Cain v. C. C. Anderson Co. of Caldwell, 7268

• Decision Date: 28 May 1946
• Docket Number: 7268
• Citation: 67 Idaho 1,169 P.2d 505
• Parties: CAIN v. C. C. ANDERSON CO. OF CALDWELL et al
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

169 P.2d 505

67 Idaho 1

CAIN v. C. C. ANDERSON CO. OF CALDWELL et al

No. 7268

Supreme Court of Idaho

May 28, 1946

Appeal from District Court, Seventh Judicial District, Canyon County; Thomas E. Buckner, Judge.

Claimant's motion to dismiss the appeal denied, order overruled, and case remanded to the district court with directions.

Whitla & Knudson, of Coeur d'Alene, and George Donart, of Weiser, for appellants.

The invalidity of a judgment for want of jurisdiction, either of the person or of the subject matter, rendering a judgment void, as distinguished from being merely voidable or erroneous, is ground for vacating such judgment at any time and the existence of a valid or meritorious defense to the action is not a condition precedent to the granting of such relief. 34 C.J., p. 268, § 492; Richardson v Ruddy, 15 Idaho 488, 98 P. 842; Miller v Prout, 33 Idaho 709, 197 P. 1023; Jensen v Gooch, 36 Idaho 457, 211 P. 551; Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Niendorf, 55 Idaho 521, 44 P.2d 1099; Baldwin v. Anderson, 51 Idaho 614, 8 P.2d 461.

It is essential to the validity of a judgment that the Court entering such judgment have jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter and jurisdiction of the question which its judgment assumes to decide and jurisdiction to render a judgment for the particular remedy or relief which the judgment undertakes to create. Baldwin v. Anderson, 51 Idaho 614, 8 P.2d 461.

E. B. Smith, of Boise, and Robert I. Troxell, of Caldwell, for respondent.

The trial court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment such as the one sought to be entered only in cases where an award has been made by the Industrial Accident Board and no appeal taken therefrom; it lacks jurisdiction to enter such judgment in all other cases. Sec. 43-1410 I.C.A.; Ybaibarriaga v. Farmer, 39 Idaho 361, 228 P. 227; Cain v. C. C. Anderson Co. of Caldwell, 65 Idaho 443, 145 P.2d 483; Haines v. State Ins. Fund, 65 Idaho 450, 145 P.2d 833.

The phrase, "The decisions of the board shall be enforceable by the district court under the provisions of I.C.A. sec. 43-1410", applies in a case where an appeal has been taken and an award of the board and judgment of the appellate court has become final, as well as in a case "from which no appeal has been taken". I.C.A. sec. 43-1413; I.C.A. sec. 43-1410; Ybaibarriaga v. Farmer, 39 Idaho 361, 228 P. 227.

Where the question of jurisdiction of the court to enter a summary judgment in a workmen's compensation proceeding is involved, as claimed by appellants in this proceeding, that may be reached by timely application for writ of review. State Insurance Fund v. Hunt, 52 Idaho 639, at page 644, 17 P.2d 354; Ada County v. Bottolfsen, 61 Idaho 64, 97 P.2d 599; Haines v. State Insurance Fund, 65 Idaho 450, 145 P.2d 833.

Miller, Justice. Budge, Givens and Holden, JJ., concur. Ailshie, C. J., did not sit at the hearing or participate in the decision.

OPINION

Miller, Justice.

June 19, 1942, the Industrial Accident Board of the state of Idaho made its findings of fact, rules of law and an award in favor of Catherine A. Cain, surviving widow, on her own behalf and on behalf of all other dependents, of Donald E. Cain, deceased, said dependents being Robert Allen Cain and an expected posthumous child, and against the defendants C. C. Anderson Company of Caldwell, Idaho, employer, and the Idaho Compensation Company, surety. Payments on account of said award were to commence as of January 10, 1942, the date of the accidental death of Donald E. Cain, which arose out of and in the course of his employment with the defendant C. C. Anderson Company of Caldwell, Idaho.

An appeal to this court from the award of the Industrial Accident Board was taken by defendants and appellants and, after due hearing had, the award of the Industrial Accident Board was affirmed, and on February 18, 1943, the decision of this court, reported in 64 Idaho 389, 133 P.2d 723, became final. The award of the Industrial Accident Board made no provision for interest on deferred weekly principal payments. The decision of this court affirmed the award of the Industrial Accident Board, as follows: "Award of Industrial Accident Board should be and the same is hereby affirmed". It will be observed that this court neither increased nor diminished, took from nor added to said award, but left it just as it found it, and silent as to payment of interest.

