State, Indiana State Highway Commission v. Speidel

Decision Date24 July 1979
Docket NumberNo. 2-877A300,2-877A300
Citation392 N.E.2d 1172,181 Ind.App. 448
PartiesSTATE of Indiana, INDIANA STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. Eleanor Faye SPEIDEL, Leslie Kay Speidel and John J. Speidel, Jr., Appellees (Plaintiffs Below).
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Susan J. Davis, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellant.

Howard S. Young, Jr., Richard A. Young, Young & Young, Indianapolis, for appellees.

BUCHANAN, Chief Judge.

CASE SUMMARY

Defendant-Appellant, State of Indiana, Indiana State Highway Commission (the State), appeals from a partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellees, Eleanor Speidel, Leslie Speidel, and John Speidel, Jr. (the Speidel children) on the issue of liability, claiming that the former adjudication of liability in a wrongful death action is not binding in the present action by the Speidel children for their personal injuries, i. e., that collateral estoppel may not be asserted against the State.

We reverse.

FACTS

The undisputed facts may be briefly summarized as follows:

On October 12, 1970, at approximately 5:00 p. m., Wilma Speidel was involved in an automobile collision with a pick-up truck while she was driving along State Road 37 five miles north of Martinsville in Morgan County, Indiana. Wilma Speidel was fatally injured in the accident and her three children, Eleanor, Leslie and John Speidel, Jr., who were passengers in her car at the time of the collision, were injured.

In 1972, John Speidel filed a 2-count complaint in Marion Superior Court. The first count was in his individual capacity for medical expenses incurred by him on behalf of his three minor children (ages 5 years, 3 years, and 9 months at the time of the accident) and for damages for the loss of their services. The second count was brought under the Indiana Wrongful Death statute to recover damages for Wilma Speidel's wrongful death. He alleged that the State was negligent in the design, construction, and maintenance of State Road 37 and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. The jury rendered a verdict for John Speidel in the amount of Two Hundred Ninety-four Thousand ($294,000) Dollars, and judgment was entered on March 1, 1977. The judgment was appealed, the Court of Appeals affirmed, and transfer was denied by the Indiana Supreme Court on February 21, 1978.

Before that process was completed, the Speidel children filed a complaint against the State on February 13, 1974, alleging carelessness and negligence in design, construction and maintenance of State Road 37 and sought damages for their personal injuries. On January 28, 1977, they sought a partial summary judgment on the issue of liability claiming that the issue of liability had already been determined in the earlier wrongful death action and that it was binding on the State in the present personal injury action.

The trial court granted the motion and the State brings this appeal.

ISSUE

A single issue is presented for review:

Is the finding of liability in the wrongful death action binding on the State in the present personal injury action?

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS The State, as appellant, maintains that collateral estoppel is unavailable because the essential elements of mutuality of estoppel and privity are absent.

The Speidel children assert collateral estoppel against the State claiming that the finding of liability in the prior wrongful death action is binding in the present personal injury action because the actions arose out of the same occurrence and the actions have the same defendant and the same plaintiffs or persons in privity with the prior plaintiff. Also, it is argued that a "fundamental fairness" test should be applied on a case by case basis as has been done in some other jurisdictions.

DECISION

CONCLUSION Mutuality of estoppel, an essential element of collateral estoppel, is lacking so the former adjudication of the State's liability is not binding in the present action.

By successfully asserting collateral estoppel against the State in the trial court, the Speidel children compel us to enter the miasmic land of res judicata where historic marsh vapors obscure concepts and semantic footing is slippery.

Despite these uncertainties, none can deny that generally speaking res judicata, unlike Gaul, is divided into two parts. The first part may best be described as "claim preclusion," 1 a term which is applied to a prior adjudication resulting in a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction which acts as a complete bar to a subsequent action on the same claim between the same parties or those in privity with them. Town of Flora v. Indiana Service Corp. (1943), 222 Ind. 253, 53 N.E.2d 161; In re Estate of Nye (1973), 157 Ind.App. 236, 299 N.E.2d 854; Amann v. Tankersley (1971), 149 Ind.App. 501, 273 N.E.2d 772; Mayhew v. Deister (1969), 144 Ind.App. 111, 244 N.E.2d 448.

