State Medical Education Bd. v. Roberson

• Decision Date: 10 April 1970
• Citation: 86 Cal.Rptr. 258,6 Cal.App.3d 493
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The STATE MEDICAL EDUCATION BOARD, an Arm or Agency of the State of Mississippi, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Faye Dillon ROBERSON, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 35010.

Page 258

86 Cal.Rptr. 258

6 Cal.App.3d 493

The STATE MEDICAL EDUCATION BOARD, an Arm or Agency of the State of Mississippi, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Faye Dillon ROBERSON, Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 35010.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

April 10, 1970.

Hecker, Kenealy & McKee, Hecker & Kenealy and Ronald A. Hecker, Hollywood, for defendant and appellant.

Young & Smith and Sol P. Ajalat, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and respondent.

LILLIE, Associate Justice.

Plaintiff sued for breach of a written contract under which it loaned to defendant a sum certain in yearly installments for the pursuit and completion of her medical studies; plaintiff was given summary judgment against defendant for the total sum advanced plus interest. Defendant appeals from the judgment.

The contract in suit was executed on June 20, 1957, pursuant to which plaintiff loaned to defendant the sum of $5,000.00 payable in four equal annual installments commencing on the above date and concluding with an installment due in August of 1960. The instrument further recited that the loan therein granted was subject to the provisions of a designated Mississippi law, reading in pertinent part as follows: 'The said loans or scholarships to be granted to each applicant shall be based upon the condition that the full amount thereof shall be repaid to the state of Mississippi in cash in full with 4% Interest from the date of each payment by the state on such loan or scholarship, same to be payable annually, the first annual payment to be due on or before one year from the date the applicant completes his internship, or same may be repaid to the state of Mississippi in services to be rendered by the applicant by practicing his profession at some place within the state of Mississippi to be approved by the board.' An additional provision declared that defendant 'shall have the right to repay the loan in installments of one-fifth thereof, with interest thereon, to be credited to the student for each year (s)he engages in public health work in Mississippi * * *.' Finally, there was an acceleration clause effective upon defendant's noncompliance with the terms of the contract.

The original complaint was filed on February 11, 1966; it alleged defendant's residence in Los Angeles County, the execution of the contract, performance by plaintiff, completion of an internship by defendant in October 1962 at a certain Washington, D.C. hospital, and nonpayment of the monies advanced despite plaintiff's demand therefor. Before a demurrer filed thereto could be heard, plaintiff filed an amended complaint containing the further allegation that defendant, after completion of her internship at a named Washington hospital on October 29, 1962, 'has at no time since that date engaged in public health work in the State of Mississippi.' Defendant's answer admitted the execution of the agreement and further admitted, by failure to deny, the allegation in the amended pleading with regard to the making of the loan. All other allegations were denied by the answer which included, as an affirmative defense, the bar of the statute of limitations (Code Civ.Proc. § 337--4 years).

Based on her declaration, executed May 3, 1966, that she had not 'to this date' completed her internship due to illness, defendant thereafter moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed its opposition to such motion and, in addition, also moved for summary judgment; such opposition and motion were supported by the affidavit of Lucille M. Hardy, plaintiff's executive secretary, enclosing copies of all correspondence, certified to be true, correct, and complete, between plaintiff and defendant, and a supplemental affidavit, executed the same day by the same affiant, that on June 23, 1962, plaintiff received notice from defendant that she would not complete her internship in Washington, D.C., scheduled to occur some 7 days later (June 30, 1962). On June 16, 1966, the court denied defendant's motion; as to plaintiff's motion, defendant was given 14 days to file additional memoranda, plaintiff being granted 14 days to respond thereto, 'at which time the matter will be deemed submitted.'

Thereafter plaintiff submitted to the court another supplemental affidavit by Lucille M. Hardy which stated that defendant had not paid any sums due under the contract; no mention was therein made, however, as to whether defendant had completed an internship. On July 22, 1966, the court (Judge Moss) made the following order: 'Motion denied. While the First Amended Complaint alleges (in Paragraph VII) that defendant completed her internship, this allegation is refuted by defendant's declaration on file. The contract and law which it incorporates by reference do not specify when internship must be completed (if indeed at all). A triable issue of fact is presented as to whether the right to payment has accrued.'

