State Highway Dept. of Georgia v. Bass
| Decision Date | 15 February 1944 |
| Docket Number | 14709. |
| Citation | 29 S.E.2d 161,197 Ga. 356 |
| Parties | STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT OF GEORGIA v. BASS. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. On the question as to whether the act of March 20, 1943 [Ga.L.1943, p. 401], amending the Workmen's Compensation Law, so far as it provides for compensation for past accidents of employees who had been employed in a department of the State that had previously to the amendment operated under the Workmen's Compensation Law, is unconstitutional as being a retroactive law under article 1, section 3 paragraph 2, of the Constitution of the State of Georgia Code, § 2-302, the members of this court are equally divided in opinion, and as to this point, therefore the judgment of the trial court holding the act valid as against such attack stands affirmed by operation of law.
2. The act above referred to is not unconstitutional, as seeking to amend or repeal a section of the Code by reference to the number of the section, and without describing the law to be repealed and the alteration to be made, as provided in article 3, section 7, paragraph 17, of the Constitution of the State of Georgia, Code, § 2-1817.
3. The act above referred to is not unconstitutional, as being a grant of a donation or gratuity in violation of article 7 section 16, paragraph 1, of the Constitution of the State of Georgia, Code, § 2-6401.
4. The act above referred to is not unconstitutional as contravening article 3, section 7, paragraph 11, of the Constitution of the State of Georgia, Code, § 2-1811, providing that no money shall be drawn from the treasury except by appropriation made by law.
(a) Nor is it a void statute by reason of the fact that the budget commission has not set apart any funds for the purposes therein provided.
5. In view of the foregoing, it is unnecessary to determine whether the State Highway Department was an employer, as defined by the Workmen's Compensation Law, Code, § 114-101, prior to the act of 1943, p. 401.
The defendant in error, Forehand S. Bass, was an employee of the State Highway Department of Georgia on December 16, 1942, and in the course of his employment suffered an accidental injury which rendered him totally incapacitated to earn money. In an agreed statement of facts the case was submitted to the State Board of Workmen's Compensation. Under this statement it is admitted that Bass is entitled to an award if the State Highway Department of Georgia was subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act, Code, § 114-101, as it existed on the date of his injury, to wit, December 16, 1942; or if by the amendment of the Workmen's Compensation Law as provided by the act approved March 20, 1943, Ga.L.1943, p. 401, his injury was covered. It was further agreed that prior to February 1, 1943, the State Highway Department was paying compensation to its employees under the Workmen's Compensation Law of Georgia, at which time it ceased all payments by reason of an opinion of the Attorney General holding such payments to be illegal.
When the case was presented to the State Board of Workmen's Compensation, the State Highway Department filed its motion to dismiss the claim on specified grounds that will be hereinafter enumerated. The motion was granted and the claim was denied and dismissed. To this order an application for appeal to the superior court of Dodge County was filed and allowed.
On the hearing of the appeal before the judge of the superior court of Dodge County, the State Highway Department sought to dismiss the appeal on the same grounds it had procured the denial and dismissal of the claim before the State Board of Workmen's Compensation.
The Workmen's Compensation Law as it appeared prior to the act of 1943, p. 401, was in part as follows:
'Unless the context otherwise requires: 'Employer' shall include any municipal corporation, within the State, and any political division thereof, and any individual, firm, association or corporation engaged in any business operated for gain or profit, except as hereinafter provided, and the receiver or trustee of the same, and the legal representative of a deceased employer, using the service of another for pay. If the employer is insured this term shall include his insurer as far as applicable.
"Employee' shall include every person in the service of another under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or implied, except one whose employment is not in the usual course of the trade, business, occupation or profession of the employer and, except as hereinafter provided, minors are included even though working in violation of any child labor law or other similar statute: Provided, that nothing herein contained shall be construed as repealing or altering any such law or statute. Any reference to an employee who has been injured shall, when the employee is dead, include also his legal representatives, dependents and other persons to whom compensation may be payable, pursuant to the provisions of this law.' Code, § 114-101.
The act of 1943, p. 401, was as follows:
'An Act to amend Section 114-101 of the Code of Georgia of 1933 by adding thereto a provision that all employees of the State of Georgia shall be placed under the Workmen's Compensation Laws of Georgia; to provide that the provisions of this Act so far as concerns the State of Georgia, and all Departments thereof shall include all compensable accidents which occurred on, before, or after February 1, 1943; to ratify and confirm any and all payments heretofore made by any department of the State of Georgia under the terms of the Workmans Compensation Law and to provide for the continued payment of all awards heretofore made which have been discontinued by reason of the said State not being included in the definition 'employer' in the original Act; to provide that if any section of this Act is declared to be unconstitutional, the remainder shall not be affected; and for other purposes.
'Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Georgia and it is hereby enacted by authority of the same:
'Section 1. That Section 114-101 is hereby repealed in its entirety and a new section added in lieu thereof to read as follows:
'Section 2. That a new section be added to the Georgia Code of 1933, immediately following Section 114-101, to be known as Section 114-101A which said new section shall read as follows:
'Section 114-101A. So far as concerns the State of Georgia or any Department thereof which has been operating under the terms of the Workmans Compensation Law, said State and such departments thereof shall be deemed to have been included in the original act under definition of 'Employer'. Any payments heretofore made under awards of the Industrial Board to State employees are hereby ratified and confirmed and any payments of awards which were being made by the State or any of its departments on or before February 1, 1943, but discontinued on account of the State and its Departments not being included in the definition of 'Employer' shall be resumed as of the date of discontinuance, and compensable accidents which occurred prior to the passage of this Act for which awards were not made but for which awards are hereafter made, shall be paid by said State or the departments thereof in the same manner as other awards heretofore or hereafter made.
The grounds of the motion to dismiss the appeal were substantially as follows:
1. The injury occurred December 16, 1942, and since the State Highway Department, the employer, is not included in the definition of the term 'employer' as defined by the Code, § 114-101, of force on the date of the injury, the employer is not subject to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
2. Although the act approved March 20, 1943, Ga.L. 1943, p. 401 undertakes to subject the State Highway Department to liability for injuries occurring prior to passage of the act, because the State Highway Department previously and without authority of law for a number of years prior thereto, had been operating under the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Law, the State Highway Department is not liable because the act is retroactive and in violation of article 1,...
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