State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of America v. Hampton

• Decision Date: 06 March 1985
• Docket Number: No. 61981,61981
• Citation: 1985 OK 19,696 P.2d 1027
• Parties: STATE MUTUAL LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. Tony F. HAMPTON, Jr., Adm. of the Estate of Tony F. Hampton, III, decd., Sawart Hampton, surviving spouse of Tony F. Hampton, III, decd., and State of Oklahoma, ex rel., Department of Human Services, custodian of Maneerat Lalansad and Tull Hampton, minors, Defendants.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 1027

696 P.2d 1027

1985 OK 19

STATE MUTUAL LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. Tony F. HAMPTON, Jr., Adm. of the Estate of Tony F. Hampton III, decd., Sawart Hampton, surviving spouse of Tony F Hampton, III, decd., and State of Oklahoma, ex rel Department of Human Services, custodian of Maneerat Lalansad and Tull Hampton, minors, Defendants.

No. 61981.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

March 6, 1985.

As Corrected March 12, 1985.

From the District Court of Tulsa County; Jane Wiseman, District judge.

Certiorari granted to review a certified interlocutory order in which the trial court concluded that (1) 84 O.S.1981, § 231 does not require that a beneficiary be convicted of the insured's murder or first-degree manslaughter in order to be disqualified from receiving the proceeds of a life insurance

policy; (2) under § 231, a beneficiary's acquittal does not automatically entitle the beneficiary to the proceeds of the policy; and (3) the issue of beneficiary's criminal responsibility for the insured's death may be litigated in a subsequent civil proceeding to determine the rights of claimants to the policy proceeds

ORDER OF TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED.

James R. Lloyd, Tulsa, for petitioner.

Katherine Vance, William Drisko, Randal Morley, Tulsa, for respondents.

SIMMS, Chief Justice:

Interlocutory certiorari was granted by this Court to review a certified order from the District Court of Tulsa County. Following a pre-trial hearing, the trial court made the following findings and conclusions, which were certified to this Court:

"1. The defendant Sawart Hampton's acquittal [on charges of first-degree murder and first-degree manslaughter] does not automatically entitle her to the proceeds of the [decedent's life] insurance policy under 84 O.S.1981, § 231. This section does not require a conviction before the defendant Sawart Hampton is precluded from receiving the benefits under the policy.

2. The defendant Sawart Hampton has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to show the existence of the insurance contract, the death of the insured covered by the policy, and her status of primary beneficiary under the policy entitling her to receipt of the proceeds. These facts will probably be established by stipulations of counsel.

3. The burden of proof is then on the defendants guardians ad litem and administrator to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant Sawart Hampton is precluded from receiving the proceeds under the policy by reason of her taking or causing to be taken the life of the insured in such a manner as to constitute first degree or second degree murder or first degree manslaughter."

This Court is asked to reverse the findings of the trial court and declare that under 84 O.S.1981, § 231, a beneficiary's right to recover insurance proceeds may be denied only if the beneficiary is convicted of the insured's murder or first-degree manslaughter. Petitioner Sawart Hampton also alleges that the trial court erred in determining that a beneficiary who is acquitted of the insured's murder or first-degree manslaughter is not automatically entitled to recover the insurance proceeds. Petitioner asserts that, contrary to the trial court's findings, the beneficiary's acquittal on criminal charges bars relitigation in a civil proceeding of the issue of whether or not the beneficiary took, or caused to be taken, the life of the insured in such a manner as to constitute murder or first-degree manslaughter.

I. OPERATIVE FACTS

In 1981, Tony F. Hampton III (husband) entered into a group accidental death and dismemberment policy with State Mutual Life Assurance Company of America (insurance company). Husband named his wife, Sawart Hampton (wife) as beneficiary under the policy.

On or about October 6, 1982, while the policy was in full force and effect, husband died as the result of injuries incurred during a family quarrel.

Wife was arrested and charged with husband's first-degree murder. On June 23, 1983, prior to the final disposition of wife's murder trial, insurance company filed an interpleader action in Tulsa District Court. Named as defendants were wife (named beneficiary), Tony F. Hampton, Jr., (Special Administrator of husband's estate), and State of Oklahoma, ex rel., Department of Human Services, as custodian of the couple's minor children, Maneerat Lalansad and Tull Hampton (children). Guardians ad litem were subsequently appointed to represent children.

Insurance company did not contest its liability under the policy. However, in order to avoid potential conflicting claims by the named beneficiary, children, and special administrator in light of the circumstances surrounding husband's death, insurance company paid the $100,000.00 policy limit into court. The trial court, Judge Jane P. Wiseman, then granted insurance company's motion to be dismissed from further proceedings.