Following the above order, written interrogatories were served upon defendant and answers thereto (dated November 17) were filed (Code Civ.Proc. § 2030.) Material here are the following questions and answers:

Q. '4. List all of your addresses within the past six (6) years and dates of your residence at each such address.'

A. '4. 4122 Don Mariano Drive, Los Angeles, California, from October 1966 to present.

1069 South Gramercy Place, Los Angeles, California, from July, 1965 to October, 1966.

St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington, D.C., August, 1964 to July, 1965.

1912 Shipley Terrace, SE, Washington, D.C., from June, 1961 to August, 1964.

1710 Jefferson Street, Nashville, Tennessee, from September, 1960 to June, 1961.'

Q. '6. Give the date of commencement and of termination of each uninterrupted period of time that you have been prsent within the State of California over the past seven (7) years.'

A. '6. From July 1965 to present.'

Q. '11. List all medical internships (if any) undertaken by you, the date of commencement and of termination of each medical internship, and the location thereof.'

A. '11. Freedmen's Hospital, Washington, D.C. from July 1, 1961 to September 30, 1961; White Memorial Hospital, 1720 Brooklyn Avenue, Los Angeles, California, from October 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966.'

Q. '14. State what licenses to practice medicine (if any) you now hold or have held in the past, the date on which each medical license was issued, and the name of each issuing State.'

A. '14. State of Georgia--July 26, 1961; State of California--August 1966.'

Q. '15. State the dates (if any) you have engaged in the practice of medicine, and the location thereof.'

A. '15. October, 1966 to present, Southern California Permanente Medical Group, 1505 North Edgemont Street, Los Angeles, California.'

Thereafter, on November 19, 1968, plaintiff made a second motion for summary judgment, based upon all documents theretofor filed, including all the interrogatories propounded to defendant and her answers thereto, and further including the declaration of plaintiff's attorney, Sol P. Ajalat, that no part of the balance owing by defendant had been paid. The motion was opposed, defendant's attorney stating in his declaration in opposition that 'This motion is no more than a rehash of the prior motion,' that nothing new was presented and that an issuable fact was raised by defendant's plea of the bar of the statute of limitations. To this declaration, plaintiff's attorney then filed still another supplemental declaration, stating that since the hearing on the prior motion for summary judgment, defendant had completed an internship.

On January 22, 1969, after assignment to another department, the motion came on for hearing; following argument by plaintiff's counsel, the motion was granted. Prior to entry of judgment, on February 4, 1969, defendant moved for reconsideration; in a supporting declaration she pointed out that she never completed the internship in Washington, D.C., as alleged, being compelled to withdraw because of illness, although admitting that she did complete an internship in Los Angeles in June of 1966 and was admitted to practice in California in August of 1966, thus confirming her answers to the interrogatories in that regard. In a supplemental declaration in support of the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff's attorney set out defendant's statement (by way of answer to interrogatory) that she 'did complete an internship in Los Angeles, California * * * on June 30, 1966.'

The motion for reconsideration came on for hearing on February 19, 1969, at which time the following order was made: 'Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to conform to proof is granted. The Court stirkes (sic) the following language from paragraph VI, lines 27 and 28: 'at Freedman's Hospital, Washington, D.C., on October 29, 1962'; and from paragraph VI, line 29, 'that date'. Motion of the defendant to reconsider is denied.' Judgment was entered that same day. It is this judgment from which defendant appeals.

It is contended that summary judgment should not have been granted for the following reasons: (1) affidavits of plaintiff as the moving party were insufficient; (2) the meaning of language used in the contract being uncertain or doubtful, an issuable fact was thus raised as to the meaning of such language; (3) the complaint alleged facts different from those set forth in the affidavits; and finally, (4) under all the circumstances here present the granting of the judgment challenged constituted an abuse of discretion. We conclude that none of these contentions is sustainable.

Particularly applicable here are the following statements in Property Controllers, Inc. v. Shewfelt, 245 Cal.App.2d 755, 761, 54 Cal.Rptr. 218, 221--222, quoting from an earlier case: "The purpose to be served by the summary judgment procedure is to expedite litigation by avoiding needless trials. While it is not a substitute for a regular trial and does not authorize the trial of any bona fide issues of fact which the affidavits...