State Of Conn. v. Lockhart
| Decision Date | 12 October 2010 |
| Docket Number | SC 17773 |
| Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JULIAN J. LOCKHART |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
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Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan and Gruendel, Js.
Richard Emanuel, special public defender, with whom, on the brief, was G. Douglas Nash, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Robert J. Scheinblum, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Timothy J. Liston, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
Thomas P. Sullivan, pro hac vice, and Todd D. Fernow filed a brief for the Innocence Legal Network as amicus curiae.
Susan O. Storey, chief public defender, Martin Zeldis, chief of legal services, and Elizabeth M. Inkster, senior assistant public defender, filed a brief for the office of the chief public defender as amicus curiae.
Thomas Ullmann filed a brief for the Connecticut Criminal Defense Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.
The defendant, Julian J. Lockhart, was convicted, following a jury trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a--134 (a) (1) and (3) and larceny in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-124 (a) (1). On appeal, 1 the defendant argues that: (1) the United States constitution and the constitution of Connecticut require law enforcement agents to record electronically, whenever feasible, custodial interrogations, Miranda warnings2 and any resulting statements made by the defendant; and (2) the state violated the defendant's right to remain silent by introducing testimony regarding his refusal to sign a Miranda rights acknowledgment card, his refusal to provide a written statement, his termination of an interview with police detectives and his assertion of his right to remain silent. We affirm the judgment of conviction.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. In May, 2002, the twenty-two year old victim, Robert Glidden, lived in Wallingford and worked as a machinist in Durham. The victim had posted an advertisement in the newspaper offering to sell his 1989 Ford Mustang GT for approximately $6000.
In May, 2002, the defendant lived in Meriden with his mother, and made a living by selling crack cocaine. On May 9, 2002, the defendant and his friend, Leonard Bunch, went to look at the victim's car. Maria Estrada, a friend of the defendant's mother, agreed to give the defendant and Bunch a ride in exchange for crack cocaine. During the drive, the defendant or Bunch called the victim to make arrangements to meet and to get directions.
The defendant, Bunch and Estrada drove to the home of the victim's parents where they met the victim's mother, Elizabeth Glidden, and followed her down Saw Mill Road to the manufacturing company where the victim was working. Glidden left after introducing the defendant to the victim. After Bunch and the defendant examined the vehicle, the victim took the defendant for a test drive. Bunch and Estrada waited in the parking lot of the manufacturing company for fifteen to thirty minutes, and when the defendant had not returned, began to drive back down Saw Mill Road. As Bunch and Estrada were driving, they noticed the victim's vehicle parked on the side of the road. Because neither the defendant nor the victim was in the vehicle, Estrada honked the car horn. Estrada then saw the defendant standing in the woods near the car, waving a stick and telling her to leave. Bunch and Estrada saw the defendant hit the ground with the stick five or six times. Estrada could not see what the defendant was strikingbecause he was standing in tall grass. The defendant told Bunch to leave, and Estrada and Bunch drove away.
The next day, the defendant called Bunch and told him that he had hit the victim repeatedly and had left him in the woods. He asked for a ride so that he could look for his watch, which he had lost on Saw Mill Road. The defendant later borrowed a car from Bunch's friend. On May 11, 2002, the defendant again called Bunch to ask for a ride, stating that he wanted to move the victim's vehicle, which the defendant had parked one block from his mother's house in Meriden. Bunch agreed and later followed the defendant as he moved the victim's vehicle to a commuter lot in Cheshire. Bunch observed the defendant wipe his fingerprints off the vehicle with a towel.
On May 12, 2002, the state police received a call from a truck driver who had seen the victim's vehicle in a news report about the missing victim. He had noticed the victim's vehicle in the commuter lot, and had observed that it did not have a license plate and that its interior appeared to have been damaged by fire. The following day, the victim's body was discovered in the woods on the side of Saw Mill Road. The police recovered the defendant's watch at the crime scene. Following an autopsy, a deputy chief medical examiner for the state concluded that the victim had died as a result of blunt force trauma to the head. On May 13, 2002, after receiving a call from a state police detective, the defendant took a bus from Hartford to New York City. From there, he went to Georgia, where he lived for more than one year.
On June 6, 2003, the defendant was arrested by Georgia authorities in Decatur, Georgia. Although he provided the authorities with a Georgia driver's license bearing the name Frederick Kelly, they matched his fingerprints to records for Julian Lockhart. On June 18, 2003, two Connecticut state police detectives interviewed the defendant while he awaited extradition. The detectives did not electronically record the interview. The defendant was turned over to the Connecticut state police on July 15, 2003.
The state charged the defendant, by way of information, with one count of murder, one count of felony murder, one count of robbery in the first degree and one count of larceny in the third degree. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty to each count of the information. On April 17, 2006, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the statements he had made to the police while in custody, which the court denied. A jury trial commenced on May 10, 2006, and on June 1, 2006, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to all counts. Subsequently, the court sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of eighty years incarceration. This appeal followed.
The defendant asks us to revisit and overrule our holding in State v. James, 237 Conn. 390, 434, 678 A.2d 1338 (1996), that the due process clause of our state constitution does not require confessions to be recorded in order to be admissible.3 Specifically, the defendant argues that the Connecticut constitution requires law enforcement agents, whenever feasible, to record custodial interrogations, Miranda warnings and any resulting statements by a defendant. The defendant contends that because the police did not record his interrogation and statements, those statements must be suppressed. In support of his claim, the defendant relies on the due process provisions of article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the constitution of Connecticut, 4 the privilege against self-incrimination, as well as the associated Miranda right to consult with counsel prior to and during custodial interrogation, the right to present a defense and the right to confrontation within article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut. The defendant also argues, in the alternative, that this court should exercise its supervisory authority over the administration of justice to establish such a requirement. In response, the state argues that the text and history of the Connecticut constitution, as well as the policy reasons identified in James, defeat the defendant's argument. The state also argues that the decisions of appellate courts in other states counsel against such a rule, as only one of the states that has addressed the issue of electronic recording of custodial interrogations since James has adopted a recording requirement, which that court has limited to juvenile interrogations. Finally, the state argues that this court has never used its supervisory authority over the administration of justice to impose a rule of criminal procedure upon law enforcement and should not do so now. We conclude that, although there are benefits to be realized by a recording requirement, it is not mandated by our state constitution, and we decline to impose such a requirement pursuant to our supervisory powers.
The following additional facts are...
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