State in Interest of J.H.

• Decision Date: 30 October 1990
• Citation: 244 N.J.Super. 207,581 A.2d 1347
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey in the Interest of J.H., Juvenile-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 207

244 N.J.Super. 207

581 A.2d 1347

STATE of New Jersey in the Interest of J.H., Juvenile-Appellant.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Argued Sept. 26, 1990.

Decided Oct. 30, 1990.

Daniel V. Gautieri, Asst. Deputy Public Defender, for juvenile-appellant (Wilfredo Caraballo, Public Defender, Daniel V. Gautieri, of counsel and on the brief).

Janis R. Melfi, Asst. Prosecutor, for State of N.J. (Richard E. Hickey, III, Gloucester County Prosecutor, attorney; Janis R. Melfi, on the brief).

Before Judges GAULKIN, HAVEY and SKILLMAN.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

SKILLMAN, J.A.D.

This appeal involves the operation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-19, which provides for the admission into evidence of certificates reporting laboratory analyses of alleged controlled dangerous substances, in light of the requirements of the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution.

J.H. was found guilty of juvenile delinquency by committing an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute possession of a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1). The court sentenced him to a six month suspension of his driver's license, a $1,000 DEDR penalty, a $15 Violent Crimes Compensation Board penalty and a $25 laboratory fee. ¹

The juvenile was apprehended after he fled at the sight of a police officer and ran home. As the juvenile was entering his house with the officer in pursuit, he dropped a plastic package containing a white powdery substance. A police officer who performed a field test on the substance reported that it was "not positive for cocaine." However, a State Police forensic scientist subsequently concluded on the basis of a laboratory test that the substance was cocaine. A "certified laboratory report" of the State Police analysis was admitted into evidence over the objection of the juvenile.

In admitting the laboratory certificate into evidence, the trial court relied exclusively upon N.J.S.A. 2C:35-19, a section of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1986, L.1987, c. 106, which provides that the certificate of an employee of a state forensic laboratory shall "be admissible evidence of the composition, quality, and quantity of the substance submitted to the laboratory for analysis." N.J.S.A. 2C:35-19b. A party intending to offer such a certificate must give notice of that intention to the opposing party at least 20 days before the proceeding begins. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-19c. ² The opposing party then has 10 days to object and to state "the grounds for the objection." Ibid. "A proffered certificate shall be admitted in evidence unless it appears from the notice of objection and specific grounds for that objection that the composition, quality, or quantity of the substance submitted to the laboratory for analysis will be contested at trial." Ibid.

The juvenile's only argument on appeal is that his rights under the Confrontation Clauses of the United States and New Jersey Constitutions were violated by the admission of the certified laboratory report pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-19. ³

The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently held that the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution "does not necessarily prohibit the admission of hearsay statements against a criminal defendant." Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, ----, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3145, 111 L.Ed.2d 638, 651 (1990). Generally, for hearsay to be admissible under the Confrontation Clause, the state must show both that the hearsay has sufficient "indicia of reliability" to warrant its admission and that the declarant is unavailable. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). But some forms of hearsay are considered sufficiently reliable to satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause without showing the unavailability of the declarant. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 106 S.Ct. 1121, 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986). Thus, the threshold requirement for admission of any hearsay is a showing of reliability. Idaho v. Wright, supra; Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181-184, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2782- 97 L.Ed.2d 144, 156-158 (1987). This requirement can be satisfied either by a showing that "the hearsay statement 'falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,' or ... by 'a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' " Idaho v. Wright, supra, --- U.S. at ----, 110 S.Ct. at 3147, 111 L.Ed.2d at 653, quoting Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d at 608.

A laboratory report offered in evidence to prove the composition, quality or quantity of an alleged controlled dangerous substance is hearsay. Evid.R. 63. Therefore, the party offering the evidence must establish its admissibility under a hearsay exception. And where the State offers such evidence in a criminal trial, it also must satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause by showing that the hearsay exception is "firmly rooted" or, alternatively, that the evidence possesses "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Idaho v. Wright, supra, 497 U.S. at ----, 110 S.Ct. at 3147, 111 L.Ed.2d at 653.

