State Highway Dept. v. Chance, 45508

Decision Date25 September 1970
Docket NumberNo. 45508,No. 2,45508,2
Citation178 S.E.2d 212,122 Ga.App. 600
PartiesSTATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT v. Mrs. S. V. CHANCE et al
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Harold N. Hill, Jr., Executive Asst. Atty. Gen., Richard L. Chambers, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Andrew W. McKenna, Macon, James G. Maddox, Jeffersonville, for appellant.

Beverly B. Hayes, Dublin, for appellees.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

JORDAN, Presiding Judge.

The State Highway Department appeals from a verdict and judgment for the acquisition of a right of way for a limited access highway in Twiggs County across a rectangular tract of land principally owned by Mrs. S. V. Chance. The jury awarded Mrs. Chance $6,000 for the taking of 12.05 acres of land, $18,000 in consequential damages to the remaining tract of about 45 acres south of the highway, $2,000 in consequential damages to the remaining tract of about 47 acres north of the highway, and $1,000 in consequential damages for loss of crop allotments. The trial judge overruled the condemnor's motion for a new trial. Held:

1. Various enumerations involving the admissibility of the testimony of a witness, Faulk, and the testimony of the principal condemnee, Mrs. Chance, with respect to value and consequential damages are argued collectively, on the premise that the witnesses testified without stating the facts on which they gave their opinions.

The testimony of Faulk discloses that he owned a life interest in 428 acres of land in Twiggs County and had been a farmer for 32 years. He lived about 8 miles by road from Mrs. Chance's property and had been acquainted with it all of his life. He stated further that he was familiar with property values, that Mrs. Chance's land was 'more suited for farming than any other thing,' and that property values are determined by the capabilities of the land and the amount of money the land is capable of producing. He defined market value as the amount of money property would bring at an open sale. He explained two other sales of land at prices well below this estimate, referring to one as a family affair, although sold at public auction, and the other as the sale of a gully. He placed a market value of $500 per acre on Mrs. Chance's land, and estimated a depreciation in value of 75% to the south tract, and 50% to the north tract, pointing out that the south tract was landlocked, that 'she's cut off from her water' and that the division of the land would create difficulties in using it for farming.

Mrs. Chance testified she had lived in sight of the property for 67 years, and had farmed it, together with her late husband who died in 1967, for 35 years. She testified further concerning the productivity of the land, and the effect of the right of way in creating a landlocked situation on the south tract, limiting access to a water supply. She also referred to discussions with others in the community concerning land values. Her opinion as to value and consequential damages are substantially the same as those of Faulk.

As shown above, the premise on which the State Highway Department attacks the testimony of these witnesses is clearly without foundation, for each witness did give the reasons for his or her opinion. Where the issue for the jury 'shall be one of opinion any witness may swear to his opinion or belief, giving his reasons therefor.' Code § 38-1708. One need not be an expert to testify as to value if he has had an opportunity for forming a correct opinion. Code § 38-1709.

There is no merit in the...

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6 cases
  • Department of Transp. v. Driggers, 57424
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 13 d3 Junho d3 1979
    ...1. The Department of Transportation argues that we "apparently either overlooked or misconstrued the case of State Highway Department v. Chance, 122 Ga.App. 600 (178 S.E.2d 212)." This court neither overlooked or misconstrued Chance. The case was accented in the brief of counsel even though......
  • Piedmont Builders, Inc. v. Fullerton
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 14 d3 Janeiro d3 1981
    ...builder built and what he should have built. The jury, however, are not bound by the exact limits of the evidence. State Hwy. Dept. v. Chance, 122 Ga.App. 600, 178 S.E.2d 212; see Dept. of Transp. v. Driggers, 150 Ga.App. 270, 275, 257 S.E.2d 294, nor are they required to accept as correct ......
  • Department of Transp. v. Coley, 74536
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 14 d1 Setembro d1 1987
    ...535, 174 S.E.2d 361 (1970); accord Dept. of Transp. v. Brooks, 153 Ga.App. 386(1), 265 S.E.2d 610 (1980). Cf. State Hwy. Dept. v. Chance, 122 Ga.App. 600(4), 178 S.E.2d 212 (1970). Judgment BIRDSONG, C.J., and DEEN, P.J., concur. ...
  • Department of Transp. v. El Carlo Motel, Inc.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 1 d3 Dezembro d3 1976
    ...was insufficient to support the verdict in that it was in excess of that authorized by the evidence citing State Highway Dept. v. Chance, 122 Ga.App. 600(4), 178 S.E.2d 212. It contends that there was no evidence of proper appraisal except its own. However, as ruled in Divisions 1 and 3, th......
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