May 17, 1943, Catherine A. Cain, claimant and respondent, in her own behalf and in behalf of the dependents of Donald E. Cain, deceased, filed a petition, together with certified copy of the award, in the district court of the seventh judicial district of Idaho, in and for the county of Canyon, purportedly under the provisions of Section 43-1410 and 43-1412, Idaho Code Annotated, in which it was asserted that defendants and appellants had failed, neglected and refused to pay anything whatever on said award although demands so to do had been made from time to time, and also praying that judgment be entered on said award, together with interest on the whole amount of the judgment of the court at seven per cent per annum from the date of the award by the Industrial Accident Board to the date of payment. On the said 17 th day of May, 1943, the judge of the aforementioned district court, upon a consideration of said petition, certified copy of the award and decision of this court, which, among other things, made, ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows: "It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed, And this does order, adjudge and decree that the defendants, C. C. Anderson Company of Caldwell, a corporation, employer, and Idaho Compensation Company, surety, and each of them, pay interest to the parties hereto, named in this judgment, on the whole amount of the judgment of the Supreme Court of the state of Idaho affirming the award of the Industrial Accident Board, at the rate of 7 per cent per annum from the date of award by the Board to date of payment, that is to say, interest shall be paid on each such compensation installment provided by said award and this judgment to be paid at the rate of 7 per cent per annum from June 19, 1942, the date of said award, to the date each such compensation installment shall be paid, as provided by Idaho Code Annotated, Section 43-1412."

June 27, 1943, defendants and appellants filed and served notice of appeal from the said judgment of the district court. September 30, 1943, claimant and respondent moved to dismiss said appeal. January 25, 1944, this court, after quoting Section 43-1410, supra, and citing authorities, in the case of Cain et al. v. C. C. Anderson Company, 65 Idaho 443, 145 P.2d 483, granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the appeal. It will be noted that the provision for a decree or judgment of the district court, upon filing a petition and certified copy of the decision of the Industrial Accident Board awarding compensation, is available in those instances where no appeal has been taken within the time allowed therefor, that is, thirty days. Section 43-1410, supra, was enacted as a part of the original act in 1917 and was last amended by Chapter 217, Session Laws 1921. The amendment to Section 9, Article V of the Constitution, was ratified at the general election November 3, 1936, and the legislature provided for appeal from orders of the Industrial Accident Board by Chapter 175, Session Laws 1937. It will likewise be noted that defendants and appellants immediately appealed to this court from the award of the Industrial Accident Board. The primary object of said statute (Section 43-1410, supra) was to afford the interested party awarded compensation a means of enforcing payment of the award when no appeal had been taken within the time allowed therefor. Furthermore, said statute also provides that there shall be no appeal from the judgment of the district court, made and entered upon filing a petition and certified copy of an award. Until the constitutional amendment and the amendment of Section 43-1408, supra, in 1937, c. 175, § 2, all appeals from an award of the Industrial Accident Board were to the district court and either party could then appeal to the Supreme Court, if so desired. Any action on an appeal to the Supreme Court would affect the judgment of the district court. Since the aforementioned amendment, however, and when appeal is taken direct to the Supreme Court, it still becomes necessary to petition the district court for a judgment in order to secure the issuance of execution for levying upon the property of the employer or surety in the event they, or either of them, neglect, fail or refuse to pay the award.

April 23, 1945, the defendants and appellants filed notice of motion, motion and affidavit, in which motion it was sought to have that part of the judgment of the district court dated May 17, 1943 (copy of which is heretofore quoted), vacated and set aside, in that the district court in entering that portion of said judgment acted wholly without jurisdiction and that the same is void. Claimant and respondent filed an answer to defendants' motion to vacate said portion of said judgment, supported by affidavit, and at the same time filed a motion for an order denying defendants' motion to vacate and set aside a portion of the judgment of May 17 1943. July 20, 1945, the district court ordered, adjudged and decreed that the defendants' motion to vacate and set aside a portion of the judgment of May 17, 1943, be and the same was denied and held for naught, and claimant's motion for an order denying defendants' motion was granted. August 7, 1945, defendants and appellants filed notice of appeal to this court from the order of July 20, 1945, denying the motion to vacate and set aside a portion of the judgment of May 17,...