State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smith
| Decision Date | 03 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2D14–1402.,2D14–1402. |
| Citation | 198 So.3d 852 |
| Parties | STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Adam SMITH, James and Elizabeth Motzenbecker, and Chelsea Ackermecht, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Mark D. Tinker and Charles W. Hall of Banker Lopez Gassler P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellant.
Kerry E. Mack and Jacqulyn Mack of Mack Law Firm Chartered, Englewood; and Mark A. Boyle and Amanda K. Anderson of Boyle, Gentile & Leonard, P.A., Ft. Myers, for Appellee Adam Smith.
No appearance for remaining Appellees.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company appeals a final judgment holding it liable to Adam Smith for $150,000 pursuant to the uninsured motorist provisions of an automobile insurance policy. Resolution of the appeal hinges on two legal questions: (1) whether the policy by its terms extends uninsured motorist coverage to Smith and, if it does not, (2) whether that failure impermissibly limits the uninsured motorist coverage State Farm was required to provide under section 627.727, Florida Statutes (2006), the uninsured motor vehicle insurance statute. We answer both questions in the negative, reverse the judgment of the trial court, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On July 30, 2006, Smith was injured in a car accident. At the time, he was driving a Nissan 300 ZX purchased by James and Elizabeth Motzenbecker and titled in the name of Elizabeth Motzenbecker. The Motzenbeckers gave the car to their daughter, Chelsea Ackermecht, for her own use. At the time of the accident, Smith was driving Ackermecht's car, with her permission, while she was a passenger in the vehicle. The accident happened when Smith attempted a right turn from the left lane and collided with a car waiting at a red light on the intersecting street.
The Motzenbeckers and Ackermecht were insured by State Farm under a policy issued to Elizabeth Motzenbecker that extended both liability and uninsured motorist coverage (the Motzenbecker policy). Smith was insured under the liability and uninsured motorist provisions of a separate policy that State Farm issued to Smith's mother (the Smith policy). The Smith policy extended liability coverage to Smith for his use of his mother's car as well as for any other car that he used but did not own—including the car at issue—subject to exceptions that are not applicable here.
In 2007, Smith filed this action against the Motzenbeckers and Ackermecht on the theory that they negligently failed to maintain the brakes on the car. The Motzenbeckers and Ackermecht tendered that claim to State Farm under the liability provisions of the Motzenbecker policy. State Farm filed a declaratory judgment action alleging that the household exclusion in the Motzenbecker policy excluded coverage for Smith's claim because Smith was an insured under that policy by virtue of having been permitted to drive the car.1 The trial court granted summary judgment to State Farm, and this court affirmed. Motzenbecker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 123 So.3d 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), rev. denied, 143 So.3d 921 (Fla.2014).
While the declaratory litigation concerning the Motzenbeckers' and Ackermecht's entitlement to liability coverage for Smith's claim under the Motzenbecker policy was ongoing, Ackermecht filed a lawsuit against Smith seeking compensation for injuries she sustained in the accident on the theory that he negligently operated the vehicle. Smith tendered Ackermecht's claim to State Farm under the liability provisions of the Smith policy. State Farm provided Smith with a defense and later paid Ackermecht the limits of liability under the Smith policy in satisfaction of her claim.
Following State Farm's tender of limits on Ackermecht's claim, Smith amended his complaint in this action to include a claim against State Farm for uninsured motorist benefits under the Smith policy. State Farm counterclaimed for a declaration that it was not liable because the Motzenbeckers' car was not an uninsured motor vehicle as defined by the Smith policy and, as a result, Smith by definition was not entitled to coverage under the uninsured motorist provisions of the Smith policy.