Our courts have previously considered the admissibility of laboratory reports to establish the composition, quality or quantity of controlled dangerous substances under the "business entries" hearsay exception of Evidence Rule 63(13) and the "public reports" exception of Evidence Rule 63(15)(a). See, e.g., State v. Matulewicz, 101 N.J. 27, 499 A.2d 1363 (1985); State v. Flynn, 202 N.J.Super. 215, 494 A.2d 350 (App.Div.1985), remanded to Law Division for reconsideration in light of Matulewicz, 103 N.J. 446, 511 A.2d 634 (1986).

In Matulewicz the issue was the admissibility of a laboratory report to prove that the substance found in the defendant's possession was marijuana. The Court stated that the linchpin of admissibility of a laboratory report under Evidence Rule 63(13) is its reliability. 101 N.J. at 29-30, 499 A.2d 1363. It also stated that "the degree of complexity of the procedures utilized in formulating the conclusions expressed in the forensic chemist's laboratory report [is] critical" in determining the report's reliability. Id. at 30, 499 A.2d 1363. However, the Court found the record inadequate to determine the reliability of the procedures utilized in preparing the report. Consequently, it concluded that:

... proofs should be adduced to reflect the relative degrees of objectivity and subjectivity involved in the procedure; the regularity with which these analyses are done; the routine quality of each analysis; the presence of any motive to single out a specific analysis for the purpose of rendering an untrustworthy report, and the responsibility of each State Police chemist to make accurate and reliable analyses. [Id. at 30, 499 A.2d 1363].

The Court also concluded that "concern for reliability remains paramount" in determining the admissibility of a laboratory report under Evid.R. 63(15)(a). Id. at 31, 499 A.2d 1363.

Although the Court in Matulewicz was concerned solely with the interpretation of Evidence Rules 63(13) and 63(15)(a), we conclude that the tests for admissibility under these state evidence rules also would provide adequate "indicia of reliability" to satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. We reach this conclusion because the "business entries" and "public reports" hearsay exceptions interpreted in Matulewicz are "firmly rooted," see McCormick on Evidence § 304 to § 320 (3d ed. 1984), or, alternatively, because the tests of admissibility set forth in Matulewicz provide "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." See Idaho v. Wright, supra, --- U.S. at ----, 110 S.Ct. at 3147, 111 L.Ed.2d at 653. This conclusion is also supported by federal cases which have considered indicia of reliability similar to those identified in Matulewicz in ruling upon the admissibility of laboratory reports under the Confrontation Clause. See, e.g., Pickett v. Bowen, 798 F.2d 1385 (11th Cir.1986); United States v. McClintock, 748 F.2d 1278, 1291-1292 (9th Cir.1984), cert. den. 474 U.S. 822, 106 S.Ct. 75, 88 L.Ed.2d 61 (1985); see also United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 80-82 (2d Cir.1977); cf. Idaho v. Wright, supra, --- U.S. at ----, 110 S.Ct. at 3147, 111 L.Ed.2d at 653 ("Admission under a firmly rooted hearsay exception satisfies the constitutional requirement of reliability because of the weight accorded longstanding judicial and legislative experience in assessing the trustworthiness of certain types of out-of-court statements.").

In admitting the laboratory certificate showing that the substance possessed by the juvenile was cocaine, the trial court did not refer to Evidence Rules 63(13) and 63(15)(a) and consequently did not require the State to satisfy the tests of reliability set forth in Matulewicz. Rather, the court admitted the certificate pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-19, without any preliminary showing of reliability.

Although the legislative commentary to the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act describes N.J.S.A. 2C:35-19 as a hearsay exception, this section does not condition the admissibility of a laboratory certificate upon a showing, as is required under a true hearsay exception, that "the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that the statement is trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superfluous." Idaho v. Wright, supra, 497 U.S. at ----, 110 S.Ct. at 3149, 111 L.Ed.2d at 655. The admissibility of a laboratory certificate under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-19 does not turn on a showing of its reliability but rather on whether the conclusions contained therein "will be contested at trial." Therefore, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-19 is not a hearsay exception at all, much less a "firmly rooted" one, and its constitutionality cannot be sustained under the kind of analysis applicable to hearsay exceptions.

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-19 is similar to Evidence Rule 3, which is designed to...