State Highway Dept. v. Robinson, 38531

Citation118 S.E.2d 289,103 Ga.App. 12
Decision Date06 January 1961
Docket NumberNo. 1,No. 38531,38531,1
PartiesSTATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT v. C. E. ROBINSON
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court

1. An objection that evidence is illegal, immaterial, irrelevant, prejudicial, inadmissible, and a conclusion without showing wherein such evidence is so characterized is insufficient and will not be considered.

2. While market value is the general yardstick in a condemnation proceeding, there may be circumstances in which market value and actual value are not the same, and in such event the jury may consider the actual value of the property therein appropriated in determining just and adequate compensation.

3. In a condemnation case where the condemnee is engaged in a business where merchandise is kept on the property being condemned the jury may consider the cost of removing such merchandise, not as a separate item of recovery, but as a factor which may illustrate just and adequate compensation.

4. Under proper evidence in determining just and adequate compensation for property taken by eminent domain, the jury may consider the value of the property for uses other than that for which it was being used at the time of the condemnation.

5. Where the charge of the court covers fully the issues in the case it is not error, in the absence of a timely written request, to charge additionally on some phase of the case.

6. The verdict was authorized by the evidence.

The State Highway Department of Georgia filed condemnation proceedings against a certain tract of land owned by C. E. Robinson. The State sought not only to take a part of the property owned by the condemnee but also sought the right to enter any adjacent land of the condemnee for the purpose of removing and dismantling 'in its entirety' any and all buildings of the condemnee lying wholly or partially within the property sought to be condemned. After the award of the assessors was made the judgment of the superior court the condemnor appealed to a jury where the issue thus made was tried. The jury returned a verdict for the condemnee and the condemnor filed its motion for new trial on the usual general grounds, which motion it later amended so as to assign error on the charge and on the admission of evidence over objection. The trial court overruled the condemnor's motion for new trial as amended, and it is to this judgment that the condemnor now excepts.

Eugene Cook, Atty. Gen., Paul Miller, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., Payne & Heard, E. Freeman Leverett, Woodrow W. Lavender, Elberton, for plaintiff in error.

Williford & Grant, Elberton, for defendant in error.

NICHOLS, Judge.

1. Special ground 9 of the amended motion for new trial complains that certain evidence (as to the damage caused to merchandise by the condemnee having to move it), was admitted over objection that such evidence should have been excluded. The condemnee offered such evidence and the condemnor objected because 'it was immaterial and irrelevant.'

'An objection that evidence is illegal, immaterial, irrelevant, prejudicial, inadmissible, and a conclusion, without showing wherein such evidence is so characterized is insufficient and will not be considered. See Deen v. Baxley State Bank, 62 Ga.App. 536, 537, 8 S.E.2d 689, and citations.' Slater v. Russell, 100 Ga.App. 563, 565, 112 S.E.2d 178, 179. Such objection fails to present any question for decision.

2. Special ground 4 complains of the following excerpt from the charge to the jury while special ground 5 complains of the italicized portions thereof: 'It is your duty in this case to determine the sum of money representing just and adequate compensation for the property actually taken by the State Highway Department. The condemnee is entitled to a sum which may restore the money loss consequent to the taking or injury. This consists generally of the fair market value of the property taken. The Constitution of Ceorgia, art. 1, § 3, par. 1, provides that the basis of recovery in cases of condemnation is stated to be just and adequate compensation. I charge you that the Constitution does not require in all cases the fair market value of the property taken to be used as a basis of determining just and adequate compensation, although as stated, the measure is governed by determining the fair market value of the property actually taken. I further charge you that the constitutional provision as to just and adequate compensation does not necessary [sic] restrict the owner's recovery to market value. The owner or condemnee is entitled to just and adequate compensation for his property, that is, the value of the property to him, not its value to the State Highway Department. The measure of damages for property taken by the right of eminent domain being compensatory in its mature is the pecuniary loss sustained by the owner, taking into consideration all relevant factors that may be disclosed by the evidence. I charge you, however, that generally speaking the measure of damages is the market value of the property actually taken and when this would give just and adequate compensation to the owner, this rule is to be applied by you.' Special ground 6 complains of the following excerpt of the charge: 'I charge you that the word value as used in the law relating to eminent domain or condemnation in Georgia is a relative term, depending upon the circumstances, and in determining such value the measure of damages is not necessarily, as I have stated, the market value but may be the fair and reasonable value of the property taken if you find that the market value would not coincide with the actual value of the property taken. While market value is the general yardstick in a condemnation proceeding, there may be circumstances in which market value and actual value are not the same, and in such event the jury may consider the actual value of the property therein appropriated. In determining just and adequate compensation under the Constitutional provision, market value and actual value will ordinarily be synonymous. If they are not that value which will give just...

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16 cases
  • Housing Authority of City of Atlanta v. Troncalli
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • March 18, 1965
    ...Ga.App. 673, 676, 89 S.E.2d 577, and is proper where the jury is not 'bound to find' that two measures coincide, State Hwy. Dept. v. Robinson, 103 Ga.App. 12, 15, 118 S.E.2d 289. The evidence should show that the value to the owner theory is applicable. State Hwy. Dept. v. Cochran, 108 Ga.A......
  • Department of Transp. v. Vest, s. 62107
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 13, 1981
    ...the charge would have been correct. City of Gainesville v. Chambers, 118 Ga.App. 25, 162 S.E.2d 460 (1968); State Highway Dept. v. Robinson, 103 Ga.App. 12, 118 S.E.2d 289 (1961). In fact the charge, as given, is included in the suggested Pattern Jury Instructions prepared by the Council of......
  • Department of Transp. v. Willis
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • January 4, 1983
    ...Housing Authority of Savannah v. Savannah Iron & c., Inc., 91 Ga.App. 881, 886, 87 S.E.2d 671 (1961). See also State Hwy. Dept. v. Robinson, 103 Ga.App. 12, 118 S.E.2d 289 (1961). In the case before us, however, it is clear that the case was tried solely on the theory that market value was ......
  • State Highway Dept. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 38532
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • January 6, 1961
    ...1. Special grounds 4, 5 and 6 of the condemnor's amended motion for new trial are controlled by the decision in State Highway Dept. v. Robinson, Ga.App., 118 S.E.2d 289. 2. The evidence adduced on the trial of the case authorized the instruction on consequential 3. Where a charge covers the......
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