State Farm moved for summary judgment on its counterclaim arguing that the uninsured motorist provisions of the Smith policy did not extend coverage to Smith in this case because the Smith policy defined the term “uninsured motor vehicle” to exclude any motor vehicle “insured under the liability coverage of this policy” and that the Motzenbecker's car was insured under that coverage because Smith was driving it at the time of the accident.2 State Farm also asserted that the Motzenbeckers' car was deemed insured under the liability coverage of the Smith policy because the liability provisions of that policy had afforded bodily injury liability coverage to Smith for Ackermecht's claim arising out of Smith's operation of the vehicle. The trial court disagreed, held that “the claimed exclusion does not apply to [Smith] under the facts of this case,” and denied the motion.
The trial court later entered a final judgment against State Farm on the counterclaim and set Smith's claims against the Motzenbeckers and Ackermecht for a jury trial. The jury found liability, apportioned ninety-two percent of the fault to the Motzenbeckers and Ackermecht and eight percent to Smith, and awarded damages of $214,860. The damage award was later limited to the Smith policy's limits of $150,000, and a final judgment was entered. State Farm timely appeals.
We now review the trial court's decision that the Smith policy's exclusion of vehicles insured under the liability provisions of the policy from the definition of “uninsured motor vehicle” does not apply in this case. State Farm argues that the exclusion applies under the plain language of the policy, and we agree. Because Smith also argues, as he did in the trial court, that to the extent this provision applies, it violates public policy by affording him less uninsured motorist coverage than section 627.727 requires, we address why that issue does not provide an alternative basis for affirmance. Because the appeal involves issues of contract and statutory construction decided by summary judgment, our review is de novo. See Motzenbecker, 123 So.3d at 602.
We first address the basis upon which the trial court decided the case. The issue boils down to whether the provision governing vehicles insured under the liability coverage of the Smith policy unambiguously precludes uninsured motorist coverage for Smith's injuries. Where the language of an insurance policy is unambiguous, we are required to interpret it “in accordance with the plain meaning so as to give effect to the policy as written.” Fla. Peninsula Ins. Co. v. Cespedes, 161 So.3d 581, 584 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). A provision in a policy is ambiguous, however, when its language can bear more than one reasonable interpretation—one that grants coverage and another that limits or denies it.
Auto–Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So.2d 29, 34 (Fla.2000). If the policy is ambiguous, we construe it in favor of coverage. N. Pointe Cas. Ins. Co. v. M & S Tractor Servs., Inc., 62 So.3d 1281, 1283 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
Turning to the provisions at issue here, Section III of the Smith policy is titled “Uninsured Motor Vehicle.” It extends coverage to any insured under the policy “for damages for bodily injury [the] insured is legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle. ” The term “uninsured motor vehicle” is defined to include any “land motor vehicle the ownership, maintenance, or use of which is” either uninsured or insured in an amount that is insufficient to cover the claimant's injuries. However, the Smith policy carves certain categories of vehicles out of this broad definition—and thus out of the uninsured motorist coverage extended by the policy—by providing, in relevant part, as follows:
Whether this language unambiguously precludes coverage depends on what it means to be “insured under the liability coverage of the policy.” As a result, we must read this provision together with the terms of the policy's liability coverage. See Cespedes, 161 So.3d at 584 (). Section I of the policy titled “Liability Coverages” provides that State Farm will “pay damages which an insured becomes legally obligated to pay” because of bodily injury or property damage “resulting from the ownership, maintenance, or use of your car. ” “Your car” is defined as the car identified in the policy declarations, in this case a Saturn station wagon owned by Smith's mother.
In addition, the “Liability Coverages” section of the State Farm policy extends the liability coverage applicable to “your car ” “to the use, by an insured, of a newly acquired car, a temporary substitute car or a non-owned car. ” A “non-owned” car is defined, in relevant part, as “a car not owned, registered or leased by” an insured but in the lawful possession of the insured at the time the insured uses it.
Reading the terms of the liability coverage together with the definition of uninsured motor vehicle, we conclude that the Smith policy's language is unambiguous and that the Motzenbeckers' car, when used by Smith, was “insured under the liability coverage of this policy.” The liability provisions of the policy plainly afford coverage for “your car” when owned, maintained, or operated by an...
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