State Highway Commission v. Humphreys
| Decision Date | 22 February 1933 |
| Docket Number | No. 9146.,9146. |
| Parties | STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION et al. v. HUMPHREYS et al. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Val Verde County; Joseph Jones, Judge.
Suit by G. A. Humphreys and others against the State Highway Commission and others. From an order granting a temporary injunction, defendants appeal.
Order reversed, and temporary injunction dissolved.
Jas. V. Allred and T. S. Christopher, both of Austin, W. P. Wallace, Jr., of Del Rio, and A. R. Stout, of Austin, for appellants.
Jones & Lyles, of Del Rio, for appellees.
This is an appeal from a temporary injunction issued by the district judge of Val Verde county, enjoining the state highway commission and the commissioners' court of Val Verde county from re-routing and relocating state highway No. 3, which has for many years passed through the town of Comstock. The appellees own property adjoining the present located highway, and are engaged in business within the town of Comstock.
Appellees base their right to this injunction on two main grounds: (1) That the highway commission acted arbitrarily and abused its discretion in relocating and re-routing this highway; (2) that their property has been taken and injured without due process of law.
We do not think that the highway commission abused or arbitrarily exercised their discretion in this matter. It is shown that the re-routing of this highway will eliminate a grade crossing over the railroad and some dangerous curves and turns. This is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the highway commission, and, until it is clearly shown that they have acted arbitrarily and abused their discretion, the courts will not interfere. The question of fraud, accident, or mistake was not raised in this case.
We cannot agree that appellees' property was taken or injured in such a way as to give them a cause of action against appellants. Appellees allege they were injured in the following manner: At the present time they are enjoying a good business as a result of the travel over the present highway; that the traveling public are their principal customers; that, if this travel is re-routed over the proposed highway, they will lose their principal customers; and that their property will depreciate in value at least 80 per cent. It was said in Heller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 28 Kan. 625: "The benefits which come and go from the changing currents of travel are not matters in respect to which any individual has any vested right against the judgment of the public authorities." If the public authorities could never change a street or highway without paying all persons along such thorough-fares for their loss of business, the cost would be prohibitive. The highways primarily are for the benefit of the traveling public, and are only incidentally for the benefit of those who are engaged in business along its way. They build up their businesses knowing that new roads may be built that will largely take away the traveling public. This is a risk they must necessarily assume.
The old highway is to remain in its present condition; the only change will be that the traveling public will be given an additional route and one that will furnish them a better route, or else they would continue to use the old highway. Ex parte Sterling (Tex. Sup.) 53 S.W.(2d) 294; Gill v. City of Dallas (Tex. Civ. App.) 209 S. W. 209; Stanwood v. Malden, 157 Mass. 17, 31 N. E. 702, 16 L. R. A. 591; Wootters v. City of Crockett, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 474, 33 S. W. 391; Quisenberry v. Mitchell, 116 Tex. 378, 292 S. W. 160; Heathman v. Singletary (Tex. Com. App.) 12 S.W.(2d) 150.
Appellees complain that the highway commission, in laying out and opening the new road, failed to give, post, serve, or advertise any kind or character of notice of their intention so to do, and that same rendered their acts void. Appellees base this contention on the theory that formerly the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Riddle v. State Highway Commission
...272 P. 189; Johnson's Petition, supra; State ex re. Merritt v. Linzell, 163 Ohio St. 97, 104, 126 N.E.2d 53; State Highway Commission v Humphreys, Tex.Civ.App., 58 S.W.2d 144, 145. In the Linzell case, supra, it was 'It is now an established doctrine in most jurisdictions that such an owner......
-
DuPuy v. City of Waco, A-10644
...writ ref. n. r. e.); Pennysavers Oil Co. v. State, 334 S.W.2d 546 (Tex.Civ.App.1960, writ ref.); and State Highway Commission v. Humphreys, 58 S.W.2d 144 (Tex.Civ.App.1933, writ ref.), were highway rerouting cases and stand principally for the propositions that an abutting property owner do......
-
State v. Schmidt
...admissible in a statutory-condemnation action, as distinguished from an inverse-condemnation action. State Highway Commission v. Humphreys, 58 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Tex.Civ.App.1933, writ ref'd); City of San Antonio v. Pigeonhole Parking of Texas, 158 Tex. 318, 311 S.W.2d 218, 219 (1958). More i......
-
Mackie v. Watt
...supra (344 Pa. 5, 23 A.2d 880); State ex rel. Merritt v. Linzell, 163 Ohio St. 97, 104, 126 N.E.2d 53; State Highway Commission v. Humphreys, Tex.Civ.App., 58 S.W.2d 144, 145. In the Linzell case, supra, it was "It is now an established doctrine in most jurisdictions that such an owner (abu......