Wife was acquitted on October 21, 1983, of both first-degree murder and the lesser included offense, first-degree manslaughter. Six days thereafter wife filed a motion for summary judgment in the pending interpleader action, asserting that by reason of her acquittal, she was automatically entitled to the insurance proceeds. Wife's motion was overruled by the trial court.

In February, 1984, a pre-trial conference and hearing were held on the interpleader action. Determining the issues that would be litigated at trial, the trial court made the findings and conclusions that were certified for an interlocutory appeal to this Court.

II. LEGAL ISSUES

In this case, this Court is asked for the first time to determine whether, under 84 O.S.1981, § 231, a named beneficiary under a life insurance policy who is acquitted of the insured's murder or first-degree manslaughter is automatically entitled to recover the insurance proceeds, so that relitigation in a civil proceeding of the issue of the beneficiary's criminal responsibility for the insured's alleged felonious, ¹ intentional and unjustified homicide, as distinguished from excusable or justifiable homicide is barred.

Section 231 ² (commonly known as the "slayer statute") provides in pertinent part:

"No person who is convicted of murder in the first degree, as defined in 21 O.S.1971, Section 701.1, or murder in the second degree, as defined in 21 O.S.1971, Section 701.2, subparagraph 1 or 2, or manslaughter in the first degree, as defined in 21 O.S.1971, Section 711, subparagraph 2, under the laws of this state, or the laws of any other state or foreign country, of having taken, caused, or procured another so to take, the life of an individual, shall inherit from such victim, or receive any interest in the estate of the victim, or take by devise or legacy or as a surviving joint tenant, or descent or distribution, from him, or her, any portion of his or her, estate; and no beneficiary of any policy of insurance * * * payable upon the death or disability of any person, who in like manner takes or causes or procures to be taken, the life upon which such policy or certificate is issued, * * * shall take the proceeds of such policy * * *." [emphasis added]

Wife asserts that under § 231, a beneficiary's right to proceeds under an insurance policy may be denied only if the beneficiary is convicted of the insured's murder or first-degree manslaughter. Thus, wife concludes, she is automatically entitled to recover the proceeds under husband's insurance policy because she has been acquitted of the criminal charges, and the issue of her criminal responsibility for husband's

felonious, intentional and unjustified killing may not be relitigated in a civil proceeding.

III.

WHETHER UNDER § 231

A BENEFICIARY'S RIGHT TO RECOVER INSURANCE

PROCEEDS MAY BE DENIED ONLY IF THE

BENEFICIARY IS CONVICTED OF

THE INSURED'S MURDER

OR FIRST-

DEGREE

MANSLAUGHTER.

In Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Weightman, 61 Okl. 106, 160 P.629 (1916), this Court was for the first time asked to determine the rights of a beneficiary who had taken the life of the insured. A wife had been convicted of murdering her husband. This Court held that as a result of her act, the wife forfeited her rights as beneficiary under her husband's insurance policy, and that a constructive trust arose by operation of law in favor of the insured's estate.

Equitable, supra, was based on common law, since the cause of action arose prior to the effective date of Oklahoma's slayer statute. The Court recognized the common law maxim that no person should be permitted to benefit from his own wrongful conduct:

"... Human law is the offspring of divine law. One of the strongest principles of that law is compensation. Every man compensates his own wrong. He cannot claim the benefits of it." 160 P. at 631.

In Goodwin v. Continental Casualty Co., 175 Okl. 469, 53 P.2d 241 (1935), a beneficiary was convicted of manslaughter. Holding that the beneficiary could not recover the proceeds of the insured's life insurance policy, this Court cited Equitable, supra, and stated:

"It may be conceded that a beneficiary in a policy of life insurance who feloniously takes or causes to be taken the life of the assured is thereby barred from collecting the insurance money; and that such rule applies in the absence of statute and is based upon public policy." 53 P.2d at 242.

While in both Equitable, supra and Goodwin, supra, the beneficiary had been convicted of killing the insured, the holdings in these cases indicate that it was the beneficiary's felonious act rather than the fact of the beneficiary's conviction that this Court found to be determinative.

Neither of these cases, nor the language of § 231 supports wife's conclusion that a conviction is the only basis for denying a beneficiary's right to proceeds under an insurance policy. Had the legislature wished to make a conviction of murder or first degree manslaughter of the insured the only basis for denying insurance proceeds to a beneficiary, they could easily...