State Highway Dept. v. Hatcher, s. 21725

• Decision Date: 06 September 1962
• Docket Number: 21726,Nos. 21725,s. 21725
• Citation: 218 Ga. 299,127 S.E.2d 803
• Parties: STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT of Georgia v. Robert P. HATCHER et al. Robert P. HATCHER et al. v. STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT of Georgia.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 803

127 S.E.2d 803

218 Ga. 299

STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT of Georgia v. Robert P. HATCHER et al.

Robert P. HATCHER et al. v. STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT of Georgia.

Nos. 21725, 21726.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Sept. 6, 1962.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 18, 1962.

Second Motion for Rehearing Denied Oct. 1, 1962.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. 'State-aid' roads are defined by the laws of this State. Code Ch. 95-17. The act of 1961 (Ga.L.1961, pp. 517-529; Code Ann.Supp. Ch. 36-13) authorizes condemnation of property in the manner therein provided only where it is to be used for 'State-aid public road purposes.'

2. Constitutional questions will be not ruled upon in this court when a ruling is not required to protect rights of the complaining party.

Eugene Cook, Atty. Gen., Carter Goode, Asst. Atty. Gen., E. J. Summerour, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, George B. Culpepper, III, Fort Valley, for plaintiff in error.

Bloch, Hall, Groover & Hawkins, Ellsworth Hall, Jr., Macon, for defendant in error.

HEAD, Presiding Justice.

The State Highway Department filed its petition and 'declaration of taking' of described lands, under the authority of an act of the General Assembly approved April 5, 1961, Ga.L.1961, pp. 517-529 (Code Ann.Supp. Chapter 36-13). Robert P Hatcher and others were named as owners.

Hatcher filed a 'special appearance' in which he attacked the validity of the 1961 act on a number of constitutional grounds. In a separate petition for injunction and other relief Hatcher alleged that: '(b) The aforesaid described Act of the General Assembly of Georgia is restricted to the acquisition and damaging of private property for 'State-Aid Roads' and is not applicable to taking and damaging of private property for the purposes contemplated in said pending proceeding, to-wit, 'Federal, Limited Access, Interstate Highways'; (c) The aforesaid Act of the General Assembly of Georgia does not provide for and is not applicable to the taking and condemnation of petitioner's 'property rights' which consist of ingress, egress and travel to and from the proposed highway and petitioner's properties bordering upon and adjacent to either side of said highway; * * *'

The 'special appearance' of the property owner and his petition for injunction were consolidated with the condemnation proceeding and considered as one proceeding by the trial judge. The judge overruled the general demurrers of the Highway Department to the petition for injunction, and the special demurrers to the allegations that the 1961 act is not applicable, and held that the 'highway in question, being an Interstate Highway, is not a State-aid public road within the meaning of the said act of the General Assembly of Georgia, Ga.Laws 1961, pp. 517, et seq.' The judge enjoined the Highway Department from proceeding with the condemnation of the property. The main bill of exceptions assigns error on this ruling. The cross-bill of exceptions assigns error on the order of the court sustaining the demurrers to the constitutional attacks made upon the 1961 act.

1. The act of 1961 (Ga.L.1961, pp. 517-529), upon which the Highway Department relies in the present case, provides in the caption: 'An Act to prescribe the procedure for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by the State of Georgia, or any division, department, or branch of the government of the State of Georgia, or any county of such State for State-aid public road purposes; etc.' (Italics ours.) In Section 1 of the act the right of condemnation is limited to the power to 'take or damage private property for State-aid public road purposes,' and in section 3 of the act the acquisition of rights of way is limited to 'State-aid public road purposes.'

Chapter 95-17 of the Code creates and defines a system of State-aid roads. By § 95-1701 a system of State-aid roads is created for the purpose of interconnecting the several county seats, such State-aid roads to be designated, constructed, and maintained by the State through the State Highway Department. By § 95-1705 the State Highway Board is required to designate the system of interconnecting county seat public roads as State-aid roads, and by § 95-1706 two roads starting at the county seat are to be designated in each county, such roads to extend to the county line and connect with designated State-aid roads of any adjoining county or counties. By § 95-1707 it is provided that additional main traffic roads may be designated, which are necessary to complete the interconnecting system, where there are unusual topographic conditions to be met, or to serve important market points. By § 95-1708 the State Highway Department is granted the right to resurvey and relocate in their entirety 'all of said roads, keeping in view only the control points.' Section 95-1709 provides that when any road is included in the system of State-aid roads, no county shall thereafter be required to levy taxes for the construction or maintenance of such road. The sections of the Code above referred to, other sections of Chapter 95-17, (and other statutory provisions, see especially Ga.L.1951, pp. 31, 36; Code Ann. § 95-1610), make it clear that the system of State-aid roads includes only such roads as are designated, which roads must be interconnecting with the several county seats of this State.