The second part of res judicata is commonly referred to as "issue preclusion" 2 or collateral estoppel. This principle finds application when a particular issue is adjudicated and then is put into issue in a subsequent suit on a different cause of action between the same parties or those in privity with them. When this happens the former adjudication of the issue is held to bind the parties or privies of the subsequent suit. See Town of Flora v. Indiana Service Corp., supra; In re Estate of Nye, supra; Mayhew v. Deister, supra. See also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).

As to claim preclusion, a party is not allowed to split a cause of action, pursuing it in a piecemeal fashion and subjecting a defendant to needless multiple suits. Roby v. Eggers (1891), 130 Ind. 415, 29 N.E. 365; Evansville Legion Home Association v. White (1967), 141 Ind.App. 574, 230 N.E.2d 623. However, two (or more) separate causes of action may arise from the same tortious act, and in such case a judgment on one action does not bar suit on the second. 3 Illinois Central Gulf RR v. Parks (1979), Ind.App., 390 N.E.2d 1078 (No. 1-678-A-180, handed down June 25, 1979); Nichols v. Yater (1970), 147 Ind.App. 29, 258 N.E.2d 66; Fairwood Bluffs Conservancy Dist. v. Imel (1970), 146 Ind.App. 352, 255 N.E.2d 674; 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 677.

In determining whether only a single cause of action exists, the test is whether identical evidence will support the issues involved in both actions. Fairwood Bluffs Conservancy Dist. v. Imel, supra; Burrell v. Jean (1925), 196 Ind. 187, 146 N.E. 754.

The Speidel children now sue the State on a different cause of action (their personal injuries) than was asserted in the previous action (wrongful death of their mother). See Chamberlain v. Mo.-Ark. Coach Lines, Inc. (1945),354 Mo. 461, 189 S.W.2d 538; Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton R.R. v. Chester (1877), 57 Ind. 297. While both claims arose from the same incident, each required proof of injury and damages that the other did not require. See Illinois Central Gulf RR v. Parks, supra ; Nichols v. Yater,supra. Thus there is no claim preclusion; the judgment on the first action did not preclude the second suit on a separate cause of action.

Our inquiry now turns to the nature of collateral estoppel or the "issue preclusion" branch of res judicata.

We have not far to look to find a line of Indiana Supreme Court cases which define the two requirements necessary to the application of collateral estoppel. Over 100 years ago it was decided that in order for collateral estoppel to apply so that the former judgment was binding as to the issue subsequently raised, there must be Identity of parties and mutuality of estoppel :

The proceedings in the partition suit do not in any manner estop the plaintiff, on the ground of being a former adjudication of the same matter. Without stopping to inquire, especially, whether the same matter was adjudicated, it is sufficient to say that that suit was between different parties. Judgments bind only parties and privies, and the estoppel must be reciprocal. (emphasis added)

Dayton v. Fisher (1870), 34 Ind. 356, 358.

Since this pronouncement, identity of parties and mutuality of estoppel have become mandatory prerequisites to a successful plea of collateral estoppel in both this and the Supreme Court. See, e. g., Tobin v. McClellan (1947), 225 Ind. 335, 73 N.E.2d 679; Hoosier Stone Co. v. Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railway Co. (1891), 131 Ind. 575, 31 N.E. 365; Maple v. Beach (1873), 43 Ind. 51; Dayton v. Fisher, supra. See also Lukacs v. Kluessner (1972), 154 Ind.App. 452, 290 N.E.2d 125; Amann v. Tankersley, supra ; Mayhew v. Deister, supra.

A. Identity of Parties.

A plea of collateral estoppel is binding only on parties to the action and persons in privity with them. 4

Indiana's Wrongful Death Statute, Ind.Code 34-1-1-2 (1976) provides in part:

When the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, The personal representative of the former may maintain an action therefor against the latter, if the former might have maintained an action had he or she, as the case may be, lived, against the latter for an injury for the same act or omission . . . That part of the damages which is recovered for reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expense shall inure to the exclusive benefit of the decedent's estate for the payment thereof. The remainder of the damages, if any, Shall, subject to the provisions of this act, Inure to the exclusive Benefit of the widow or Widower, as the case may be, And to the dependent children, if any, or dependent next of kin, to be distributed in the same manner as the personal property of the deceased. (emphasis added)

The personal representative is the proper person to institute a wrongful death action. In fulfilling this statutory duty, the personal representative is not acting as administrator for the estate, but as trustee for those...

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