State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Astro Leasing, Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 February 1990
• Docket Number: No. A89A2217,A89A2217
• Parties: STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. ASTRO LEASING, INC.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 885

390 S.E.2d 885

194 Ga.App. 515

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. ASTRO LEASING, INC.

No. A89A2217.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Feb. 5, 1990.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 14, 1990.

Certiorari Denied April 5, 1990.

Fortson, Bentley & Griffin, J. Edward Allen, Jr., James A. Dunlap, Jr., Athens, for appellant.

Edward D. Buckley III, Atlanta, Bonzo C. Reddick, Savannah, Blasingame, Burch, Garrard & Bryant, Andrew J. Hill III, Athens, for appellee.

BIRDSONG, Judge.

Appellant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (hereinafter State Farm Mutual), appeals the trial court's order granting directed verdict to appellee Astro Leasing, Inc. et al. in a declaratory judgment action.

Appellee Richard Meagher (hereinafter Meagher) entered into a rental agreement with appellee Astro Leasing, Inc. d/b/a Budget Rent-A-Car of Athens, Georgia (hereinafter Astro). The rental contract listed additional drivers as "NONE."

Astro was insured by Reliance Insurance Company under a policy which, with certain exceptions not here applicable, listed Astro and anyone else using an Astro automobile with Astro's permission as "insured" under the terms of the policy. Moreover, the Astro policy contained an exclusion pertinently stating "This policy does not apply: (a) to the rentee while such auto is used or operated in violation of the terms and conditions of the rental agreement under which such auto is rented." The rental agreement expressly provided that "Vehicle shall not be used or operated by any person: (a) Other than Renter or any Additional Driver who is shown on the other side and has Renter's prior permission." The agreement further provided that "All of the benefits given to Renter and all of BUDGET's obligations under this Agreement, including but not limited to insurance coverage, are void if Vehicle is used or operated in violation of this Agreement."

Meagher is a named insured under a State Farm Mutual policy that provides for automobile liability coverage with bodily injury limits of $100,000 each person and $300,000 each accident, and property damage limits of $25,000.

Subsequently, Meagher gave his wife permission to drive the rental vehicle, and she was involved in a collision while driving it. Certain people are alleged to have been injured in this collision, and they have initiated suit. State Farm Mutual, while admitting its obligation at least as an excess insurer and its duty to defend Meagher, asserted that Astro's insurer is the primary insurer under the terms of its policy with Astro. Astro contested any such obligation, and State Farm Mutual initiated a suit for declaratory judgment which is the subject of this appeal. Reliance Insurance Company was not made a party to the declaratory judgment action. Held:

Appellant State Farm Mutual asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing its complaint for lack of standing because its action can be properly maintained under the declaratory judgment act.

The trial court in granting directed verdict for Astro, by implication concluded appellant has no standing to seek declaratory judgment, and based its ruling on Eberhardt v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 142 Ga.App. 102, 235 S.E.2d 616 and Zurich Ins. Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 117 Ga.App. 426, 160 S.E.2d 603. Appellee Astro further directs this court's attention to United States Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Watson, 106 Ga.App. 748, 128 S.E.2d 515 in support of the trial court's ruling. Appellant State Farm Mutual, however, asserts that these cases were effectively overruled by the holding of the Supreme Court in Atlantic Wood Indus. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 258 Ga. 800, 375 S.E.2d 221.

Atlantic Wood Indus. is distinguishable from the facts before us, as in that case declaratory judgment was brought by the insured to determine the obligation of the insurers to defend an action pending against the insured. The holding in Atlantic Wood Indus. was narrow in scope, establishing that "insureds should have the same opportunity as insurers to determine in advance the scope of policy provisions." Id. at 801, 375 S.E.2d 221. In the case sub judice, declaratory judgment was sought by an insurer, not by an insured. Moreover, Atlantic Wood Indus. does not expressly overrule either of the cases relied upon by the trial court. By implication, Atlantic Wood Indus. overruled the holding of this court in United States Cas. Co. v. Ga. S., etc., R. Co., 95 Ga.App. 100, 97 S.E.2d 185 to the extent that the latter was in conflict with the holding that "insureds should have the same opportunity as insurers to determine in advance the scope of policy provisions." See generally, Atlantic Wood Indus., supra, 258 Ga. at 801, 375 S.E.2d 221. The limited scope of the Supreme Court's ruling was further clarified by this court in the subsequent case of Atlantic Wood Indus. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 190 Ga.App. 814, 380 S.E.2d 504, wherein we expressly held, "[s]uch decisions of this court as hold that declaratory relief is not available to an insured, including but not necessarily limited to United States Cas. Co. v. Ga. S &c. R. Co., supra, and Residential Dev. Inc. v. Merchants Indemn. Co., 122 Ga.App. 503 (177 SE2d 715) ... are hereby overruled and will no longer be followed." Clearly, the intent of the Supreme Court, as interpreted by this court, was not to overrule these and any similar cases in toto, but only to the extent they conflicted with the specific holding that insureds should have the same opportunity as insurers to determine in advance the scope...