State Highway Commission v. Laird
| Decision Date | 12 April 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 3555,3555 |
| Citation | 426 P.2d 439 |
| Parties | STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION of Wyoming, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. Russell I. LAIRD and Florence Sien Laird, Appellees (Defendants below). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Glenn A. Williams, Chief Special Asst. Atty. Gen., John F. Raper, Atty. Gen., J. Richard Plumb, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellant.
Elmer J. Scott, of Scott & Joffe, Worland, for appellees.
Before GRAY, McINTYRE, and PARKER, JJ
This is an eminent domain case. By order of the trial court, the State Highway Commission was granted possession of land belonging to Russell I. Laird and Florence Sien Laird, for the purpose of widening and improving a highway running in front of their property. Following the commissioners' award, a stipulation was entered into as to the compensation for land actually taken, but upon the demand of the commission there was a jury trial on the matter of damage to the remainder. Defendants were awarded $2,750. The commission has appealed from the award and the resulting judgment on the ground that the trial court as a matter of law erred in overruling the commission's motion to strike all testimony relating to loss of crops.
At the trial the landowners presented evidence that as to a 31-acre field 'the traffic from the highway, construction, telephone, the whole bit' denied to them the full access necessary to plant the field until a month past the usual planting time. Evidence was also adduced to the effect that when construction of the highway began some of the irrigation drainage course used by defendants was torn out. Only a cement supply ditch was immediately installed; and due to the fact that the resident engineer did not realize this ditch was needed for anything except to supply water, it was at a grade too high to carry away the landowners' waste water.
The highway department assumed the responsibility for putting in the waste ditch, but a new waste ditch was not staked by the engineer so the contractor could go on with construction in time to handle waste water from irrigation of the crop of sugar beets. The new ditch caused an extra acre of ground to be lost to the landowners for cultivation purposes.
Although the resident engineer testified the landowners could have put the water on their crop and the contractor would have taken care of the waste water in the best possible way, there was testimony to the effect that this would have resulted in erosion, starting at the creek where the water emptied and causing a gully, probably 10 to 14 feet deep, back to the borrow pit, dropping the whole highway and roadbed and washing it all into the creek.
The landowners testified the inability to plant their crop seasonably and immediately irrigate it caused the subsequent abandonment of eight acres and the replanting of oats, which did not mature and had to be plowed under. Also, the beet production on the other 23 acres was only three tons per acre; while adjacent acreage, planted and irrigated without delay, produced 16 tons per acre. Thus, the landowners claimed a loss of 380 tons of sugar beets, which would have sold for $14 per ton, or $5,320.
During the trial, the commission entered objections to questions concerning the beet crop, first on the ground that 'it hasn't been connected up, that the Highway Department caused the loss,' and second, that a proper foundation had not been laid to show that 'it' was a condemnation factor. These objections were overruled. Later, out of the hearing of the jury, counsel for the commission moved to strike all the testimony pertaining to any allegations of damage to the beet crop, but the argument concerned only the matter of irrigation. The trial court declined to strike this testimony.
The commission here argues that the trial court as a matter of law erred when it overruled the motion to strike all testimony pertaining to the landowners' loss of sugar beet production. It maintains that, viewing the evidence in the best possible light, the delay in staking the waste ditch and in constructing it would either have been a result of the negligence of the resident engineer in staking the ditch or a result of the negligence of the contractor in constructing it. 1
Relying on our decision in Chavez v. City of Laramie, Wyo., 389 P.2d 23, 24, attorneys for the state say a damaging of property not actually taken cannot be said to be for a 'public use' if the damaging results from accident, negligence or a tort. They insist the situation is the same in the case at hand as it was in the Chavez case, and that the loss of a part of defendants' beet crop served no public use.
In the Chavez case, an inverse eminent domain action was brought by the owners. They alleged their damage was caused in the construction of a new viaduct by the negligent crushing of a sewer line and the negligent severing of a water...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 5571
...landowners in eminent domain cases have the burden of proving the just compensation to which they are entitled. State Highway Commission v. Laird, Wyo., 426 P.2d 439 (1967); Wilson v. United States, 350 F.2d 901 (10th Cir. 1965). This is the general rule. 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 18.5......
-
Wilson v. Amoco Corporation
...is relegated to a common-law action for damages." Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 642 P.2d 423 (Wyo.1982); see also State Highway Comm'n v. Laird, 426 P.2d 439, 441 (Wyo.1967) (noting that where claim for damages is based on tort, condemnation action is appropriately It is apparent from the fa......
-
Energy Transp. Systems, Inc. v. Mackey
...the burden of proving the just compensation to which they are entitled. Coronado Oil Company v. Grieves, supra; State Highway Commission v. Laird, Wyo., 426 P.2d 439 (1967); Wilson v. United States, 350 F.2d 901 (10th Cir. 1965). This is the general rule, 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain § This ......