State Insurance Fund v. Hunt

• Decision Date: 22 December 1932
• Docket Number: 5878
• Citation: 52 Idaho 639,17 P.2d 354
• Parties: STATE INSURANCE FUND, Plaintiff, v. Hon. EVERETT E. HUNT, District Judge of the Eighth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for Boundary County, and to Said Court, Defendant
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

17 P.2d 354

52 Idaho 639

STATE INSURANCE FUND, Plaintiff, v. Hon. EVERETT E. HUNT, District Judge of the Eighth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for Boundary County, and to Said Court, Defendant

No. 5878

Supreme Court of Idaho

December 22, 1932

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD-AWARD-DEATH OF BENEFICIARY-SUMMARY JUDGMENT-WRIT OF REVIEW-INQUIRY LIMITED TO JURISDICTION.

1. On application for writ of review, supreme court's sole business is to inquire into single question of jurisdiction (C. S., sec. 7249).

2. On writ of review, such defenses as limitation statutes cannot be considered or made bases for affirmative relief (C. S sec. 7249).

3. Every phase of controversy before Industrial Accident Board is withdrawn from operation of common-law rules (C. S., sec 6213 et seq., as amended).

4. Under summary judgment statute, court has no general jurisdiction to determine any question of fact or law necessary to support award as rendered by Industrial Accident Board (C. S., sec. 6271, as amended by Laws 1921, chap. 217 sec. 13).

5. Unless void, or modified or reversed on appeal, Industrial Accident Board's award is final and conclusive (C. S sec. 6213 et seq., as amended; sec. 6271, as amended by Laws 1921, chap. 217, sec. 13).

6. On statutory application for summary judgment based on Industrial Accident Board's award, court has no jurisdiction to proceed unless satisfied that applicant is party in interest (C. S., sec. 6271, as amended by Laws 1921, chap. 217, sec. 13).

7. "Party in interest," within statute authorizing filing of Industrial Accident Board's award as basis for summary judgment, means any party in interest existent at time of filing (C. S., sec. 6271, as amended by Laws 1921, chap. 217, sec. 13).

8. Where award had been granted to employee's widow, balance remaining unpaid on widow's death belonged to her estate (C. S., sec. 6213 at seq., as amended).

9. Where beneficiary died before receiving entire award for employee's death, exclusive duty of beneficiary's administrator was to collect balance unpaid (C. S., secs. 7685, 7687).

10. Administrator, although owning no part of estate, is "trustee" in broadest sense (C. S., secs. 7685, 7687).

11. Administrator represents legal title of deceased.

12. While administrator is functioning, no heir or other person interested in estate may sue to enforce claim in estate's favor.

13. Where widow died before receiving entire award for employee's death, widow's administrator held sole "party in interest" within statute authorizing summary judgment for unpaid balance of award (C. S., sec. 6271, as amended by Laws 1921, chap. 217, sec. 13).

14. Statutory requirement that judgment shall be in accordance with Industrial Accident Board's award is not violated by court's taking testimony and rendering summary judgment for amount actually due in favor of existing party in interest (C. S., sec. 6219; sec. 6271, as amended by Laws 1921, chap. 217, sec. 13).

15. Statute authorizing summary judgment in accordance with Industrial Accident Board's award does not foreclose any adverse party from protesting or correcting judgment (C. S., sec. 6271, as amended by Laws 1921, chap. 217, sec. 13).

16. Statute authorizing filing of award and summary judgment thereon should be construed in light of ultimate purpose of Compensation Act (C. S., sec. 6213 et seq., as amended; sec. 6271, as amended by Laws 1921, chap. 217, sec. 13).

17. Beneficiary's administrator obtaining summary judgment for unpaid balance of award for employee's death held not entitled to interest under statute specifying cases wherein interest is permissible (C. S., sec. 6271, as amended by Laws 1921, chap. 217, sec. 13; Laws 1921, chap. 217, sec. 15, adding sec. 6272A to C. S.).

ON REHEARING.

Original proceeding for a writ for a writ of review. Denied.

Writ denied.

Charles F. Reddoch and J. J. McCue, for Plaintiff.

The jurisdiction of the district court under C. S., sec. 6271, as amended by Sess. Laws 1921, chap. 217, p. 479, is statutory and limited and must be exercised in strict conformity with the statute. (C. S., sec. 6271, as amended by 1921 Sess. Laws, chap. 217, p. 479; Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Albrethsen, 50 Idaho 196, 294 P. 842; Platts v. Platts, 37 Idaho 149, 215 P. 464; Wright v. Atwood, 33 Idaho 455, 195 P. 625.)

The award fully accrued on October 5, 1926, and the court was without jurisdiction to enter judgment thereon after said date, for the reason that it could not render the same in accordance therewith. (Brown v. George A. Fuller Co., 193 Mich. 214, 159 N.W. 376; Gallup v. Western Board & Paper Co., 252 Mich. 68, 233 N.W. 184; City of Norfolk v. Norfolk Landmark Pub. Co., 95 Va. 564, 28 S.E. 959.)

