgment evidence on which it relies, and must provide copies of any evidence not already on file with the court.
In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure (Two Year Cycle), 917 So.2d 176, 177 (Fla.2005) (emphasis added). Plaintiff argued that the use of the word "shall" in the rule 1.510(c) instruction that "[t]he adverse party shall identify, by notice ... any summary judgment evidence on which the adverse party relies," signified that evidence identification, by notice, was mandatory. (emphasis added). The rule assumes summary judgment evidence may be on file, but requires the adverse party to take the additional step of notifying the moving party of the evidence on which it relies. There would be no purpose for the rule if the adverse party could rely on a notice filed at any point before the summary judgment hearing.
State Farm disagreed, arguing that its only reason for obtaining the doctor's affidavit was to oppose Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment; at trial, it would have presented the doctor's testimony. The circuit court affirmed per curiam without explaining its reasoning.
The standard of review for a petition for writ of certiorari to review a decision rendered by the circuit court in its appellate capacity is " ‘whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and whether the circuit court applied the correct law,’ or, as otherwise stated, departed from the essential requirements of law." Custer Med. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So.3d 1086, 1092 (Fla.2010) (quoting Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 530 (Fla.1995) ). "[A] district court should exercise its discretion to grant review only when the lower tribunal has violated a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice." Id. (citation omitted).
State Farm argues that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law by failing to apply the correct law, i.e., it caused a manifest injustice by affirming a county court judgment which in effect added the word "after" to the rule. According to State Farm, the rule as rewritten requires that notice by the adverse party be served only after the motion for summary judgment is filed. But, it contends, this interpretation is not supported by any Florida case. Instead, decisions speak of considering all the record evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party in determining whether to affirm a summary judgment.1
However, those decisions do not concern the specific issue on which this case was decided: the adverse party's failure to notify the moving party of the evidence on which it intends to rely at the summary judgment hearing. Certainly, evidence filed earlier may be considered; the rule requires only that the adverse party identify it.
The dissent contends that the majority has construed rule 1.510(c) too narrowly. Importantly, the majority and the dissent are concerned with opposite sides of the same coin: litigation game-playing. The dissent is completely correct that Florida courts have sought to adhere to the principle that the civil rules of procedure "should be interpreted to further justice and not frustrate it." Strax Rejuvenation & Aesthetics Inst., Inc. v. Shield, 49 So.3d 741, 743 (Fla.2010). However, interpreting the rule as broadly as the dissent does would appear to increase the chances that a party opposing summary judgment can play the "gotcha" tactic more easily than the movant who relies on the more "narrow" construction adopted by the majority. We agree with the dissent that the problem of game-playing is not resolved by using "magic words." Even if State Farm had stated in its notice, when it filed the subject affidavit, that the affidavit will be used "for any purpose permitted pursuant to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and Florida Evidence Code, including to oppose any motion for summary judgment filed by the plaintiff, " the notice requirements of rule 1.510(c) would not have been met.2
A properly crafted motion for summary judgment should frame the legal issues to be decided by the court and the movant must identify the facts in support of the motion. The movant is not supposed to ambush the opposing party. In regards to rule 1.510(c), we have said that the rule "requires that a summary judgment motion ‘state with particularity the grounds upon which it is based and the substantial matters of law to be argued,’ " and that "[a] court errs when it enters summary judgment upon a ground not previously raised in the initial summary judgment motion." Adams v. Bell Partners, Inc., 138 So.3d 1054, 1059 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). Just as the rule requires that the grounds for the motion be specifically identified, the rule also requires that the evidencein support of and in opposition to the motion be specifically identified, prior to the hearing. Thus, if the movant or opposing party, at the hearing on the motion, tries to rely on record evidence in the court file that is not identified in advance of the hearing as being in...
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