In the brief of counsel for the Highway Department the question is presented as to whether the lower court was 'authorized to hold that this proposed highway, being a 'Federal, Limited Access, Interstate Highway,' is not a 'State-aid highway' within the meaning of Georgia law.' It was alleged in paragraph 2 of the petition that, 'Said right of way is for a state-aid road, as defined by law, * * *' In paragraph 3 of the petition it is alleged that the lands sought to be condemned 'are for State-aid public road purposes, being a part of a system of limited access highways authorized and established under the provisions of Chapter 95-17A of the Code, Georgia Laws 1955, pp. 559, et seq.' The copy of the resolution of the State Highway Board describes the highway to be constructed as 'Project No. I-75-1(29) Valdosta to Macon Interstate.'

There are many provisions in the act of 1955, pp. 559-564 (Code Ann. Ch. 95-17A) which eliminate any possible construction that a limited access highway is, or can fall within the classification of, a 'State-aid' road as defined by Chapter 95-17 of the Code, and reference to any Federal Act providing for the creation of a system of national interstate highways is unnecessary to demonstrate the character of the proposed road (but see City of Carrollton v. Walker, 215 Ga. 505, 511, 111 S.E.2d 79). The pleadings in the present case demanded the finding by the trial judge that the limited access interstate highway under construction did not fall within the classification of a State-aid road as defined by Chapter 95-17 of the Code.

'The right of eminent domain is a sovereign right of the state. It is inherent in every sovereignty, and existed before constitutions were adopted. It lies dormant until the Legislature sets it in motion. As the Legislature cannot in every case supervise the condemnation, it may confer the power upon agencies. * * * The power thus conferred is always to be strictly construed, and will not be permitted to be exercised except where it is affirmatively granted.' Chestatee Pyrites Co. v. Cavenders Creek Gold Mining Co., 119 Ga. 354, 355, 46 S.E. 422, 423; D'Antignac v. City Council of Augusta, 31 Ga. 700; Botts v. Southeastern Pipe-Line Co., 190 Ga. 689, 10 S.E.2d 375; Marist Society of Georgia v. City of Atlanta, 212 Ga. 115, 118(4), 90 S.E.2d 564.

In Frank v. City of Atlanta, 72 Ga. 428, 432(2), it was held: 'The taking or injuring of private property for the public benefit is the exercise of a high power, and all the conditions and limitations provided by law, under which it may be done, should be closely followed. Too much caution in this respect cannot be observed to prevent abuse and oppression.' It is the general rule in this country that statutes conferring the power of eminent domain must be strictly construed, and clear legislative authority must be shown to authorize the taking. 18 Am.Jur. Eminent Domain § 26, p. 650; 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 22, p. 806; 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rd ed., p. 229.

Under the 1961 act the condemnation of private property for public road purposes in the manner therein provided is affirmatively granted only where the land taken is to be used for a State-aid road. If the General Assembly had desired to extend the right and power to condemn under this act to all roads, it could have done so by omitting the limitation imposed by the words 'State-aid' as applied to public roads. The legislative history of the 1961 act conclusively shows that the General Assembly knowingly and intentionally limited the 1961 act in its application to State-aid roads, in that as originally introduced the act was not so limited. This limitation to State-aid roads was imposed by committee substitute which was duly enacted. See Ga. House Journal, Regular Session 1961, pp. 982, 1017. The presumption that the 1961 act was enacted by the General Assembly with 'full knowledge of the existing condition of the law,' (Botts v. Southeastern Pipe-Line Co., 190 Ga. 689, 701, 10 S.E.2d 375, 382, supra), is fully sustained by the legislative history of the act.

This court will not undertake to grant a power withheld by the General Assembly, where the limitation on the power is specific, clear, and unambiguous. The property can not be taken in the present case for the construction of a 'Federal, Limited Access, Interstate Highway' under the act of 1961 (Ga.L.1961, pp. 517-529...