The court was without jurisdiction to render a judgment in favor of a party not named in the award, as the phrase "any party in interest" used in the statute means some person to whom compensation was provided by the terms of the award. (Ybaibarriaga v. Farmer, 39 Idaho 361, 228 P. 227; Raggi v. H. G. Christman Co., 92 Ind.App. 337, 151 N.E. 833.)

Myra Fisk, to whom compensation was awarded, and which fully matured October 5, 1926, instituted no action for the recovery thereof in her lifetime; hence, there was no action pending at the time of her death over which the court had acquired jurisdiction, and it was without authority to enter an order of revival or substitution in the name of her administrator without the pendency of an action. (C. S., secs. 6652 (as amended by 1931 Sess. Laws, chap. 96, p. 169), 6681; 1 C. J., sec. 435, p. 216; Green's Admr. v. McMurthy, 20 Kan. 189; Auerbach v. Maynard, 26 Minn. 421, 4 N.W. 816.)

The death of a party to an award puts an end to the proceeding for the entry of summary judgment, in the absence of a statute to the contrary. (5. C. J., sec. 644, p. 236; Manning v. Pratt, 18 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 344, Farmer v. Frey, 4 McCord (S. C.), 160.)

E. B. Smith, for Defendant.

All of the award in favor of Myra Fisk had accrued and the balance thereof was due and payable to her prior to the time her death occurred, and she did not remarry, by reason whereof the Industrial Accident Board lost jurisdiction to end, diminish or increase the award, pursuant to C. S., sec. 6269. Myra Fisk had the right to petition for and to obtain a judgment in the district court as a party in interest, and such right survived to the administrator as her personal representative, since the amount of compensation accrued belonged to her estate. (C. S., secs. 6271, 6652; Greenwood v. Luby, 105 Conn. 398, 135 A. 578, 51 A. L. R. 1443; Haugse v. Sommers Bros. Mfg. Co., 43 Idaho 450, 254 P. 212, 51 A. L. R. 1438; Burns' Case, 218 Mass. 8, 105 N.E. 601; Murphy's Case, 224 Mass. 592, 113 N.E. 283; Morganelli v. City of Derby, 105 Conn. 545, 135, A. 911.)

The writ of review will not issue except for the purpose of inquiring into the single question of jurisdiction. (C. S., sec. 7249; Lansdon v. State Board of Canvassers, 18 Idaho 596, 111 P. 133; Mays v. District Court, 40 Idaho 798, 237 P. 700.)

LEE, C. J. Budge, Givens and Varian, JJ., concur. Leeper, J., took no part in the decision.

OPINION

LEE, C. J.

On February 4, 1919, Arthur N. Fisk died from injury due to an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with the Bonner Tie Company: he was protected by the State Insurance Fund. Thereupon his widow, Myra Fisk, as a dependent, filed with the Industrial Accident Board her claim as provided for under the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Law. After a tedious course of litigation unnecessary to detail here, the board on June 3, 1925, made the following award:

"It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the claimant, Myra Fisk, do have and receive from the Bonner Tie Company, defendant, and State Insurance Fund, its surety, the sum of One Hundred and no/100 ($ 100.00) Dollars to cover burial expenses, and the further sum of Forty-three Hundred Twenty and no/100 ($ 4320.00) Dollars payable at the rate of Ten and 80/100 ($ 10.80) Dollars per week for a full period of four hundred weeks, subject, however, to be terminated upon the death or re-marriage of said Myra Fisk, claimant, should she die or re-marry prior to the time that her right to the full amount of such compensation shall accrue."

On July 3d following, the State Insurance Fund paid Mrs. Fisk the sum awarded for burial expenses and $ 43.20 compensation for four weeks, thereafter paying her continuous, monthly installments of $ 47.80 until and including December 27, 1927. She died without remarrying January 5, 1928, having received only $ 1,477.20 of the original award of $ 4,420, at that time fully accrued. On February 24, 1932, Clarence M. Fisk, son of the deceased, and administrator of her estate, presented to defendant, Hon. Everett E. Hunt, Judge of the Eighth Judicial District, his petition together with a certified copy of said award, setting forth the facts above stated and praying that as administrator he be substituted in the stead of his deceased mother and awarded summary judgment under C. S., sec. 6271, as amended by chap. 217, sec. 13, p. 479, of the 1921 Session Laws, for the balance claimed due upon the award, with interest accrued.

At that time, the entire award had become due and payable more than five years prior to the filing of the petition and more than four years after Mrs. Fisk's death. Claiming that the court was without jurisdiction of either person, subject matter or question to be decided, the State Insurance Fund filed formal objection, in addition invoking the bars of the statutes of limitation, C. S., secs. 6608, 6609, 6610, 6611 and 6617. Hearing was had and, on March 10 1932, the court made and entered judgment in pet...